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PART 1 METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Moral Education could be described as the Cinderella of the Primary and
Secondary Curriculum: whilst many would admit its importance and agree
that children should be exposed to some form of moral education, it would
probably lose out in the apportioning of the school's yearly capitation
allowance with Just about any other area of the curriculum one would care
to mention.
It would be nice to think that there was only one answer as to why this
should be, one that was neat, compact and remediable. However, what little
research there is on this issue, indicates that the problem is far more
complex.
The research by May(1) of the early 1970s, for instance, seemed to show
that approximately two thirds of the teachers in his survey approved of
the idea of teaching moral education in school, though the reasons why
and how these teachers thought this should happen, and the reasons of
those who thought it shouldn't were extremely varied and complex(2).
Whilst the material for such a course suggested by teachers centred
around the personal development, ethical training, and training in social
awareness of children (3), this did not answer the more crucial issue of
which stance was to be taken in the presentation of moral and ethical
issues. May himself suggested three main possible positions(4):
(a) that of relativism - a set of values determined either by group,
society, or individual choice;
(b) what he called an 'existentialist' approach(5) - a highly personal
interpretation of situational ethics; or
(c) the discovery of certain absolute principles.
None of his suage5tions ntectsLo be accepted as they stand. With his first
alternative, May appears to be confusing subjectivism with relativism.
With his second alternative, he appears to be setting up an unnecessarry
either/or choice: either one accepts the making of moral choices purely
from within a situation, or one accepts an absolutist impersonal ethic.
His own prescription, a variant of the third alternative, was for an
absolutist Christian standpoint. However, it must be said that some of
his remarks are contentious in the extreme:
"Of the various religious and idealistic codes of conduct, the
Christian ethic is the most self consistent and distinctive." (6)
"It is the most clearly worked out of all codes..." (7)
"...this is still an officially Christian country..."(8)
"—many non-Christians openly support the teaching of the
Christian moral law."(9)
In the present post-Swann period(10), with the issues of multicultural
and anti-racist education seemingly more difficult and intractable than
ever, confidence in solving such problems by the universal adoption of
one particular viewpoint is no longer a real possibility. Common ground
has to be found for a meeting of minds, and not, as some perceive it(11),
by the demand from the white Anglo-Saxon majority for other cultures to
assimilate to their cultural and ethical values.
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Indeed, such a position is not only impossible, but is also undesirable as
a starting point, for, it will be argued, it is one which may be arrrived
at towards the end of the process, but it is not the position from which
one should begin.
This thesis will argue that there is a fourth alternative, one which does
not accept relativism, but allows for degrees , of subjectivism, which
suggests that consideration of an impersonal ethic, and details of the
particular situation, are both vital for the proper understanding of an
issue.	 It will be argued that an explanation of why moral education
occupies the lowly position it does in the educational hierarchy is, in
the main, a function of problems within the spheres of epistemology,
content, and psychology. By examining these in detail, and by suggesting
ways in which the issues may be clarified, it is hoped that some teachers
may feel more confident in teaching this area of the curriculum, whilst
others, paradoxically, may not be so dogmatically confident.
The description of this area of the curriculum will begin with a
description of the kind of curriculum model necessary for a comprehensive
understanding of this area to be gained. After all, the practice of moral
education, like any other part of the curriculum, must surely aim to
improve itself. In order to do this, its practitioners must be very clear
about what they are doing and why they are doing it: they must have a
clearly conceived plan in mind. It will be apparent, then, that using
random personal interests, the following up of intuitions on no set plan,
all helped out by a dash of serendipity, can be no model from which to
work.	 This in no way means that such things do not have immense
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and Techniques
contributions to make, but only that on their own they probably will
not do the job effectively enough.
Thus, in this thesis a model of the curriculum will be utilised which
looks like this:
Description and Justification of:
-
A. Aims and Intentions
A
-------------------) B. Content
E. Evaluation and
Assessment
	
C. Psychological Factors
r"
L...
D. Strategies for
Implementation	 Fig.l.
Such a model appears to indicate, and approve of, a circular, uni-
directional movement. This is true, but needs to be supplemented by two
further notions.
Firstly, that the movement should be of an upwardly spiral nature, rather
than of a simple circular one, as a circular movement would indicate
precisely the kind of behaviour which should be avoided - that of making
no improvement in understanding. An upwardly spiral nature, on the
other hand, indicates that once a circuit has been accomplished,
understanding has improved, and therefore that returning to an area does
not mean beginning from the same situation again. Consequently, the
re-appraisal of the area in the light of previous understanding should
suggest a continuous, cumulative improvement.
Secondly, progress in understanding can be made by jumping past some
factors, or by moving back to ones previously dealt with. However, a
model which attempted to show this could look misleading, and might
suggest that the movement is in no particular direction, merely hopping
to and from areas. It might well look something like this:
Fig.2.
Figure 2, then, as it stands, will not do. Figure 1 would seem to be the
better model, as there are sound logical reasons for believing that there
is a priority in its ordering. In order to explain this further, the
stages of Figure 1 must each be examined in turn.
<A) Description and Justification of Aims and Intentions 
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It will be apparent that a great deal can be done regarding the
justification of an area's inclusion by dwelling at some considerable
length on the justification of its aims and intentions, for if these are
seen to be valid, praiseworthy, and important, then its position on a
curriculum timetable should reflect this heightened appreciation.
It is at this stage of the model, then, that this thesis will really
begin. Furthermore, it will be argued that such a description and
justification of the aims and intentions of a curriculum in moral
education is best served by the investigation of a much wider question:
what is the nature of enquiry, and of human understanding in general? It
will be argued that if the strands to this question can be teased out,
then a position will be reached where it can be argued that these should
both inform and constrain any description and justification. Therefore,
the natures of language, epistemology, and science will be examined in
some detail, and an attempt will be made to show that they share similar
structures in their processes of enquiry to that of morality, and that it
is in the description and teaching of these processes that, at the
cognitive level, the core of moral education will be found. .
(3) Description and Justification of Content. 
The description of the content of moral education is not specified by a
description and justification of aims and intentions in this area, though
it might be suggested by them: thus if x is the object aimed for, then
dwelling on subject matter y may be just the vehicle needed.
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Moreover, the Justification of content is not specified either; how can
one Justify content y and be opposed to content z if they both do the
same Job equally well? How, then, does one arrive at either?
In the baldest sense, the description is determined by the subject area.
As moral education is concerned with the kinds of choices human beings
have to make, a start will be made with a description of those areas
within which we are all forced to make choices. It will be argued that
there are five of these areas:
(1) the natural;
(2) the personal;
(3) the interpersonal;
(4) the mystical/religious;
(5) the social.
An attempt will be made to show that they are distinct by arguing that
any theory which conflates these moral areas, necessarily produces
contradictions in its own arguments.
Thus the description of these areas is determined empirically, but the
Justification of the selection within or between them cannot be so
determined. It is not an empirical matter. It is a matter of choice. It
will therefore be argued that the Justification of content is a function
of the original aims and intentions, of the nature of enquiry, and of the
constraints working upon this area.
Finally, it should become apparent, during the exposition of these areas,
that they clearly imply a modification in the original aims and
intentions; as the possible content is more clearly understood, so the
original aims and intentions will be enriched, clarified, and changed.
-7-
This will be the first of the 'feed-back' situations - that is, where the
examination of a later stage in the curriculum model, (Fig.1), should not
wait until implementation and evaluation have been gone through - where
the earlier stage should be immediately returned to, and adjusted in the
light of the latest findings. This, then, is the true meaning of figure 2.
(C) Description and Justification of Psychological Factors and Techniques. 
It will be apparent by the time this section is reached, that the
description of psychological factors and techniques is not value free. It
will have been argued in earlier sections that a thoroughgoing empiricist
description of any scheme - scientific, psychological, moral, or
otherwise, is simply not viable, as any conceptual scheme is necessarily
selective in what it regards as valuable and relevant data. 	 A
psychological theory, therefore, must be assessed and appraised like any
other. Furthermore, the original aims and intentions, which have been
clarified by means of a description of the nature of the enquiry, and
enriched by a description of content, will be seen to suggest the kind of
psychological theory needed for an adequate description of the moral
functioning of the human being. By so doing, the use of other theories
will be limited or excluded. Three major theories will be examined, those
of the Behaviourists, the Social Learning Theorists, and the Cognitive-
Developmentalists, and an attempt will be made to show that they are as
value-laden as any other conceptual schemes. An examination of their
claims will highlight their inadequacies as much as our human
limitations.
This examination will suggest the kind of psychological theory needed for
a full analysis of moral functioning.	 It will therefore attempt an
outline of what such a psychological theory should include, and will
also imply that no one theory currently in vogue is sufficient to capture
the richness and diversity of moral motivation, thought and action.
0) Imp ementation and	 (E) Assessment and Evaluation. 
This thesis will not deal with Implementation, Assessment and Evaluation
in any detailed manner. 	 This is not because they are regarded as
unimportant.	 Far from it: they are crucial parts of the process of
constructing a curriculum in moral education. 	 Without skilled
implementation, theory is useless.
	
Without sensitive and intelligent
assessment and evaluation, only the most haphazard understanding of the
successes and failures of a scheme can be achieved.
However, it will be argued that the crucial areas for disagreement and
misunderstanding with regard to a curriculum for moral education are
generated with regard to the prior areas of the spiral model.
Implementation, assessment and evaluation, for the purposes of this
thesis, are seen as functions of these earlier processes, and without a
clear understanding of these processes there can be nothing to implement,
assess or evaluate. Thus whilst techniques from these later stages will
be suggested throughout the thesis, they will arise as the consequence of
deliberations on the earlier stages.
The first stage, then, is that of the description and Justification of
aims and intentions. In this, an attempt will be made to show that this
is much bound up with the problem of epistemology.
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CHAPTER 1 FACTS, VALUES, AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
Having already asserted in the introduction that the nature of moral
enquiry is best understood by examining other areas by which, or through
which, man comes to understand the world, it will be as well to explain
at this stage why the areas of language, science and epistemology have
been chosen.
Language, after all, is the primary means of expression about the world.
Indeed, if Wittgenstein(1) is to be believed:
"...the limits of language (of that language which
alone I understand) mean the limits of my world."
As he explains(2):
"We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think,
we cannot say either."
Language, then, is the medium through which comprehension is expressed.
So it seems that an examination of its construction, its structure, and
its use, will help to express the limits of an understanding of the world;
it may also say something about the way the world is approached and
categorised. It seems more than likely that the way in which language is
used will be intimately linked to thought processes in general.
Science could be described as that branch of human enquiry which
embodies par excellence the quest for the truth. It would be marvellous
If, upon examining the question of what constitutes scientific enquiry, it
were possible, firstly, to come up with a problem-free definition, and,
secondly, find that this method was at least in part transferable to the
moral domain.	 Certainly, to the extent that any moral enquiry must
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depend at least in part on an understanding of the world around us, then
a description of that field which claims pre-eminence in methods
investigating the 'truth' of things, namely the scientific, must have some
bearing upon this investigation. Of course, if it turns out that science
is something approaching an "anarchistic exercise" (3) 	 that no
straightforward, objective account can be given, then this is both better
and worse for the enquiry. It will be worse in that it casts even graver
doubts upon the possibility of a straightforward, objective account in
morality; it will be better, in a perverse sort of way, in that admitting
difficulties in the moral area may be no worse than in any other area.
If everyone else has the same problems, even the scientists, then those
involved in the nature of moral enquiry won't be engaged in a totally
different kind of exercise.
Epistemology, the way in which knowledge is gained, is obviously related
to the two other areas. But it has a licence and a range which the other
two do not.	 It is a philosophic exercise which takes the path its
investigator chooses, whether he be Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume,
Kant, or anybody else. The influence of these thinkers has directly
affected the understanding of language and science, as these areas have
affected them. An investigation will be conducted again to see if any
correspondence can be found between these areas and morality. If such a
correspondence is possible, if the same features occur in all these
manners of enquiry, a description of the nature of moral enquiry may not
be too far away. If that can be achieved,a prescription for the conduct
of moral education may then be near at hand. This will be the approach
in this first section.
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However, before starting these enquiries, it would be well to begin by an
examination of that most perennial of problems, the supposed dichotomy
between facts and values. 	 It is all too easy to founder upon this
problem, and be accused of committing the 'Naturalistic Fallacy', the
supposedly improper movement from 'is' to 'ought'. The issue raises a
number of vital questions which it is necessary to be clear about before
going further. These questions include:
(a) what is a 'fact'?
(b) what is a 'value'?
(c) where do values come from?
(d) to what extent does the adoption of a value depend upon an
understanding of the facts?
(e) if they do depend upon facts to some extent, then what exactly is
the relationship?
The classic statement of the naturalistic fallacy is that of Hume (4):
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with,
I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some
time in the ordinary way of reasoning—when of a sudden I am
surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason
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should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are
entirely different from W'
The Naturalistic Fallacy, then, can be taken to be the principle which
states that one cannot derive ethical conclusions from factual premises,
that one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is', or that descriptive and
evaluative languages inhabit different linguistic universes. To give an
example: one cannot say that garotting cats is wrong from the fact that
nobody does it. Estimating and reporting on how many people garotte
cats is a factual statement: deciding that such actions are wrong is an
evaluative one. In order to make a correct transition to the statement
that garotting cats is wrong, one would have to have an initial
evaluative premise to the effect that causing pain to cats is wrong, or
that garotting is not a pleasant occupation, or some such thing.
In this sense, then, the adherence to the naturalistic fallacy is, it
seems, correct.	 But it would be absurd to assert that no factual
statements are taken into account when making evaluative judgments. For
instance, one must know both what to 'garotte' means, and also various
facts about cats before being able to make any evaluative pronouncements
upon an act of this nature.	 If future scientific research were,
incredibly, to prove that partial garotting was actually beneficial to
cats, in that it increased their life expectancy by causing the flow of
some age-retarding hormone, or some such thing, then evaluative attitudes
to such acts would no doubt change substantially. What would we think of
dentists if their occupation had no beneficial effect?
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Thus, at the most basic level at least, factual statements do influence
evaluative statements. But what of the approach of Moore(5), the other
famous exponent of the fallacy? Now, as a number of commentators have
pointed out(6), Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy' is something of a misnomer:
it has connections with Hume's version, but these are tangential at best.
What Moore is interested in doing with his 'naturalistic fallacy' is
arguing against any theory which equates any two notions as identical
when they are logically distinct. Thus his fallacy is not necessarily
interested in the factual and the evaluative, and possible confusions
between them: it could as generally be applied to two logically distinct
factual notions - for example, equating as identical the sensation of
pleasure and that of playing football. So really Moore stirred up
something of a dust cloud unnecessarily, and he still leaves unanswered
the question - are the factual and the evaluative logically distinct?
Perhaps Moore's fallacy should be re-titled, as Frankena(7) suggests, the
'definist fallacy', and then one could get on with arguing whether the
definist fallacy is committed.
Moore's argument doesn't really get very far. Intuitionism is hardly in
favour in philosophic circles these days, and for good reason.
'Intuiting' something does little more than short-circuit philosophic
argument. As Warnock(8) says:
"Fundamental moral terms were said simply to be indefinable,
and fundamental moral Judgments to be simply, transparently,
not further explicably, self-evident."
The intuitionist stands there saying "I see two qualities - goodness and
a.n.other", whilst the naturalist stands there saying "I see only one,
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a.n.other, which is goodness." Really there is little more here than the
two protagonists repeating their opinions at one another. Ewing puts it
nicely when he says (9):
".-it seems unsatisfactory to most philosophers to admit as a
final account of ethics a theory which just leaves us with a
heap of unconnected and underived prima facie duties, to be
accepted as self-evidently obligatory, without any reason that
can be adduced for saying these acts are our duties."
It is a terribly stultifying way of going on, and yet the reason it
happened in the first place may well be that there is right and wrong on
both sides.
Despite the limited nature of Moore's intuitionism, it still had something
valuable within it. Moore's feeling that ethical viewpoints could not be
a simple translation of a factual viewpoint has substance. Naturalism as
it is normally presented will not do either. For a start, there are just
so many variations of the naturalistic viewpoint, all claiming to be the
real thing.
There is the naturalistic hedonist like Bentham who would declare(10)
that:
"—nature has placed mankind under the guidance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."
Or there are evolutionary ethics, probably the most blatant derivation of
an ethical system from information about the natural world. It is still
a little breathtaking to read Spencer, full of Darwinian theory, declare
that:
"—the conduct to which we apply the name good is a
relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is a name we
apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved."(11)
The social approval theory of Durkheim(12) also interprets goodness in
strictly naturalistic terms:
"...there are no genuinely moral ends except collective ones.
There is no truly moral force save that involved in attachment
to a group."
One could add stoicism, theological naturalism, Nietzsche's variations on
the evolutionary theme.- the list goes on. By their definitions, only one
of them can be the Good - so how can it be there are so many opinions as
to what we should translate the Good into, in naturalistic language? The
detached observer could not be too heavily criticised for feeling that
perhaps the reason is that no one description on its own is the complete
answer.
This, of course, is not to dismiss naturalistic answers out of hand. As
indicated above, there has to be some factual grounding for an evaluative
theory, if only to understand the terms involved. An appreciation of the
factual context surrounding that evaluative utterance would seem to be a
necessary condition for understanding that evaluative utterance, and of
being able to discuss it in any meaningful way. Whether the factual
context is a sufficient condition is much more problematical, and it will
be argued later, turns on the meanings given to 'factual' context, and
'evaluative' utterance. For the moment, though, an attempt will be made
to substantiate the claim that the factual context surrounding an
evaluative utterance is a necessary condition for its proper
comprehension.
Epistemology, and knowledge of the self would seem to be good places to
begin. Hume(13) considered that there is no self beyond the stream of
experience, that the self is nothing but a bundle of such things. This
doctrine has now, it would appear, been factually disproved by the
experiments of the brain surgeon, Penfield(14), in Montreal. 	 He
stimulated, by means of a very small electrical charge, what he called the
'interpretative cortex' of the exposed brain of his patients. 	 They
reported that they were experiencing most vividly sensations and feelings
of happenings long ago, whilst at the same time being fully conscious of
the fact that they were still in an operating theatre in Montreal. In
other words, their consciousness of themselves was not affected by their
perceptual experiences. Whatever the self is, it is not, as Hume claimed,
a mere bundle of such things.
It does seem then, that, occasionally, the resolution of philosophical
conundrums comes closer. This is not normally, however, by logical
argument, but rather by scientific experiment and empirical evidence.
There are bad arguments which can be shot down by a sound piece of
reasoning, but it appears more than likely that the
	 puzzlers of
philosophy will remain in the realms of metaphysics, until science can
find the tools (and man the ingenuity to use them) to throw new light
upon the problem and perhaps allow the move from its resolution to other
considerations.
Now it might well be argued at this point that all that has been shown
is that some small piece of scientific research has seemed to resolve
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some problem in epistemology, and that this has not touched morality at
all. Fact may solve factual problems, but why should fact solve moral
problems? To assert this is to cross the is/ought distinction, and
where, so far, is the proof for that?
Perhaps it is time to go on the offensive. Why, it might be asked,
should the is/ought distinction not be breached in those areas where
facts seen to have relevance? The naturalistic stances quoted above may
not be correct, but they have one apparent strength in common - they are
all prepared to let others examine what they claim morality to be made
of. The person who wishes to maintain an is/ought distinction cannot
fall back so easily on the facts of experience, or of what human beings
are constituted, or the world, or what have you. He has to resort to
either a form of rationalism divorced from the problems of the everyday
world, or fall back upon an intuitive apprehension of goodness, with all
the difficulties which that involves.
Naturalists may well be justified in arguing that it is not for them to
justify their movements from 'is' to 'ought', but rather for the non-
naturalists to show why they shouldn't.
	 Perhaps the best argument
against such movement is simply that of the definist fallacy - that no
natural quality yet asserted to be the Good is, in most people's minds,
identical with it.
	 Such an argument is, however, an argument from
negation, and does not - cannot - preclude the possibility that such a
quality may exist which has not yet been put forward,
	 If, for the
moment, it is accepted that there is no one quality on its own which does
the job, there are still things in a naturalistic outlook which are very
appealing.
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Firstly, there is the bald fact of the inadequacies of a totally non-
naturalistic outlook. By 'totally' is meant an outlook which completely
excludes from consideration in moral matters, facts about human genetic
inheritance, social conditions, or the world in general. On such a view,
human beings would have to be mere cyphers for a moral order totally
divorced from earthly existence. Arguments advanced for this cause
would be that of a moral order discovered by reason, or a moral order
ordained by God(15). However, the former begs the question of where such
an order comes from, whilst the latter gets itself enmeshed in the
argument which goes back as far as Plato(16), where Plato has Socrates
saying:
"Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do
they approve it because it is holy?"
For the purposes of this argument, this should be translated "is it good
because God ordered it, or did God order it because it is good?" If the
first horn is accepted, one is caught up in problems over evil gods and
man's moral autonomy: if the latter is accepted, and morality is placed
prior to God's command, God is effectively made redundant. And those who
would argue that God is co-existent with the Good, ia the Good, may well
be guilty of the definist fallacy, but are no nearer proving the crux of
this position - the objective existence of the deity.
This may well be the real point of the Prometheus legend, and one the
Greeks (or at least the originators of the legend) were coming to grips
with: is Prometheus blameworthy for presuming to Judge and revolt against
the Judgement of the supreme deity, or praiseworthy in relying upon his
own moral assessment of the situation? Anyone going below the surface
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of this legend finds themselves encountering another - the opening of
Pandora's box.
Secondly, whilst the applicability of 'facts' in other areas of
philosophic discourse - Penfield's work and Hume's theory of personal
identity, for example - is no guarantee that this will work in the moral
sphere, yet it is a positive indicator. If it is accepted that other
areas of philosophy may be clarified and even solved by factual
discoveries, there seems good reason to believe that careful usage of
such discoveries may be possible in the field of moral philosophy. After
all, morals would seem to depend upon the existence of personal identity,
so there is a prima facie case to begin with at least.
Perhaps the place of facts in an understanding of morality would be
better accommodated if 'morality' were not seen as some monolithic entity.
It will be argued throughout the next two sections of this thesis that an
approach which views morality as deriving from five distinct areas makes
sense of a lot of problems in this field. These areas would be:
(1) the natural
(2) the personal
(3) the interpersonal
(4) the mystical/religious
(5) the social.
Now such an approach can locate moral attitudes of the natural, the
personal, the interpersonal and the social in the 'facts' of existence on
this planet, as naturalistic philosophers have done, whilst still
acknowledging that there is another area of morality - the
religious/mystical - which explicitly states its distancing from any
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naturalistic grounding, and yet which undoubtedly is a very potent force
In many peoples' moral attitudes. To exclude this last area from a
consideration of the functioning of morality as a whole is simply to fly
in the face of experience. Thus a foot is being placed in both camps,
because there is truth in both camps. Perhaps, the naturalistic/non-
naturalistic argument, and at least part of the is/ought debate, is
another example of the difficulties which are encountered when people
fail to recognise that morality has its genesis in five different areas.
A belief that is located in only one or two of these areas - perhaps the
personal and the social - may lead to a naturalistic attitude which
cannot do justice to the mystical; whilst a non-naturalistic attitude
which locates morality in the mystical has great problems accounting for
the fact that many people do not have mystical experiences, and claim not
to have a religious orientation, and instead assess morality in the light
of the perceived facts of this world. If five areas are crammed into one
or two, and their different geneses are not taken into account, then
is/ought problems are created which really need not occur.
FACTS, VALUES, AND PSYCHOLOGY; A PRELIMINARY
On this argument, then, 'facts' do have a place in a careful consideration
of the field, but here 'careful' is the key word, and covers a universe of
difficulties, most of which seem to arise from an inadequate conception
of the genesis of morality. For example, whilst it undoubtedly is the case
that people, as they mature, attempt to develop different, more
comprehensive, ethical stances, it might be asked just what should be the
relationship between such studies of moral functioning and development,
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and that of moral theory. 	 At this stage, only one attempt at an
explanation will be examined, and that only in the detail needed for
present purposes. Thus, the American developmental psychologist,
Kohlberg, at one point(17) seemed to be saying that a study of how people
develop morally should be evidence for the greater validity of those
philosophical arguments used by people at the higher levels of
development. This hypothesis seemed perilously close to chasing its own
tail, for one might well ask who defines what counts as 'higher'. If
Kohlberg, as he does, defines 'higher' as an amalgam of the moral theories
of Socrates, Plato(18), Kant(19). and Rawls(20), then he is taking only
one possible philosophic stance, which is derived essentially from the
personal, interpersonal, and social areas - or, at least, as Kohlberg
interprets them. If, on the other hand, he wants to say, on the basis of
his own empirical findings, what is the most comprehensive approach to
the moral dilemmas (21) he sets, then he is making a straight 'is' to
'ought' move - another naturalistic philosophy defining the Good in yet
another way. It would appear from Kohlberg's latest thinking(22) that
he does not wish to do this now, but seems prepared to go no further
than saying that a psychological theory of moral development presupposes
an underlying philosophical theory, and that finds from psychology
provide only 'indirect support' for this underlying philosophical theory.
Such a position is much less controversial , as 'indirect support' sounds
like little more than 'circumstantial evidence'. Of course, by being this
much safer, it loses much of its novelty and daring. If this level of
explanation is kept to, one remains fairly safe, but, as Popper(23)
remarks, much less is explained. If exponents of theories of moral
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development are happy to claim that their theories provide only 'indirect
support' for an ethical theory, then there is a great danger of not only
losing any punch in the argument by becoming lost in generalities - and
of their becoming much less testable - but also of their effectively
divorcing themselves from the philosophic discussion. Perhaps, though,
Kohlberg is having a change of heart, and is coming round to the point of
view which Egan puts forward so forcefully(24).	 Egan argues that
psychological theories, like those of Kohlberg and Piaget, should be
essentially descriptive theories, in the sense that what they do is to
describe the behaviour and the possibilities of human performance. They
are not prescriptive, in the sense that they say what ought to be the
case in human functioning.	 But this is precisely what educational
theories do.	 They select an end point, an ideal towards which the
educator works; the educator develops curricula which aim towards this
prescription of human behaviour. Psychological theories, on this account,
are no more than indicators, pointers, suggestions as to what might
constrain our educational theories, or what might be possible as well. If
Kohlberg were to accept such an account - and he does seem to be heading
this way - then it would mean that his account of the stages of moral
development can be no more than a description of what goes on, and that
for it to act as an educational theory, it needs something totally
different, a philosophic, prescriptive argument which would suggest why
this account, as an educational, not a psychological, theory is better in
some sense than other educational, prescriptive theories. It may well be
that Kohlberg has confused the two notions, and may only be just now
disentangling them.
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However, even were he to do this, his theory would still seem to be
inaccurate because, as it has been argued, he treats morality as the
product of, at best, three areas - the personal, interpersonal, and social.
He at one time flirted with the notion of the mystical(25), but never
more than that. Consequently, he has tried to squeeze five areas into
three, with the subsequent problems one might expect. Furthermore, even
with the three areas he does utilise, he does not consider that they
might be generators of moral demands which are contradictory because of
their genesis from separate moral areas. By searching for one over-
arching principle, he loses sight of the much less orderly manner in
which morality is actually produced.
The approach suggested here takes account of these problems. Having
argued so far that morality is not all of a piece, but comes to us from
five separate areas, it would seem to follow that each individual,
throughout his or her life, is faced with a complex of moral decisions,
different demands, and these will be generated by the different areas. To
the extent, then, that they believe in the importance of principles
generated from one or more of these areas, as contrasted to the others,
so individuals will give emphasis and take action in ways which make
their judgments unique.
Such an approach takes, as a basis for moral reflection, man's
predicament in the world - his personal relationships, his role as an
actor in society, his view of the claims of other living things on this
planet, of his perennial desire to make sense of the reason for his
existence, and of the meaning of his life and death, all of this wrapped
up in a biological and physical framework of constraining and determining
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ideas. This approach argues that these five areas of morality at times
contradict one another, and this is the major reason for moral
disagreements and problems with moral dilemmas. So in claiming this, an
'is' to 'ought' move is being made, but a simplistic 'one-for-one' trade is
not being offered in so doing. On this account, then, the Good is not
one, but is as numerous as there are thinking people en the planet, and
their conceptions of the Good will change throughout their life, as they
constantly strive to adjust and balance this judgement, as they change, as
they face new situations, and as they learn and reflect more.
Such a theory makes no obvious definist fallacy, as it at no time equates
one natural quality with the Good, but at the same time does not dissolve
into generalities, simply because it locates the Good within each
individual, rather than attempting to extract a core notion of the Good
from each person's belief, and holding it up for public display.
At this stage, though, it might well be argued that this theory does not
help too much at all, for whilst it might pass muster for some on the
transition from 'is' to 'ought', it does so at a heavy price, that of
descending into a hugely relativistic muddle, into a sceptical quicksand
from which one might never escape. This is simply because if each
person is, in the last resort, the definer of his own Good, then it might
be argued that people could have little to say to each other on moral
matters, simply because they all start off from different bases. How
could moral argument and moral evaluation be conducted? Not only does
this become impossible for other countries' practices, it becomes
impossible for one's own country's as well.	 It would seem that in
accepting this thesis, therefore, the most savage relativism in morals
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would be produced, so extreme that only a fool would open his mouth and
pronounce on other peoples' behaviour.
However, such an argument assumes that if there is not a Platonic moral
order, existing timeless and unchanging, then there can be nothing save
each person's path, that therefore one approach is really as good as
another. This is the sort of attitude seen in subjective accounts of
knowledge of the external world.	 On such accounts, people are so
imprisoned inside their physical bodies, with the distortions produced by
their senses, that they can never be sure of anything. And if they
attempt to take the Kantian way out(26) and try to detect those internal
constants - the 'categorial apparatus' - which Kant claims are brought to
bear on this sensory data, then one may become lost down Hegelian or
Marxist roads, faced with the possibility that this apparatus is not a
universal constant, as Kant would believe, but is either the product of
the ideology of the nation state, or is the product of a class ideology.
One form of subjectivism lurches into another.
Is there a way out? It would seem about time to look at that supposed
paragon of reason and detachment, the scientific method. If there is a
clear, explicit, and rational way forward which may provide the kind of
procedure needed to make some kind of non-relativistic sense in morals,
then science would seem to be a good first bet.
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CHAPTER 2 SCIENCE, EPISTEMOLOGY AND REASON
At the end of the previous chapter, a point was reached where it was felt
that a procedure was needed which could provide a non-relativistic
approach to human affairs. As science is normally thought to be the most
logical and rational of human enterprises, it was suggested that an
examination of its method might throw some light on the problems
encountered in moral enquiry. It is with such an examination, then, that
this chapter begins.
It seems fair to say that the man in the street has what might be called
a nineteenth century conception of science. If he was talking about
history, he might be described as following the Whig' School of
History (1). The Whig historian assumes that his subject is going
somewhere - that it has reached its final stage, that only the it's' need
crossing, and the 'i's' need dotting to round it all off, and that the
history of the subject may be read as progress towards present
understanding.
In somewhat similar fashion, science can be seen by the man in the street
as having reached a final paradigm, and that the history of the subject
should be read as a journey towards this level of understanding. When
science is viewed in this way, there seem to be four separable
assumptions underlying the belief, which may be characterised as:
(a)that science is the building up of a corpus of knowledge,
(b)that scientific 'facts' are the qa-mth%
(c)that induction la the scientific method,
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(d) that we can apprehend reality.
This approach, then, gives the impression that scientists are gradually
coming nearer and nearer to a complete understanding of how the universe
works, and that at some stage it may be proudly proclaimed that the end
of the journey has been reached.
It was said that the average man-in-the-street has a nineteenth century
conception of science, but this is meant as no insult. To some extent
the view may still be held by some scientists - perhaps those whom
Kuhn(2) would say were working in the area of 'normal science' - an area
safely within the boundaries of a well-defined field, where a lot of work
takes the character of problem-solving, a kind of intellectual game,
which does not demand an explanation of what 'scientific' means, in the
way in which other areas of scientific research might.
Such an attitude would cultivate an unconscious endorsement of the
nineteenth century view, as would a scientist's ontological commitment to
the belief that he is getting somewhere, for, after all, if he didn't
believe this, why bother in the first place? However, on top of this,
there seems to be a further endorsement of this view by some scientists,
In addition to the two already mentioned. If the thesis is accepted that
science has taken on almost religious overtones in this century, then
certain disturbing and misleading consequences seem to follow. One is
that to gain acceptance in the larger world for one's view, one has only
to say that this approach has been arrived at 'scientifically', or that
the case has been proved scientifically. The man in the street comes to
feel that these are all the credentials he needs in order to find out if
something is a 'fact', the sort of thing that can be trusted, respected,
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and valued. If science endorses the view that there are absolute truths,
that it is the business of schools to teach and learn these truths, then
a view of knowledge is disseminated which suggests that there are in life
some worldly certainties, stepping stones of incontrovertible facts.
Yet such a conception of science is held by hardly any reputable
scientist in the world today - or at least by any thinking scientist.
The core of the problem appears to lie with the status of the inductive
method, which, it is argued, can be no basis for certainty. Hume(3)
argued that it is impossible to justify a law by observation or
experiment, since it transcends experience - the observation of constant
regularity is no guarantee whatsoever that this constant regularity will
continue. Just because the sun has been seen to rise every morning since
the beginning of recorded time is no guarantee that it must rise
tomorrow; just as the observation that metals have always expanded when
heated in all previous tests is no guarantee that they will do so on the
next test.	 Hume believed, though, in the psychological power of
induction: that it may not be a logically valid procedure, but that it is
one which animals and men have made use of successfully as a matter of
practical necessity; one performed, he argued(4), because of 'constant
conjunction', the irresistible power of the law of association. We are
conditioned by repetition.
Now if this is all our scientific knowledge amounts to, then there are
real problems here, simply because it amounts to no more than irrational
habit or custom. Hume is not just being sceptical, he is moving straight
into irrationality.	 However, Popper's claim(5) that the belief that
induction is used is simply a mistake, a kind of optical illusion, would
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seem to be simply wrong: most people work on the principle that when
all known cases of x have been found to be y, then they presume that all
other x's will be y as well, until some particular reason comes along to
revise these expectations. However, the central issue remains - this is
not the basis for solid, irrefutable, permanent truth. Is there any other
account of the scientific method which aims to give such an account? Karl
Popper attempts to give such an account.
Popper argues(6) that the key to scientific objectivity is that theories
and observations should be publicly testable, that anybody in the world
should be able to criticise a theory or reproduce an observation. If we
are rational, if we can follow a logical argument, if we can seek
empirical error in a theory, then no matter who utters a pronouncement,
no matter what initial assumptions one begins with, then, in principle, it
should be replicable or falsifiable. Knowledge is objective to the extent
that experience of it can be shared. This is Popper's 'World 3'(7), a
storehouse of notions, theories, and hypotheses which are not the
preserve of an individual, but are, in a sense, semi-autonomous, in that
they can be investigated by anyone. However, unlike Plato's world of
universals (8), Popper's World 3 contents are only semi-autonomous, for
they are the creation of human beings, and will be changed as they are
investigated, falsified, and superseded.
For Popper, then, science and knowledge of the external world are
essentially natters of guesswork, trial and error, the issuing of
conjectures and their refutation. In a sense, Popper doesn't want to say
that there are 'facts', if by this is meant hard, permanent truths which
are known about the world. All knowledge is transitory, but this does
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not mean it is a waste of time. Permanent 'truths' may never be achieved,
but by the very fact that the possibility of error can be proved, that
falsification is possible, it is possible to see that there is a world
beyond an individual subjective viewpoint, and that it is possible to
come to a deeper understanding of this viewpoint. Popper illustrates his
understanding of the world in the following striking metaphor():
"The empirical base of objective science has thus nothing
'absolute' about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock.
The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any
natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper,
it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry
the structure, at least for the time being,"
Thus, for Popper, the touchstone of the scientific method has nothing to
do with positive accumulation of data at all, but rather to do with
criticism, with falsifiability: whilst one confirmed instance adds little
to knowledge, one falsification, for him, at least puts behind what is
not true in any absolute sense, and therefore limits the material needed
to be investigated and criticised, because the data falsified can be left
out of the enquiry.
All of this, of course, applies to scientific theories : theory A may
explain more than theory B, and be able to account for anomalies not
covered by A, but there is always the probability that theory C will come
along which appears to do a better job. Thus no theory can be claimed to
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be 'true', simply because it would take only one other inconsistent
observation to throw that theory into doubt.
Now the curious thing about Popper's position is that it is really no
more than the reverse side of the positive coin, and must consequently
face much the same criticisms. Popper, much as he criticises Plato and
scientists of the inductive method, is really after much the same kind of
thing - an account of knowledge which has within it something
impersonal, static, and permanent. Falsifiability is his method, but it
would seem to be open to much the same kind of objections which Popper
raised against objective truth. For if knowledge is always imperfect,
what right does he have for asserting that the criteria for falsifiability
will be adequate?	 It may well be that such criteria are themselves
imperfect, and that what were thought as solid foundations for the
falsification of a theory are no more solid that those of the theory
itself.	 It is not that falsifiability can be rejected outright - this
would only confirm Popper's thesis - but that no position can be reached
from which either positive or negative instances can be adjudged as
final.
Thus, when a theory is put to the test, there is more involved than just
the theory. There are initial conditions, auxiliary hypotheses and the
test conditions. For example, as Chalmers(10) points out, the movement
of Uranus appeared to falsify Newton's astronomical theory, yet this was
the result of an unknown initial condition, the existence of the planet
Uranus. Again, Harris(ii) points out that Flamstead's observations on the
moon's orbit did not falsify Newton's theory because there was a failure
in Flamstead's auxiliary hypotheses, namely that he failed to account for
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the refraction of light from the moon in the earth's atmosphere. Thus, at
this level, one instance of falsification is not enough to justify a
theory's falsification. Popper's theory does not seem adequate to cope
with such problems.
The very real difficulties which practitioners of the scientific method
encounter are even more startlingly brought out in the work of Kuhn,
whose seminal work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (12), opens up
a whole new dimension to the problem.
Kuhn argues that the replacement of one scientific theory by another is
not really based on reason and logic, but on the prevailing perspectives
and dogmas of the scientific establishment at the time. To understand
fully the way in which science works, Kuhn says, one should look not so
much at its logic but more at the cultural and historical background to
the period of science which one is studying. Kuhn is suggesting that the
rationality of scientific endeavour presupposes the acceptance of a
common framework, that rationality depends upon something like a common
language and a common set of assumptions, and, further, that rational
discussion and rational criticism are only possible if fundamentals are
agreed upon.
Kuhn's thesis, therefore, is a relativistic one, one which describes human
beings as prisoners caught in the framework of theories, expectations,
past experiences and language, and that because of the imprisonment
within these frameworks, meaningful communication with other people
working within other frameworks is not possible. 	 Kuhn quotes the
experiment by Bruner and Postman(13) to explain the sorts of difficulties
encountered. In this experiment, subjects were asked to identify certain
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playing cards. Most of the cards were normal, but a few were anomalous
- i.e. there might be a red six of spades and a black four of hearts.
Almost without exception the subjects identified the black four of hearts
as a four of spades or clubs, the red six of spades as a red six of
hearts or diamonds. In other words, those anomalous instances were
categorised by means of conceptual schemes which the subjects brought to
the experimental situation - that all red cards could only be hearts and
diamonds, that all black cards could only be spades and clubs.
Now when the subjects did come to recognize that something was wrong,
there was confusion, hesitation, and then suddenly, an abrupt shift to the
new, and correct recognition. A new conceptual scheme had been adopted -
there could now be such things in the pack of cards as red spades and
black hearts.
Popper's answer to this is simple and straightforward(14):
".-it simply exaggerates a difficulty into an impossibility.
The difficulty of discussion between people brought up in
different frameworks is to be admitted. But nothing is more
fruitful than such a discussion.. .a critical comparison of the
competing theories of the competing frameworks is always
possible."
The problem is, for Popper, however, that if induction is no guarantee of
truth, if falsification by instances is no guarantee of falsity, what
criteria can Popper put forward for his 'critical comparison'? Must an
account similar to that put forward by Feyerabend(15) be accepted, when
he says:
".-knowledge is not a gradual approach to the truth.-it is
- 38 -
rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible
(and incommensurable) alternatives.- nothing is ever settled,
no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account."
On such an account, the way in which a scientist views a particular
aspect of the world will be wholly determined by the paradigm within
which he is working. Science, then, will be an -essentially irrational
exercise. Feyerabend goes even further for he argues that the only test
of the validity of a theory is whether the theory adequately reflects a
particular scientist's wishes or not. The poet and the scientist are not
that far apart(16):
"...every poet who is not completely irrational composes, improves,
argues, until he finds the correct formulation of what he wants to
say. Would it not be marvellous if this process played a role in
the sciences also?"
On this argument, then, there is a sense in which proponents of rival
paradigms are living in different worlds, and this is because a variety
of non-rational factors are necessarily involved in the scientist's
judgement of the merits of a scientific theory. An individual scientist's
decision will depend upon the priority he gives to various factors, such
as his own personal likings or dislikings for other scientists, his
personality characteristics, his holding of particular sets of social,
moral, and scientific standards, and his adherence to certain
metaphysical principles. Since supporters of rival paradigms will not
accept each other's premises, they will not necessarily be convinced by
each other arguments.
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JHowever, if the arguments of Kuhn and Feyerabend are accepted, then the
consequences must be accepted as well.
Kuhn, for instance, cannot say that scientists who act like a mob are
wrong, because he has left himself with no standards to which he can
appeal, beyond those which scientists themselves recognise. If they stop
thinking that there are good reasons for choosing one theory rather than
another, and start using non-rational means of persuasion, all that Kuhn
can say is that the nature of science has changed.
Similarly, it is difficult to see how Kuhn could claim to believe that
scientific development is 'evolutionary' - one scientific theory is not as
good as another for doing what scientists normally do - because by
proscribing the possibility of a scientific language that could Judge
between theories, he surely excludes this possibility of movement.
Feyerabend, on the other hand, can retain neither the concept of
knowledge, nor, of course, the notion of improving knowledge. For if
nothing is true, then there can be nothing to know, and nothing further
to find out.
These arguments of Kuhn and Feyerabend are of the utmost importance
because they run to the heart of the problem of the validity of knowledge
in general, and therefore of the possibility of valid moral utterances.
It would be well, then, to ask in which ways our understanding of the
world, of science, and of other people, is limited. If these factors can
be identified more acutely, it should be easier to ascertain whether
Popper's Judgement that Kuhn exaggerates a difficulty into an
impossibility is fair or not.
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There would, then, seem to be eight major factors affecting our perception
of 'reality'.
(1) Human perceptual apparatus is probably the major constraining factor
in this regard, for it is suited to the requirements of a particular
biological organism. Human beings are simply not equipped to bounce
sound like a bat, detect ultra-violet light like a bee, sense
dampness like the humble woodlouse, and have no heat-seeking
sensors like the rattlesnake. It is possible, admittedly, to develop
instruments to compensate for these deficiencies, but having only
come to know of these deficiencies in the last couple of hundred
years, there is no reason to believe that all the forms have been
detected in this scientific epoch. It means that there must be much
of the external world which can affect human beings without their
knowledge and understanding, and of which they cannot be aware.
(2) Physiological and psychological states directly affect this
perception. Much of the body of knowledge assembled by Behavioural
Psychology demonstrates that factors such as hunger, thirst and
fatigue, mediate between a stimulus and its perception.
(3) Similarly, the behaviourists have shown quite convincingly that
previous experiences affect the frequency with which the potential
stimuli are avoided or noticed.
(4) The cultural system of which the observer is a part will affect the
person's interpretation of events. Evans-Pritchard describes how
the notion of witchcraft is incorporated into the Azande's thinking
in such a way that its existence is impossible to disprove. Thus
the experienced potter knows how to make pots - he need have no
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fear that during firing his pots will crack as a result of error:
".-he selects the proper clay, kneads it thoroughly.. .builds
it up carefully and slowly. On the night before digging out
his clay he abstains from sexual intercourse. So he should
have nothing to fear. Yet pots sometimes break, even when
they are the handiwork of expert potters, and this can only
be accounted for by witchcraft. 'It is broken - there is
witchcraft', says the potter simply." (17)
(5) The value scheme adopted affects one's perception as well. Thus,
looking into a room, person A sees six people. Person B looks in. He
sees four. Two of the figures are Jews, Person B is a Nazi. For him,
they do not count as people. Person C, on the other hand, sees five.
One of the figures is a negro. This observer is an extreme
Afrikaaner. Finally, person D sees seven. This observer sees that
one figure in the room is pregnant, and she counts the foetus as a
person.
(6) In like manner, one's sex, race, colour and age will all affect
perception. Sex and age may affect one physiologically and
psychologically, whilst all four may affect one socially, permitting
or disallowing the experiencing of situations which people of the
other sex, of another race, or differently coloured, or older or
younger, may or may not be permitted to indulge in.
(7) One's historical and geographical location obviously limit the
possible perceptual experiences, and influence their perception. Thus
a sneeze by someone on a bus in the 1980's will do no more than
cause vague interest: in 1665, during the Black Death, if one is to
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believe the popular interpretation of the meaning of the Nursery
Rhyme 'Ring-a-ring-a-roses', such a sneeze would have occasioned an
altogether different reaction.
(8) Finally, the complex interplay of these factors upon one another may
reduce further the influence of certain stimuli to the point of their
total exclusion from one's perceptual awareness, or accentuate them to
the point where they become one's primary topic of interest, and thus
affect one's perception of other possible stimuli to the point where
they pale into insignificance.
If it has been established that the stimuli capable of being received
are necessarily limited, and that are therefore capable of being selected,
then, necessarily, there can be no such thing as the perception of a 'true
reality', nor, and more importantly for present purposes, can there be a
truly detached scientific observer. The ideal of science must remain an
ideal, but one which no scientist, simply because he is a human being, can
approach. The human approach is, necessarily, subjective.
This, in itself, is no way of deciding between Popper and Kuhn, for they
would both accept this,	 The nub of the matter is this: do the
difficulties make comprehension between scientists of different
approaches, difficult to the point of impossibility for practical reasons,
or for theoretical reasons? Popper seems to be saying that the factors
affecting our perception of reality do prevent us from ever knowing what
'reality' might be - with that he is in agreement with Kuhn. But he
also seems to be saying that though these factors affect people
differently, yet it is still possible to work through the
misunderstandings until comprehension is reached. Thus, take factor (5)
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- the value scheme adopted. Popper would say that the way round this
difference of opinion is not to stand there shouting down the other over
the number of people you can see. The answer is to go back to basic
assumptions and ask on what grounds the Nazi doesn't class Jews as
people, the Afrikaaner doesn't accept black people etc, etc. Even if, at
the end of the discussion, the Nazi or the Afrikaaner refuses to yield his
system for counting figures as people, the observer is still in a position
to do something about it. Because the value position he is taking is
understood, the next time the Nazi says that there were twelve people in
the room, it may be asked "and how many Jews?" When told four, one then
knows, that on one's own value scheme, that there were actually sixteen,
Two problems, however, remain. One is that on many occasions, the other
person is operating under a different value scheme of which one is
unaware, because of different unknown premises, or different factors and
constraints are acting on the other. Thus irreconcilable differences are
the result, This Popper can accept, adding only that the key must be an
eternal vigilance to this possibility.
The second problem is much more difficult.
	 If one person counts to
twelve, and another counts to sixteen, and even if the difference is
realised, how are the rival theories to be evaluated? This is really the
crucial question, and one which urgently needs explanation. One of the
dangers with it is that it can turn doubts about the possibility of the
development of scientific knowledge, into doubts about logic and
rationality, and from there, as the foundations of a coherent epistemology
are undermined, into doubts about the validity of any evaluation of moral
viewpoints. They all become enmeshed in the sticky glue of cynicism.
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Now two things can be said at this point. One is that the reason why
someone comes to hold certain beliefs could be a totally different issue
from the question of whether these beliefs are true or not. The first
demands sociological and psychological explanations, the second demands
rational and logical explanations. Illost of Kuhn's and Feyerabend's
arguments are of the first sort, showing that, contrary to much popular
opinion, science has generally not progressed rationally at all, but has
been largely a function of these psychological and sociological pressures.
But the point is that even if the entire history of science proved to be
of this nature, it would still not alter one jot the possibility of
something better - the logical and rational investigation.
In the same way, if it is possible to give reasons for judgments, and the
Nazi refuses to change his count of twelve, this can be seen as a
psychological problem, not a rational one. People are perverse: faced
with the strongest reasoned cases possible, they may still refuse to
chan e their mind. This does not indicate a weakness in the principle of
rationality, but of the intrusion of other factors into the equation.
This, of course, is the well-known gap between knowing something to be
right and acknowledging or doing it. Weakness of the will cannot be
solved by purely rational means. It is a psychological and sociological
problem as well.
Secondly, this cynicism can be countered by highlighting the reasons for
using logic and rationality. This is not a circular process, despite its
initial appearance as such. For one is merely asking: "which of the
various approaches is it best to adopt - that of going by intuition, by
accepting someone else's word, by taking pot luck, or by making a
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reasoned examination of the pro's and con's of a case?" There is nothing
circular in this. Popper(18) is of the opinion that in the final
analysis, the commitment to using logic and rationality is a moral one,
for a commitment to it involves one in following the rules of a game - a
game which has, as part of its structure, the notion of equal respect
for people, and impartiality. This is vei-y similar to Peters'
argument(19) that using reason involves one in making various second
order moral commitments - such as impartiality, willingness to listen to
another's point of view, and fairness. In other words, once one boards
the train of reason, the train must proceed along certain laid-down
tracks, and these tracks, for Popper, lead to 'better' destinations than
those which might be arrived at by other means of transport.
Now Popper describes this as a "moral decision", because the decision to
adopt either rationalism or irrationalism "will deeply affect our whole
attitude towards other men, and towards the problems of social life."(20).
Perhaps 'moral decision' may seem at first a rather surprising choice of
words, if only because people do not normally make a conscious decision
to use reason - this is instilled into the child from birth. However,
Popper is really aiming his argument at the adult, who, for one reason or
another, is tempted to dispense with rationality, and for him, the
argument seems well directed. Adopting rationality can be the conscious
adoption of a conceptual scheme, in the same way in which one adopts the
Darwinian theory as opposed to the Larmarckian - one sees that it does
the job better. Now Popper's argument comes at the end of his celebrated
two-volume set, "The Open Society and Its Enemies"(21), on the dangers of
irrational tendencies in Western philosophy, and is best understood in
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that light, but the point still remains. Faced with resolving any sort of
problem, rationality is the safest and surest way, the way which guards
against totalitarian governments, for its surrender invites them.
However, another argument may be used to suppport Popper's, and this is
a biological one. Reason and logic have profound survival value for a
species. They are immensely useful to those capable of utilising them,
and to not use them would make as little sense as walking round with
one's eyes shut when they function perfectly.	 Rationality, then, is
something which can be chosen from a moral point of view, but which can
also be chosen because it is useful.
From this point of view, then, talk of the Justification of the use of
rationality makes about as much sense as talk of the Justification of the
use of one's eyes. They are both their own Justification. It is not the
irrationalist who should be asking the rationalist for a Justification of
his mode of thinking - it surely is for the irrationalist to Justify what
ha is doing. The ball is in his court, and it is difficult to see how he
could return it.
It is at this point, as well, that Singer's(22) notion of an 'escalator of
reason' can be introduced, as an indication of the way in which some
progress at least might be achieved through reason. Singer's notion
bears some comparison with the metaphor of the train and the tracks used
earlier in this chapter, in that once one steps on, one may be carried by
the process of logic to places not intended, but to which the processes
of logic inexorably tend. In his "Expanding Circle", Singer describes the
possible evolution and expansion of moral thought from man's most
primitive social beginnings, through his tribal, custom-bound period, to
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his present, incomplete, universalisable stage, which appears to be
expanding in thought, according to Singer, to an inclusion of not only
other races, cultures, and nations, but to other species as well.
The key to this escalator lies in the need for Justification in one's
actions when these actions conflict with another's wants, for this
Justification demands reasons that are equally' acceptable to all - the
very universalisability criterion. As Hume(23) put it, someone giving a
Justification must:
"...depart from his private and particular situation and must
choose a point of view common to him with others.-"
This seems to be the essence of Rawls' 'original position 1 (24) as well,
and is the point at which one's foot is placed on the escalator. Once
this principle of disinterestedness, for oneself, or for a close family
group is agreed to, it needs, it demands, good reasons why such a
decision should not be extended to the village, to the society, to the
rest of humanity, and to other species as well. If the qualities of
empathy and imagination are possessed as well, then what appears
logically to be the right thing to do, also feels the right thing to do,
and is that much more likely to be Implemented.
This is not for one moment to deny the value and needs of the family, the
group, the nation or the species. The concrete needs of human beings
need to be recognized. A crucial part of the moral framework may be
impartiality, but this is not a framework for computers. As Midgely(25)
has pointed out, human beings have social needs, possess biological
requirements, and exhibit an evolutionary history. However, rationality
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is an essential part of the description of the nature of moral enquiry,
because it is the form normally chosen to bed it in.
So, granting that there are still problems with the scientific method and
epistemology, and with their effects upon the nature of moral enquiry,
what can be said about the relationship between reason and morality?
There would seem to be at least four ways in which reason can be used to
assess the validity of a moral theory.
Firstly, reason can be used within the argument, simply by examining the
logic of the passage under question. As Weber put it(26), it involves:
"...the elaboration and explication of the ultimate,
internally consistent value axioms, from which the divergent
attitudes derived..."
Secondly, it can again be used within the argument through:
"The deduction of s implications'(for those accepting
certain value-judgments) which follow from certain
irreducible value-axioms, when the practical evaluation of
factual situations is based on these axioms alone" (27).
This requires the careful analysis and articulation of the value
assumptions.
Thirdly, and again internally, it may be used by contrasting it with
other parts of the person's overall moral view. Thus, if one area of
morality is given heavy or overall preponderance in the balance of the
five areas described in Chapter 1, then one may ask the person to Justify
this balance.
Fourthly, it may be used in an empirical manner, through:
"The determination of the factual consequences which the
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'realization of a certain practical evaluation must have:
(1) in consequence of being bound to certain indispensable
means, (?) in consequence of the inevitability of certain, not
directly desired repercussions." (28)
This, then, goes some way, but not too far. It is as far as Weber will
go, and leads Strauss to say(29):
"...Weber's thesis necessarily leads to nihilism or to the
view that every preference, however evil, base, or insane,
has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as
legitimate as any other preference."
This is simply because these four ways are all based on a prior
acceptance of certain values which, Weber believes, cannot be rationally
justified: it is absolutely hopeless, he thinks, to believe that such basic
values can be justified; they can only be accepted through prior choice.
How similar to Hare(30) who said:
"...we can only ask him to make up his mind which way he ought
to live; for in the end, everything rests upon a decision of
principle. He has to decide whether to accept that way of life
or not..."
Now this argument has already been attacked through a description of the
difference between logical and psychological reasons for holding these
beliefs, and through an argument for the possibility of a thoroughgoing
rationality. However, a positive theory of knowledge acquisition has as
yet not been described in any detail. The possibility of its existence
has merely been defended.
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In the next chapter, this process will be begun with an investigation
of the nature and construction of language, one which will go on to show
that it shares much the same characteristics with science, epistemology,
and morality.
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CHAPTER 3 LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY, THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY, AND
SUBJECTIVITY.
There are at least four very good reasons for looking at the nature of
language and a consideration of linguistic problems, in the determination
of the nature and genesis of moral thought and enquiry.
Firstly, linguistic analysis, the scientific method, epistemology, and
morality may all share much the same problems as regards subjectivity, and
all may use tools of a similar nature to lessen the degree of this
subjectivity. Thus, such an approach should contribute something regarding
the intelligibility of one set of moral notions for people holding another
set.
Secondly, it seems valuable because this line of thought has something to
say about the genesis of moral concepts specifically at the linguistic
level. Whilst such an approach does not necessarily explain why these
concepts are held in the first place, they do at least provide the tools to
explain how different human beings can produce different ideas on
morality.
Thirdly, in addition to the account given in Chapter 1, where it was
argued that the naturalistic fallacy was the production of an inadequate
conception of the areas of morality, an analysis of the way in which
language is used may demonstrate that this fallacy is in some cases based
upon an incorrect understanding of the way in which language is used.
Thus, in this chapter, the previous analysis of the naturalistic fallacy
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will be expanded in order to show that misunderstandings about it stem
from more than one source.
Finally, this area will be examined for the simple reason that much of
recent philosophy, moral and otherwise, has been couched in the terms of
linguistic analysis. Whilst being no devotee of the school, there are
undoubted benefits and attractions in its modus operandi; and a
consideration of the plusses and minusses of such a system should prove
of great value in elucidating the problems to be faced.
This chapter, then, will begin by explaining exactly what it is about
linguistic philosophy which, for the purposes of this thesis, would be of
valu ; it will then describe the genesis and nature of language, before
moving to apply this analysis to the problems of the naturalistic fallacy,
and an understanding of the world in general.
Linguistic Philosophy's predecessor, Logical Positivism, had consigned to
the wastebin whole areas of human investigation - ethics, aesthetics,
religion, even some everyday psychological statements, as being
meaningless, simply because by their very nature they were not empirically
verifiable.	 It originated in Vienna in the 1930s, but was brought to
England by the twenty-five year old Ayer, with his aggressive little book
"Language, Truth, and Logic"(1). It had, essentially, three main principles.
Firstly, the principle of verifiability suggested that anything which
couldn't be verified by sense-observation was meaningless, and that what a
proposition meant could be described by saying what would verify it. It
reduced all statements to statements of immediate observation.
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Secondly, it asserted that all meaningful propositions of logic and
mathematics were analytic, and therefore tautologies. As Magee says:
".-the predicate merely unpacks what is already present in the
subject." (2)
Finally, philosophy was seen as an "activity of elucidation", as
Wittgenstein and Schlick(3) called it - it clarified, analysed, and, where
necessary, exposed nonsense.
For a number of reasons, many philosophers now believe that Logical
Positivism has been put to rest.	 The principle of verifiability, in
particular, came in for a great deal of criticism. Could it really explain
what worked in sub-atomic physics? How could it possibly deal in a
meaningful way with things that happened in the past? What could it have
to say about other peoples' minds?
	
To dismiss such concepts as
meaningless because they couldn't be verified by sense observation was too
much for many to take. And to round it all off, was the principle of
verifiability verified by sense observation? If not, did that mean that it
too was meaningless? Another way would have to be found.
However, Logical Positivism, and Emotivism, its moral philosophic
counterpart, had had their effect. As Barrow has put it(4):
".-Emotivism was the last straw that broke the camel's back."
Philosophers conceded that their job:
"...was not to produce elaborate systems of desirable behaviour,
nor to prescribe good conduct, but to analyse the way in which
we do in fact use moral language.. .to put it cynically, they
lost their nerve."
Whether philosophers did lose their nerve or not, a new orthodoxy took
over as the accepted way of 'doing philosophy'. Seminal works such as
Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" (5), and Ryle's "Concept of
Mind"(6) asked people to look at the way in which words and concepts were
being used, and argued that knowing how a word is used is the same as
understanding that word. Thus meaning, it was claimed, was determined by
a word's usage, not by some independent entity existing behind the word or
concept. For example, knowing what the word 'truth' means is the same as
understanding all the correct uses of that word.
This naturally revitalised whole areas of philosophy discarded by logical
positivism, simply because it argued that it is a perfectly legitimate
function of philosophy to enquire how words and concepts are used, and
that this does not involve the throwing out of areas of discussion which
cannot be verified in an absolute sense. 	 The promise of linguistic
philosophy was that it would not so much solve as dissolve philosophical
problems (7). Thus, if the traditional problems of philosophy had been
phrased by different people with different linguistic uses, and the ways
In which language can be used were to be understood, then there seemed a
good chance that some of these problems could be solved simply by
unravelling misunderstandings in usage.
Further, because linguistic philosophy started from the premise that its
approach - the analysis of the use of words - was a very catholic one,
rather than an approach of limiting philosophy to being a handmaiden of
science - as logical positivism had threatened to do - it offered the
prospect of a great expansion in the field of philosophy to virtually any
area where language is used, simply because it could be the means of
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bringing out into the open problems within the field, and then insisting
on greater rigour and clarity in the use of these words.
It is very noteworthy, however, that in treating, for example, the language
of religion in this way, a number of things happen. One is that by
discussing only the usage of this language, one tends to deal with those
areas involved in the causation of such language, partly psychological,
partly sociological. Second, and related to this, such an approach to
philosophy, by examining usage, tends to fall short of examining the truth
of the subject matter. As Adelstein(8) points out:
".-we must ask whether it is assumed that reality conforms to
the concepts which are being analysed. If the answer is 'yes',
the entire question is presumed answered without any grounds
whatsoever being given. 'Yes' implies that an extremely
contentious theory, that reality conforms to the usage of
everyday speech, is proposed and accepted without a shred
of evidence."
Further, if such an analysis does purport to examine the truth of the
subject matter, it tends to assert it from a humanistic perspective: man
uses the language, it expresses human needs, and is therefore a form of
discourse not significantly different from any other. This doesn't have to
happen, but because of the initial 'set' of those engaged in the exercise,
it is the most likely outcome. Look, for instance, at Braithwaite's(9)
description of religious language:
".-the primary use of religious assertion is to announce
allegiance to a set of moral principles."
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Now it seems fair to say that the average religious believer would reply
that he or she was saying something about an existent God, or about a
metaphysical reality transcendent to this earthly one. 	 They would
probably be most offended to be told that they were only talking about
their own outlook on life. Braithwaite really has no right to arbitrarily
reduce references to the transcendent or miraculous, to the sociological
and psychological. As Trigg puts it:
"...what is offered is not so much a philosophical analysis of
religious belief as a denial of its truth."(10)
Further, any bright young thing, if he thinks all he has to do is to
analyse the ways in which words are used, can start his own branch of
philosophy of virtually any discipline - the philosophy of stamp
collecting, for instance. But this won't do. Particular fields of study
have their own concepts which are not discrete items, and cannot be
studied in a piecemeal manner. They need a frame of reference to be
understood, and that frame of reference can only be provided by a profound
knowledge of that area of study. This knowledge might include that of
being an experienced practitioner within the field, of being well versed in
the theories and beliefs of the field at the present time, and also of an
historical understanding of the subject, so that insight is gained into how
the meaning of terms current in the field, have changed with time. This
is, perhaps, the central insight of the later Wittgenstein(11) - that the
part cannot be understood before its relationship to the whole, and the
whole itself, is understood.
The final danger, and the one most relevant to this thesis, is that
linguistic philosophy can become too preoccupied with its own method. By
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this is meant four things. Firstly, an insistence on clarity and rigour is
an admirable notion, but it can strangle something at birth. Any new idea,
by the very fact that it is new, has problems expressing itself. This does
not mean that this new idea is necessarily wrong, only that it is not yet
properly formed. Pedanticism can be a weedkiller which kills weeds and
struggling new plants alike, and an orthodoxy like linguistic philosophy
can become a tyranny all too easily. Indeed, with concepts like Freud's
'unconscious', there may be no words adequate to express what is said.
Secondly, an insistence on clarity and rigour in analysis must not make
the mistake of thinking that there is a clear and rigorous definition
underlying the variation. This is a Platonic fallacy which can, and does,
creep into much linguistic analysis. Take the word 'indoctrination' for
instance.
	 It can, and has been, defined in terms of aim, method, and
content, either in combinations of these criteria, or in terms of just
one(12). This chapter will attempt to show that words do not have rigid,
permanent, objective meanings - and this will be a considerable help in an
understanding of human enquiry in general.
Thirdly, in the last few years there has been a reaction to this whole
approach, stemming from the feeling that there is more to philosophy than
the analysis of words(13). What about the issues of great moment in the
world today - injustice, the use of violence, abortion, foetal research,
voluntary euthanasia? Are not issues of this kind as of similar or
greater importance than armchair nit-picking over the meanings? No doubt
Marx would have included the linguistic philosopher in his thoughts when
he said(14):
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various
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ways; the point is to change it."
Finally, and as indicated earlier in the chapter, such a method may come
to think that because it is concerned exclusively with how language is
used, that language necessarily expresses the 'truth' or 'reality' behind it.
There are times when Wittgenstein appeared to talk in this vein(15):
"...the limits of my language mean the limits of my world..."
- that what the language says is the truth, because the language is the
conceptual apparatus used, and therefore determines the truth or falsity
for the user) because it la the conceptual world. Wittgenstein is at least
equating the meaning of a word with the way it is used; and it is a very
short step from that to saying that the meaning of a statement is 'the
truth'.
Now this seems to be wrong because it is too simple an account of how
language is used. For a start, to discover all of the current uses of the
meaning of a word gives one no more than a psychological, sociological,
and anthropological background to the word: it does not necessarily give
much valid epistemological information. The word may simply have been
inadequate in its meaning because of a lack of understanding of how the
world works in that area of understanding. Take the word 'mad', for
example. A thousand years ago, people meant by it something like 'acting
strangely because possessed by devils'. Nowadays, there are, by present
standards, perhaps half a dozen valid definitions of the word. The word
has stayed the same, but perceptions of what lies behind it, its
epistemological content, have changed. And there is nothing to suggest
that its meaning won't change again with advances in knowledge.
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Fuxther, the information behind the word may be deliberately limited.
Thus, whilst there is only one meaning for the word 'snow' in the English
language, the Eskimo has several in his(16). This is quite simply because
he needs those variations as a matter of his very survival. It might be a
matter of life and death for him as to which sort of 'snow' another Eskimo
Is talking about. But the crucial point is that there is nothing stopping
the English-speaking world from picking up these Eskimo differentiations
and using them if so desired. But it is not desired. There is no need.
If another ice age swept Britain, then there seems a good chance that the
distinctions supplied by the Eskimo would be used. And they could be
used as well. Practitioners of a language are not so concept-bound that
they cannot, with training and practice, understand the subtleties of other
concept systems. The first connection in this chapter with subjectivity
may now be brought out. If people are not bound to concept systems in
the way suggested above, if they can learn to utilize the applications and
insights of other systems, then the notion of a complete conceptual
subjectivism at the level of systems of thought is simply fallacious. It
may be the case that people don't understand other languages and concepts,
but it is not the case that they cannot.
It might be argued here that language systems have been confused with
conceptual schemes, and that whilst one might well understand a language
system, one need not understand a conceptual system. If this stand is
taken, it would seem to verge into incoherence. After all, a conceptual
system is built upon and from language; and any system of beliefs is a
system of concepts which therefore is a system of words of a language.
Person A may not share Person B's beliefs, but surely they can come to
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understand the concepts being used. The only conceivable way, it would
seem, for a person to argue that other people cannot understand his
conceptual system at all is for him to claim that he is a solipsist - and
of course how could he claim this for others, for he has already asserted
that they cannot understand him?
Yet there would seem to be truth in a subjective standpoint, but the full
appreciation of this cannot be brought out at the level of conceptual
systems. It must be sought within a system. Wittgenstein once said(17)
that if a lion could talk, we could not understand him.	 As with most of
Wittgenstein's remarks, this is pretty cryptic, but what he appears to be
suggesting is that a lion is so different from us in every way that we
really have nothing in common with it.	 The lion's entire sensory
apparatus, the driving forces in its life, its desires and wants, the
things in the world that it abstracts as important, are so totally alien
to the human point of view that if the lion could speak, we simply would
not understand each other.
Whilst Wittgenstein has propounded an important truth here, it would be of
limited value if its intention is to make us generalise this statement to
human beings in other cultures, or with other belief systems from our own.
Such people may see things in a different way from ourselves, they may
have different likes, dislikes, desires and wants, but the essential point
is that we are of the same species. We can learn, because physically,
physiologically, and psychologically, we all function in the same way.
What Popper was quoted as saying in the last chapter applies equally well
here: that "it simply exaggerates a difficulty into an impossibility"(18).
The lion, on the other hand, is an impossibility. Human beings are not the
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same shape or size, our bodies do not function in the same way, our brains
do not either. And they never can. This is the essential difference and
is the reason why complete conceptual subjectivism among human beings
does not stand up, though it probably would if we tried to communicate
with lions, dogs, little green men from outer space, etc, etc.
The truth, then, is not to be found at the level of conceptual systems, but
at the level of the individual, and to expand on this, another old chestnut
in the philosophical cupboard must be examined, that of the notions of
public and private languages.
It seems reasonably self-evident that whilst there may be some Chomskyan
pre-programming in our brains, we learn to speak by listening to others,
by imitating them, by exploring with different combinations of words and
sounds, and generally develop our facility by interplay with others. In
the most general sense, then, language is public. It is there for all to
use, and for all to mis-use as well. This last point is important, for
whilst some words like 'clog' and 'football' are in such common usage that
only the most pedantic would want to argue that their meaning is not
public, yet there are other words, which do not quite have this publicness
about them. Take, for example, the word 'paradoxical'. It is certainly
public in the sense that one can go to a dictionary and look up its
meaning. But there are probably many people in this country who simply
do not know its meaning at all. If it were used in conversation with
them, and the context in which it was used did not give enough clues for
these people to be able to work out its meaning, then they would simply be
lost. Again, there must be other people who have heard of the word, have
perhaps read it, but have only taken sufficient note of it for them to
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believe that it has something to do with a situation or experience being
'odd' or 'puzzling'. Thus, some of the time, conversations may go on quite
happily, and misunderstandings of the word not produce any real
difficulties, whilst at other times, it may profoundly mislead the person
who only partly understands its meaning, or may mislead someone else, if
the person of only partial comprehension attempts to use it in their 
sentences.
This is, in a very real sense, an example of a private language, for words
understood in one way by one person may totally mislead another. This is
a very common way for misunderstandings and disagreements to happen.
Now Wittgenstein(19) excluded the possibility of a private language simply
because the criterion for determining whether language is being used
properly or not is by whether it proceeds in accordance with the rules of
language - and those, he argues, are intersubJective and public in nature.
Now of course human beings try to maintain public standards of
comprehension by constant inter-communications - "the twittering machine",
as Klee(20) calls it - but there seems to be no reason why there should
not be a temporary misapplication of rules by individuals, and in this
sense, then, people could be said to be practising a private language.
But private languages can occur in other ways too.
	
Vords may be
deliberately misused in order to give a new sense to a sentence.
Chesterton once described an incident in which a person received an
unexpected message at the breakfast table, and as a result, a 'surprised'
piece of toast fell from his fingers. This playing with words is, of
course, most often seen in poetry, and is also one of the principal sources
of the Joke.
	 By such actions, language is explored, developed, and
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expanded by individuals who use public terms in a novel way, an utterly
private way at first, but which, given sufficient currency, become part of
the public language.	 It is a mistake of the first order to think of
language as static, 'out-there', to be examined. Languages are alive and
changeable.	 And the main reason for this movement, change, and
development, is the interplay between language in the public domain and
its mis-use, deliberate or not, by individuals in the private. The two
depend and live off one another.
This is particularly true with regard to moral language. Groups of people,
whether they be groups within society, or whole societies, come to have
generally accepted 'public' notions of moral terms. And mis-use of these
terms, for whatever reason, has the effect of making these moral notions a
private conception which at first only the user will understand (assuming
that	 doe-s!), and only later on is it possible that this private
understanding may be fed back into the group understanding and thus
become public currency.
But to really understand the mechanics of moral notions - and it is vital
that this is done - their construction must be examined as well. Only
through such an exercise will a point be reached where a totally
subjectivist account of morality can be dispensed with, as well as
facilitating a more complete comprehension of the relationship between the
naturalistic fallacy and the nature of language.
A moral notion is an example of what Kovesi(21) calls a 'formal element'.
A formal element is an umbrella term, whose meaning is defined (either
publicly or privately) by its function, its organising principle. A moral
example of one of these formal elements would be 'murder', a non-moral one
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would be 'property'. An act is described as a murder if it fits certain
conditions - if a person is killed, if someone else performed the killing,
if the performance were deliberate, and if the performance was from malice
or for profit. Thus someone being pushed off a cliff, and another being
poisoned with arsenic, are both 'murders', if they conform to the
conditions described above. There may be very little similarity between
the two cases, apart from the fact that somebody died, and yet both are
called 'murder', because they fit the previously stated conditions.
Further, the word 'murder' is a formal element because it enables the
classification of new actions never seen before. Thus, if a person were
born with the psychic ability to 'think' a heart attack on someone else,
and they did this to someone to gain some inheritance money, then this
would come under the formal term 'murder'.
Now two things must be said here. One is that it is possible that people
may disagree with the list of conditions given to describe the formal
element 'murder'. This, in fact, indicates something to be dealt with later
- that if we disagree over such matters, we are merely stating one of the
ways in which ordinary people do come to blows (literally and
metaphorically) over what constitutes 'moral' terms. Secondly, 'murder' is
but one instance of a 'bad' act, again indicating that a hierarchy of
formal elements is being discussed. This fact will be returned to as well.
Much of the same sort of things can be said about the word 'property'. It
will have a list of conditions for its proper usage, over which people may
disagree, and it will be the kind of concept which will enable the
classification or pigeon-holing of new, less complex words as they are
encountered.
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In neither case of the words 'murder' or 'property' do empirical
similarities between various instances of these formal elements need to be
looked for. What needs to be known in each case is why they were called
by that name in the first place, what was the purpose, what are the
criteria. To use another of Kovesi's terms(22), the 'material elements' of
each formal element may be totally different on each occasion - we may
shoot, strangle, knife, suffocate or drown someone, but this would still be
'murder' if it conformed to the conditions used to describe a murder.
At this point, it may well be worth pointing out that Kovesi's esoteric use
of 'formal' and 'material' elements may be not only superfluous, but
positively misleading. Their usage does have the merit of letting one
know that less complex formal elements come within the control of the
complex formal elements, but the impression is given that they are
different animals, and they simply are not. They are both examples of
more or less complex concepts, nothing more and nothing less, and it is
the use of these concepts, prior to sense experience, which determines the
structure of what is seen. Thus Kovesi can say(23):
"—in an important sense, in the world, there ia no value
and there are no murders, tables, houses, accidents, or
inadvertent acts—the world of raw data cannot be described for
the sense of that world also lies outside it, and the very
description of it, likewise, lies outside it."
In other words, an order is imposed upon the world, and without this prior
imposition, the world would be unintelligible. This is why Kovesi can take
Hume to task for using the word 'murder'(24), for this is a concept which
is brought to an external event, and the event is interpreted in the light
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of this concept. On Hume's empiricist stand, he is simply incapable of
this act. Moreover, because of the nature of concepts, Hume could not give
another example of murder. As Kovesi says(25) "—evaluation is not an
icing on a cake of hard facts", but, rather, to continue the metaphor, it is
the cake tin in which the cake is first shaped.
But there is something else to point out, as
	 and this is that all
facts are products of concepts, and that these concepts rank from the
lowliest - the concept of 'yellow' perhaps - to the most complex, which go
higher than Kovesi's formal terms of 'murder', 'good',
	 or 'justice',
but which go to the level of what may be called 'conceptual schemes'. Now
a distinction between 'concepts' and 'conceptual schemes' is normally
accepted, but it seems wiser to think of the difference as being one of
degree, rather than of kind. Viewing concepts in this way suggests that
misunderstandings between people over concepts and conceptual schemes is
in principle no different. 	 Thus, there may be disagreement over the
meaning of the words 'yellow' or 'table', but very few people would say
that they cannot, logically, understand one another. Similarly, there may
be disagreement over the meaning of the word 'murder', but people still
understand each other.	 And finally, then, it can be argued that the
scientist who practises vivisection may have difficulty understanding what
the anti-vivisectionist is saying, but the same kind of disagreement as
the two previous examples is still being described, only at a more complex
level. As Trigg(26) put it:
to posit different moral traditions for every fundamental
moral disagreement is to reduce to absurdity the notion of a
form of life..."
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and is to separate off as different in kind what is really only different
in degree.
This strongly suggests that an understanding of the nature and function of
concepts, and of their hierarchies, is essential if a full understanding of
the naturalistic fallacy is to be gained. After all, what is an evaluative
utterance, but the use of one of Kovesi's formal terms? In this respect,
the word 'murder' has strong similarities with the word 'property', and
both have only distant connections with the word 'yellow'. Both 'murder'
and 'property' are conceptual terms, the use of which determine the
material elements, or lower conceptual terms, to be assigned to them.
'Yellow', on the other hand, is considerably less complex, and is, in a very
real sense, much nearer to being a part of the external world than 'murder'
or 'property' are. But none of them exists independently of the user, for
they were invented as concepts, and the manner and type of lower concepts
used in the construction of higher concepts is a human invention as well.
Now the mistake sometimes seen with the naturalistic fallacy is when a
person says that one cannot move from the descriptive to the evaluative,
and quotes as an instance of this the example of not being able to move
from 'the boy is at school' to 'the boy ought to be at school'. With this,
no-one could disagree. However, it misses the point.
	 'The boy is at
school' may be a description of certain conceptual elements, but they are
the wrong conceptual elements for the construction of the statement 'the
boy ought to be at school', Such a complex conceptual notion demands the
use of other, less complex, conceptual elements - such as, perhaps, the
notions of a mother ordering him to school, a belief in the right of the
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parent to do so, a belief in the value of education, etc,etc. As Kovesi
says (27)
"—our different sorts of notions do not cross the floor of the
house: in order to get to the other side they have to go back
to their constituencies and be elected for the other side. If
certain material elements have been e_lecEedto serve a purpose,
then they serve that purpose. In order for them to serve another
purpose, they have to go through the same process again that
enables them to serve a particular purpose, they have to be
elected again."
Now it may be said against such an argument that there may be
disagreement with the reasons given for believing the boy ought to be at
school. But this is perfectly all right, simply because the nature of the
argument is implicitly accepted. Such an argument agrees that reasons for
moral Judgements are valid ways of arriving at these moral Judgements:
they only disagree about the content.
Thus every time one of the more abstract conceptual terms like 'Justice' or
'fairness' is used, implicitly included within this term is a lot of less
complex conceptual terms which go to build it. This seems to explain why
few people argue over the meaning of 'yellow' or 'dog' or 'wife', but there
are libraries of argument over the more complex conceptual terms. Words
like 'yellow' or 'sweet' have one or two terms under their command, words
like 'clog' or 'wife' rather more, whilst the most complex have whole armies
under their command.
	 Now if the previous findings about public and
private meanings of words are applied to that which has Just been stated,
the opportunities for misuse, invention, neglect of certain lower
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conceptual elements within a more complex conceptual element's definition,
are vastly more likely with the more complex than the less complex. Thus
a comparison, as Moore(28) does between the words 'yellow' and 'good'
simply isn't on. The former is near the bottom of a conceptual hierarchy,
whilst the latter is very near the top. To say that the two are both
describing words is to be hugely over-simplistic. To say that they are
different because they are from different areas of discourse, the factual
and the evaluative, is also to miss the point completely. They may be
used for different purposes, but this does not mean that they are from
different areas of discourse, if by that is meant that there is a huge
divide between the factual and the evaluative areas of our discourse. This
simply isn't true.	 The difference lies in their positions within the
hierarchy of the whole of human discourse, which should be treated as a
unified whole, but which obviously has within it different areas of
interest. But these areas show a subtle interplay all of the time, and at
all levels, because there is an essential unity between them. Morality,
being an area concerned with some of the more subtle and complex
concepts, being an area which, for its concepts to work effectively, must
take into account those concepts to do with our physical world, tends to
occupy the higher levels. However, it still rubs shoulders with concepts
like rights, meaning, and impartiality, which would not, all of the time, be
Included within the moral area. It is because Moore(29) failed to notice
that there is this unity and this hierarchy that he could see the
naturalistic fallacy as so plausible. Moral notions are invariably near
the top of our hierarchy of discourse simply because they are normally
among our more complex notions, and to argue for or against them, complex
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notions at the same level, or immediately above or below, need to be
introduced. Those below may act as reasons, but with the possibilities of
misunderstandings multiplied spectacularly, not only with people's
different ideas of what count as reasons, but also through the interplay
between private and public languages, it is little wonder that people do
not always see eye to eye. Indeed, it speaks volumes for man's capacity
to overcome misunderstandings that there should be so much homogeneity in
the world.
A final point concerning objectivity and subjectivity in morality,
epistemology, and linguistic analysis may now be brought in. There is a
very real danger that such an argument will become divided into two
separate camps, the totally subjective and the totally objective. Whilst
this chapter may have managed to show that the totally subjective stance
in this field is simply untenable, it should also be added that the totally
objective stance is untenable as well. As long as there is the individual,
and as long as he or she is capable of developing his or her own ideas, as
long as there is the possibility of misunderstandings, then there is no
possibility of a totally objective stance. This implies that there are
degrees of subjectivity, and that these can be lessened by the use of
patient analysis, consideration of the relevant facts, tolerance and
rationality. Total objectivity may never be achieved, but this does not
mean that it is not possible, nor worthwhile, to get nearer to this goal.
In the final chapter of this section, an attempt will be made to extend
this analysis of language into an account which adequately describes the
nature of moral enquiry.
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CHAPTER 4 THE NATURE OF MORAL ENQUIRY.
This chapter will try to tie in a variety of threads which have been
untangled in earlier chapters, and will try to show that there is a
unity in their structure which leads back to the concept of the person
which not only suggests but Justifies a particular approach to moral
education, and also prescribes the kind of theory of human functioning
which a psychology of moral behaviour and moral development must have
if it is to be described as adequate. The headings, then, will be:
(1) Language;
(2) Epistemology;
(3) Science;
(4) The Social and Moral Being;
(5) The Human Organism;
(6) Implications;
(7) Discussion.
The chapter's main thrust will be to argue that progress and criticism
are possible in the area of moral education, but that a proper
recognition of the (necessary) impeding factors to a total
understanding must issue in an attitude of tolerance, patience, and
care.
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(1) LANGUAGE.
In the previous chapter, the manner in which language evolved was
described, which	 argued for a complex inter-relationship between
public and private uses, where the one trades off the other in
meaning; and further, that there is a pyramid of terms, with complex
conceptual notions being built upon the less compLex. It was by the
use of these two processes - public/private interactions, and
hierarchies of terms, and of the complex interplay betweea these two
processes, that an attempt was made to explain how language was used,
how languages grow, and change, and how the possibility of
misunderstandings could arise.
To this account, two further points implicit in the argument but not
sufficiently drawn out, will now be added.
The first is the notion of the language-game within which a word is
used.	 This is the principal move, which Wittgenstein made in his
change of view from the 'Tractatus' to the 'Philosophical
Investigations' - from seeing language as a set of independently
existing atomic propositions, to seeing it as a unified coherent
system, wherein individual terns depend for their meaning upon the
rules of the language game being played.	 Passmore(1) gives the
example of a builder teaching a labourer that a 'slab' is a 'slab', a
'brick' is a 'brick' etc. Now this pointing to a particular object is
only a very small part of learning a language, for when the builder
shouts 'slab' to the labourer when he is half way up the shell of a
building, he is not merely displaying his knowledge of what the term
refers to, or testing the labourer's knowledge of the meaning of the
- 77 -
term; rather he is indicating what he wants the labourer to bring h m
But to understand this, the labourer needs to know m ch more than Just
to what the term refers; he must already be 'nitiated into the pur se
and rules of the particular 'game' to which the word belongs.
Now this goes one stage further than the public and private
definitions of words - though this account,still holds good. It goes
one stagP further because it is insisting upon the examination of
words as part of an overall scheme, paradigm or game, and arguing that
to really 'know' the meaning of a term,	 the game in which it is
located has to be understood
	 In other words, to understand the part
the purpose of the whole must be understood first.
This, incidentally, excludes the possibility of a private language
Wittgenstein argues (2), because the criterion for determining whether
a language is used properly or not, is by whether it proceeds in
accordance with the rules of language - and these are public and
intersubJective in nature	 Now an argument has been presented
previously(3), arguing for private meanings to words, on the basis
that each person cones to their understanding by a different path, and
a private language to some extent at least seems to be viable on the
same grounds
	
Thus, new creative attempts at expression,
misunderstandings, and misapplications, are all basically private in
nature. However, to the extent that these activities are essentially
parasitic on public rules, then Wittgenstein was surely correct in
asserting primary position to the public domain.
Nevertheless, the private application of words leads on to the second
point to be added. This is that language concepts are never static,
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but constantly on the move, being modified by the occurrence of new
instances	 At the universal level, there is the notion of a word -
'table' - but each new instance which comes along - this one is a
purple and yellow aluminium star suspended in mid-air off which we eat
- causes the expansion or modification of existing notions slightly.
However, and importantly, in so doing other concepts near to 'table'
are also modified, Now there are at least two views possible as to
how words modify each other. The first could be called the 'jigsaw'
theory of language - where the words fit together into a complete
picture, and the expansion or contraction of one piece affects the
linkage with other pieces, and thereby distorts the whole picture.
The second could be called the 'sliding plate' theory - where the
meaning of one word slides over or under the meaning of another. This
suggests that even before a change in meaning, there is already a
considerable ambiguity in the relationships between words, and that
change in the meaning of one word simply changes an already difficult
process of understanding.
It would be nice if the 'jigsaw' theory were true; it seems more
likely, from what has been said so far, that a 'shifting plate' theory
is.	 But whatever is the truth in the proper description of the
relationship between words, this notion of the modification of
existing concepts by new instances is not particularly problematical
when it comes to the meaning of 'table'. It becomes much more so when
a move is made further up the language pyramid to the more complex
conceptual terns, and when a move is made into more esoteric areas -
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such as the new sciences, where terms have not the direct validation
or life span of more everyday words.
This approach - the continual modification of general terms by the
assimilation of new instances - is sometimes called 'finitism1(4).
Its core notion is that proper usage is developed step by step, in
processes involving successions of on-the-spot judgements. It further
denies that concepts have inherent meanings, and argues that the truth
and falsity of a concept is something which communities, and the
individuals within these communities, decide upon.
However, it is not being argued that 'truth' and 'falsity' per se are
decided by communities - statements, after all, refer to something -
but it is being argued that because of the finitist nature of
language, determination of the 'truth' and 'falsity' of the reference
of concepts can be extremely hazardous.
One final point is that if words, concepts, and meanings depend upon
the larger game in which they are played, it is important to point out
that the purpose of the game does not prescribe the exact number of
participants in the game - it is an open-ended game with an indefinite
number of terns, the number being defined only by the limits of the
desire, or the ability, to express thoughts about the world. This
openness, this ability of systems to expand themselves to accommodate
new interests and purposes within the system, will raise grave doubts
about the validity of using terms like 'paradigms' and 'revolutions'
too rigidly in talk of science, for it would seem that movement can be
effected much more sensibly in a lot of cases by talk of a shift in
focus, or an expansion in the existing field.
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To summarise, then, five things are being argued.
(a) There are hierarchies of terns, the more complex depending upon
the less complex for their meaning.
(b) The meanings of words change through an interchange between
private understanding and public usage.
(c) The meanings of words change because of the finitist nature of
language -that each new instance to some extent affects the
current usage.
(d) Terms cannot be fully understood in isolation - one must
understand the 'game' in which they are being used. The parts
can only be fully understood when the purpose of the whole is.
Teleology raises its head, and will continue to do so
throughout this thesis.
What are the implications for such a position? There seem to be at
least five.
(i) There will always be misunderstandings - because of confusions
between the private and public, the public application of a
term, the meanings of terns within hierarchies of discourse.
(ii) 'Objectivity' is an unattainable notion, but one which draws
us on; and there can be degrees of subjectivity.
(iii) Language is never static, but constantly, inevitably, on the
move in its meaning.
(iv) The purpose of the 'game' needs to be understood before the
meaning of the usage of individual terms can be understood -
and the purpose of the game is decided by prior choice.
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Thus, values precede facts. But these values are based on
prior facts, so there is a constant circle of evaluation and
resort to the 'facts'.
(v) Facts cannot be separated from values because language systems
are constructed to make sense, and sense is made by the
selection of external reality.
(2) EPISTEMOLOGY.
If the understanding of the meaning of words is a subjective, non-
static, purposive one, then so is the epistemology.
For a start, epistemology is expressed through language, it is the
medium used, the interface between human beings and the world. The
characteristics of language, drawn as they are out of epistemology,
are attempts to map the world, and so will tend to express to a
greater or lesser extent the perception of this world. But secondly,
language works back upon this epistemology, for it is certain to
influence understanding. Thus, the very way in which comprehension
is framed necessarily places limitations upon the ways in which the
world can be thought about, and in this way necessarily structures the
perceptions made and received.
So, at the very start, the influence of language shunts understanding
of the world onto a particular track, just as understanding goes to
frame how we express language. If this is the case, and epistemology
takes of the nature of language - partly private, partly public,
subjective, constantly on the move, purposive, and framed in terms of
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these purposes
	
then it bears little resemblance to the majority of
descriptions put forward throughout the history of Western philosophy.
The key to this difference lies, it would appear, in the overwhelming
desire to relate how explicit, impersonal, permanent knowledge can be
attained.
	 Plato attempted to achieve it through his notion of the
Forms - eternal, transcendent universals, existing above this world of
flux and decay. Aristotle saw not a world of flux and decay, but a
stable, permanent world which only needed to be ordered and sorted
out. Sense-perception is certainly the beginning, but the move to
universals, once made, is permanent.
	 Descartes thought he had
achieved permanence and objectivity through the notion of clear and
distinct ideas, an expression of his time in the power of human
reason. Kant, in attempting to counter the nihilist conclusions of
Hums, revolved reality around the spectator, and looked for the
categorial apparatus of the mind, the synthetic a priori truths which
would give him and us that objective permanence so much sought after.
But each of them, in some way, went wrong. 	 Why?	 It is most
instructive for present purposes to look at the reasons for each.
Beginning, then, with Plato, it must be asked how he arrived at the
notion of the Forms. The argument, can be seen most clearly in the
'Mena'.	 Here, Socrates professes his ignorance, but suggests that
others, by contact with him, may at least achieve his ignorance, that
i., come to question what they formerly took for granted. Socrates
concludes (5)
" ...and now, as far as excellence is concerned, I don't know
what it is; you perhaps knew before you came into contact with
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me, but now you are like someone who doesn't know. All the same,
I want to consider it with you and join with you in searching
for whatever it is."
They will therefore seek together for what they do not know. But now
the slave boy asks the crucial question which either forces the Forms
out of Plato, or leaves him with no answer(6):
...and how are you going to search for this, Socrates, when
you don't have the faintest idea what it is? Which of the
things that you don't know will you suppose that it is, when
you are searching for it? And even if you cla come across
it, how are you going to know that this is the thing you don't
see?"
And so it is that Plato is able to present the Forms, the immortality
of the soul; and this wonderful notion of a suprasensible world of
universals more real than the real world, comes into being.
It must not be forgotten why Plato is appearing in this chapter. A
form of knowledge totally at odds with the Platonic conception is
being argued for. The only point of contact is that both agree that
there is a reality, but further than that and there is little in
common.	 But how can Meno's question be answered?
	 It can't be
answered in any other way but Plato's if his premises are accepted.
But it has already been shown in the discussion of language that the
parts cannot be understood on their own - both their relationships
with each other, and with the purpose of the game, need to be
understood before a full understanding can be achieved. But this full
understanding is always, necessarily, at the personal level, and so
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can never really be a full one, in the sense of being totally
objective.
Now the same would seem to apply with knowledge as with language, and
Polanyi s s(7) distinction between 'focal' and 'subsidiary' awareness
would seem to be what is being looked for. 	 Focal awareness is
"knowledge by attending to", whilst subsidiary awareness is "knowledge
by relying on." Polanyi's central argument is that no knowledge can
be wholly focal - human beings are directed to a problem by their
subsidiary awareness - by their present state of knowledge suggesting
that there are anomalies in their understanding - and their focal
awareness centres on the problem. But implicit in this argument are
three major assertions:
(a) that comprehension of an area of knowledge is dependent upon
comprehension of surrounding areas;
(b) that total comprehension is subjective because it must be
personal;
(c) that complete reality can never be encountered, simply because
a total picture can never be achieved. Hunan beings are
always on the move trying to make sense, more sense, different
sense, of their experience, of reality.
Knowledge, then, is not impersonal, static, and objective, as Plato
would have us believe, but personal, transitory, subjective, and
possibly wrong.	 As Polanyi remarked in respect of our cultural
heritage(8), it comprises "everything in which we may be totally
mistaken."
- 85-
What of Aristotle
	 Meno's question can only really arise where there
is genuine puzzlement and search, and as Aristotle's account of the
world(9) is one in which the groping towards new insights, new
understandings, is missing, Meno's question has little relevance.
Aristotelian universals are not Platonic universals, they are not real
in the way that the individual is for us, or the Platonic universal is
real for him, but they are expressions of a tidy, ordered, unchanging
world which is there to be classified and sorted out.
	 As Barnes
says (10)
"...in Plato's opinion, whiteness is prior to white things, for
the existence of white things is simply a matter of their
sharing in whiteness,,. in Aristotle's opinion, white things
are prior to whiteness, for the existence of whiteness is
simply a matter of there being white things...."
How different from the universals which Polanyi describes(11):
"...the problem of how a universal concept is formed is part
of the problem of empirical induction. All attempts to
formulate strict rules for deriving general laws from
individual experiences have failed. And one of the reasons
is again, that each instance of a law differs, strictly
speaking, in every particular from every other instance of it."
Thus	 epistemology and	 science must move continuously between
particulars and universals in both directions.
	
The particulars
continually change notions of the universal, and the universal gives
structure and background to the particulars. There will always be a
groping further into the problem, but never a completion of its
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resolution. For this thesis, then, truth is open and contingent, for
Aristotle it is closed and complete.
It is this Aristotelian notion of science which seems to have had more
profound effects than its Platonic counterpart. 	 For whilst both
suggest that it is in principle possible to grasp the permanent,
objective, and static truth, Aristotle's notion is much more amenable
n••
to the scientist.	 It posits no necessary knowledge of the mystical
realm, but invites investigation of the world of here-and-now, and
guarantees the desired end result. Little wonder, then, that with a
philosophic tradition beginning with these two giants, and with man's
natural desire to know, that a counter-tradition which offers far
less, and is intuitively so unappealing, would have had such a hard
time to establish itself.
Does Descartes provide any more help? Not really, because Descartes
offers the same stable truths, though arrived at, admittedly, from a
new direction:
"Concerning the subjects proposed for investigation, we
should seek to determine, not what others have thought, nor
what we ourselves conjecture, but what we can clearly and
evidently intuit, or deduce with certainty, for in no other
way is knowledge obtained." (12)
The secret of Cartesian method, and its intuitive appeal, lies in its
mathematical precision, the move from those truths which cannot be
doubted through to the more complex, via the notion of clear and
distinct ideas, a clear and distinct idea being something the mind
does which cannot be doubted. Thus:
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"...we reject all knowledge which is merely probable and judge
that only those things should be believed which are
perfectly known, and about which we can have no doubts." (13)
Descartes structure, then, works something like this: there is
knowledge which one cannot doubt, and this knowledge, because of its
objective nature, is obviously the same everywhere, and is perceived
by a rational faculty which is not constrained or impeded by the body.
The body is thus perceived as only a machine which houses the
intellect.
However, this approach can be doubted immediately. Descartes
sunnarised his method in what is known as the principle of clarity and
distinctness, which in the words of 'The Discourse' is:
"...the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly
are all true..."(14)
And yet there is the classic example of Priestley clinging tenaciously
to the phlogiston theory and refusing to admit the existence of the
oxygen he had 'discovered'(15). In this case, which is the clear and
distinct idea? Priestley would have said the phlogiston, so another
approach must be sought if he is to be disproved. It will have to be
admitted that the advance of knowledge, far from being an inexorable
process through these clear and distinct ideas, is actually a tangled
web of partial truth and partial error. All knowledge is capable of
doubt, and this is so precisely because of the manner in which it is
approached - via ourselves as persons, in particular, rooted,
historical situations, groping from the subjective conception of the
slightly less, and always, because of the nature of focal and
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subsidiary awareness, capable of error and mistake. Again, a major
philosopher offers an account of knowledge guaranteeing stability,
objectivity, and permanence, and again it must be rejected. This time
it is because, as Merleau-Ponty(16) said
...we are not in some incomprehensible way an activity joined
to a passivity, an automatism surmounted by a will, a
perception surmounted by a judgement, but wholly active and
wholly passive, because we are the upsurge of time."
Curiously, however, Descartes set in motion something which was to
result in the last great system of objective knowledge leading into
the present day.
A Cartesian clear and distinct idea is an act of understanding which
the mind performs. But what if the mental performance is extracted,
and those data that cone to the mind are concentrated upon instead?
Locke's version of ideas does just this(17), and it only takes a tweak
from Hume(18), to turn such a theory into one which argues that
sensory awareness never carries its own interpretation, that human
beings are the prisoners of those stimuli impinging upon them, the
possessors of minds which can never know the truth or falsity of
anything. Here is an empiricism so deep and biting and sceptical that
if its inexorable logic is followed, the possibility of the knowledge
of anything must be denied - of the reality of the world, of
causation, of personal identity, and of ethical principles.
This is the extreme empiricism which was the forefather of the logical
positivists and behaviourists of the twentieth century, and they
suffer from the sane problems as it does.
	
If such a thoroughgoing
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empiricism i. adopted, its own principles lead to the demonstration
of its own inadequacies, for as was demonstrated in the discussion on
language above, it is not the data which wholly determine the
conceptual system adopted; sense of external reality is made by being
selective of its content.	 Thus choice and selection precede the
incoming data, and any description of human activity which is nothing
more than a description of the data impinging upon the organism must
be grossly deficient. As Grene says(19):
"...purely passive contents of experience cannot build
themselves up into systems of knowledge, unless given shape
and significance by the person whose experience they are."
T e recognition of this personal nature of perception at least goes
part of the way to an epistemological link-up with the nature of
language, and Kant is the man to introduce this personal element.
Kant, as he says, was woken from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume, and
attempted in philosophy(20) what Copernicus had attempted in astronomy
to revolve reality around the spectator, rather than the spectator
around reality.	 But he came to the problem with certain crucial
presuppositions which led him astray.
Kant was looking for necessary absolute truths via the mind's
contributions to knowledge - the synthetic a prioris. These synthetic
a prioris - the products of the categorial apparatus which the mind
brings to bear upon the data impinging - are guaranteed for Kant by
three main things:
(a) a belief that contemporary Newtonian science was the final,
secure, unalterable stage of this branch of knowledge;
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(b) his profound faith in a benevolent deity who would not deceive
humanity;
(c) the beli f that the synthetic a prioris, becau.e of the
categorial apparatus being the same for everyone, were a so the
same everywhere.
Thus Kant in his approach is not aware of, nor incorporates into his
account, the possibility that different cultures might adopt different
conceptual schemes, different synthetic a prioris, that no part of
science is final and complete, nor the possibility that a benevolent
deity may not be there to guarantee the validity of this categorial
apparatus.
So it is not possible to go along with Kant, as it is not possible
with Plato, Aristotle, or Descartes in their accounts of the guarantee
of an absolute, certain epistemology. But there are certain things
with which agreement with Kant is possible.
Firstly, it is possible to agree that experience is not atomic, but
rule-governed, and that these rules are supplied by the mind's
categories - even if there can be no absolute guarantee for them.
Secondly, it is possible to agree that human beings are constantly
searching, groping for the truth.
Thirdly, it is possible to agree that there is a truth, a reality
which is being searched for.
Finally, it can be agreed that the search for knowledge must be
located within the individual, even though this must be taken much
further than Kant, and be argued that not only is each person a
transcendental Unity of Apperception, but something much more, an
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individual located within an historical scheme, and with all his or
her genetic attributes interacting with this evironment.
	 Kant has
begun the personalisation of knowledge, but it must be carried much
further.
What, then, are the conclusions to be reached? Having looked at the
theories of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, and having rejected
the notion of knowledge as a public, static, permanent entity, this
does not mean that the notion of a reality can be dispensed with as
well. The notion of something to which we refer must be held in mind
if the more subjectivist and relativist positions are to be escaped.
Nor does a personalised view of knowledge mean that either the notion
of universals, or of the public nature of conceptual schemes may be
rejected. For a start, experience can only be made sense of through
the use of universals, for they act as the standards for the
evaluation of experience.	 Indeed, it seems fair to say that there
could be no sense to experience without universals - it is only that
they hold the same sort of impermanent, finitist character as the rest
of knowledge; or, to be more exact, they are impermanent, but less so
than individual instances because they have the strength of the
collected wisdom of past instances. Thus the shift in a universal's
meaning is likely to be small in the short run: it will take the
accumulated weight of a great many instances to move it substantially.
However, the fact remains that universals do come under pressure and
do change.
Similarly, conceptual schemes share the same sorts of tensions - the
tension between private and public understanding, the effects of
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individual acts of categorisation upon the entire scheme, the effects
of the scheme upon attempted acts of categorisation. The best way to
see exactly what is meant is to look at these tensions in practice.
This can be done through an examination of the practice of Science.
(3) SCIENCE.
The inquiry into language and epistemology generally has led to the
conclusion that knowledge of the 'real' is either impeded by, or
proceeds from four processes.
Firstly, the personalised and subjective nature of the operation is a
limiting but necessary condition.
Secondly, there is
	
the constant dialogue and possibility of
misunderstanding between the public and private conceptions.
Thirdly, the framing of language and knowledge within conceptual
schemes is a directing and possibly misleading process, but one,
again, which is a sine qua non of the process.
Finally, universals are essential as guides, but are of a constantly
modified nature because of the finitist nature of human understanding.
The tensions produced by such a process have been clearly demonstrated
in the debates proceeding the philosophy of science. 	 As in
epistemology, so in science;	 there is the initial belief in the
possibility of a perfect, static, permanent, objective science. This,
as mentioned in Chapter 2, is similar to the Whig view of history, in
which historical change is seen as progress, and change is interpreted
as the move towards more advanced and complete forms of political and
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social organisation.	 Thus Whig historians saw the explanations for
past periods in the events of a future time.
This tendency to see the pattern of the present as the explanation of
the events of the past, of past events as development towards the
future, is not so current in liberal circles today, though perhaps, in
science, it would have rather more justification. After all, it can
be argued that there are profound differences between history and
science. History could be described as the record or interpretation
of man's attempt to make sense of his environment and life, 	 in a
world uncontrolled and mostly uncontrollable, where he tends to react
to situations rather than to impose a plan upon them, where the
variables are so numerous and ungoverned that all too often history
becomes the story of response rather than premeditated action.	 In
this situation, to talk of history as progress is selective in the
extreme.
Science, on the other hand, has conventionally been seen as planned
investigation: where a small part of the environment is separated off,
isolated, all the relevant variables held under control, and in so
doing, man, by his logic, reason and planning, is able to totally
control, and therefore to understand. There is, then, good reason, at
least initially, for believing that science might be equated with
progress - assuming that 'control' is progress. However, some views
take this one stage further, and see the knowledge of modern science
as the very pattern of reality itself.
It has already been seen that there are severe problems with such an
account, and that these problems appear to rest upon the status of
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the inductive method. However, the argument of Popper was noted, which
argued that the hallmark of the scientific method has nothing to do
with induction at all, but rather to do with criticism and
falsifiability. It was pointed out	 that the curious thing about
Popper's position is that it is no more than the reverse side of the
positive coin, and must consequently face much the same criticisms.
The alternative views of Kuhn and Feyerabend, however, are
discomforting in the extreme. It is, however, easy to see how Kuhn,
for instance, could arrive at his position. Kuhnian paradigms are not
seen by him as somehow an impediment to making sense of reality, but
rather as the only manner in which this activity could take place.
Thus, in his account of the training of neophyte scientists(21), in
the pattern that research takes(22), he describes activities which
impose a necessary pattern, which are not just cultural variants, but
are the kinds of selection needed if the activity is to take place at
all.	 Thus, just as in language, where the language has to have a
purpose, and only with this purpose can words within the system have a
meaning, just as in epistemology, where it is only by the selection
and choice imposed by the person and culture on experience, can events
be given any meaning, so with the scientific 'fact' - only within the
context of the scientific paradigm can the fact gain acceptance. As
Barnes has said(23):
...observations accepted by scientists are not simple protocol
reports, standing on their own. To become part of science, they
must be relevant to the interests of science. They must be
attuned to standards of scientific value, acceptable not only
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to the individual experimenter, but to the consensus of
scientific opinion whose authority he accepts."
As Grene points out(24), this is why Mendel's brilliant work in
genetics failed to attain the significance it deserved during his
lifetime, why no one noticed or accepted his results.	 It was not
until much later, when the values of the , scientific community were
such as could incorporate his work, when the subsidiary awareness was
such, and the focal awareness was directed towards his area of
research, that his true stature could be recognised.
Kuhn, however, wants to be much more radical than to merely describe
the social and psychological factors which might prevent valid work
from being recognised as such: Kuhn wants to assert that the
scientific paradigm of the time, the conceptual scheme then in
operation, was such that Mendel's work was incapable of being
recognised because it belonged to a different paradigm, one whose
valuesweredifferent, and therefore whose research was incommensurable
with the paradigm of his time.
Kuhn is in effect asserting that the notion of 'progress' in
scientific understanding, in conceptual schemes in general, is really
an archaic notion which has no mileage - as paradigms describe and
measure different things, so they cannot be compared with each other.
They work for the communities who employ them, they can be changed,
but only by a change in gestalt, a scientific revolution, and then it
cannot be said that one is better than the other - simply because
there is no criterion of judgement.
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Now Kuhn's work is as an historian of science, and his observations
are detailed and specific.	 But it is instructive to compare his
account with that of seven appraisals in the volume "Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledge u (25).	 Five of these appraisals are by
philosophers, and their criticisms of Kuhn are not empirically based
at all. It would be unfair to say of Popper et al, that they do not
care a fig whether Kuhn has produced an accurate description of the
history of scientific thinking or not, but it wouldn't be far off the
mark.	 Popper and the other philosophers are concerned with what
science ought to be, and produce their definitions. 	 Thus, for a
Popperian, science is what Popperian philosophy asserts it should be.
Never mind that in the past scientists haven't performed in a
Popperian manner: this simply means that they weren't doing science
properly.
Kuhn, on the other hand, draws out his normative considerations from
his empirical, historical study: if this is what science has been,
this is what science is, this is all science can be. 	 Now it is
Important to note that Kuhn isn't exactly committing the naturalistic
fallacy - if his account of the incommensurability of scientific
paradigms is correct, then he is saying that there is no 'ought' in it
science cannot take place except within these incommensurable
paradigms, and to say, as Popper does, that science ought to be like
this or like that, is nothing more than whistling after the wind.
However, the onus would seem to be on Kuhn to prove his thesis - that
these paradigms are incommensurable - otherwise his account may be of
psychological and sociological interests but little more.
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As was seen in Chapter 2, there are good reasons to doubt his
account, Further, Kuhn's descriptions of the move from one paradigm
to another by scientists is sketchy in the extreme. 	 What is a
revolution? Is it a massive reconstruction in the entire way a branch
of science looks at the world? Or is it a large scale re-orientation
because of the impact of the influence of, a new, but related, branch
of study coming to bear? Or is it esoteric changes among specialists?
The problem is that Kuhn's description of 'normal' science and
'revolutions' appears to give a clear-cut picture which, in reality,
does not necessarily exist or work in the way he suggests.
Take Mendel's case again.	 Was it .a scientific revolution which
allowed the incorporation of his findings? Or was it more likely the
Polanyian description of focal and subsidiary awareness - that during
his lifetime, scientific communities' focal attention was on other
aspects of the field, and only later did their attention, their
awareness shift to areas which needed the inclusion of Mendel's
insights.
Moreover, there seem to be very real problems with the need for
scientific revolutions in the first place. 	 If there is no way in
which one is Justified in claiming that one paradigm is 'better' than
another, then one might well ask why there is a revolution in the
first place.	 And yet Kuhn's description of the build-up to a
revolution - the anomalies, the inadequacies of the present paradigm
to incorporate new findings, suggests that there is more to this
revolution than a duck/rabbit gestalt shift. There is the personal
nature of investigation, the tension between private and public
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understanding, the subjectivity of knowledge, but there is something
more, the groping towards something - which might well be
characterised as a more adequate description of reality. 	 It seems
that at times Kuhn's theory takes on almost idealist overtones. There
are the competing paradigms, but Kuhn sometimes seems to forget that
they are competing with a purpose, and about something which can be
classified as their criteria of usefulness - external reality.
It would appear that talk of 'normal' science and 'revolutions' is a
misleading way of describing this - and by implication - other human
activities. Science appears to work, like most other human pursuits,
in terms of a whole series of different activities, among which are
the following.
Firstly, there is the chosen normative scheme.	 In the case of
science, its normative content is usually the search for the truth,
but it can be influenced by the social and psychological factors of
the practitioners and the community involved. Thus Lysenko's work in
genetics(26) was influenced by another normative paradigm -that of
squaring with existing Marxist-Leninist theory.
Secondly, there is the noting within this scheme of the repetition of
similar occurrences - the use of analogy, comparison, and induction.
Thirdly, there is the attempt to predict and falsify.
Lastly, there is the construction of conceptual schemes to account for
validated instances.
On the account given so far, then, there are strong reasons for
believing that the work by Lakatos(27) in the philosophy of science
parallels quite closely the description of the nature of universals
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given previously in this chapter. Lakatos advances a sophisticated
version of Popper's falsification hypothesis, and argues that
falsification is the basic indicator of the 'progressive' or
'degenerative' status of research programmes. However, he is at pains
to argue that such programmes are never totally proved or disproved,
indicating the folly of ever totally discoupting any programme, and
of the extremely complex nature of bringing arguments to bear, either
for or against the worth of any programme. It will shortly be seen,
when attention is focussed upon the status of social, political and
moral theories, that this closely parallels the account given there.
All of this will happen within the epistemological and linguistic
constraints noted above, particularly that of the personalist nature
of focal and subsidiary awareness. It would appear that Popper and
Kuhn have got hold of part of the elephant and thought they could thus
extrapolate from the part they held to an adequate description of the
whole
Recapitulation and Forward.
So far, then, it has been argued that language, epistemology, and
science share the same basic characteristics. It may well be asked why
they should do so. The answer given here, the reasons for which will
shortly be given at length, is because they are activities of the sane
organism - the human being.	 The next task, therefore, will be to
describe those characteristics which produce these similarities. In
so doing, the aim will be to show that the moral activities of mankind
necessarily partake of the same structure, and must be characterised
in the sane manner. If this argument can be achieved, then, it would
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seem to be an adequate base for a description of the cognitive side of
moral activities. This is crucial for three reasons.
Firstly, it will provide the justification for the approach to the
subject matter of moral education, which might be characterised as the
tentative approach. If this is what human beings are, by their very
nature, then moral education, and education in general, must educate
people to the awareness of these limitations - assuming of course
people should be educated to an understanding of what la.
Secondly, it prescribes the least necessary description of an adequate
psychology of man's moral thinking and development. In so doing, it
sets limits to what can be expected of the individual, and, also,
extends his capabilities and possibilities.
Lastly, it does not suggest the matter directly, but describes the
manner in which it can be approached and dealt with. It therefore
directly affects policies of the implementation of moral education.
(4) THE SOCIAL AND MORAL BEING.
A description of man via his language, his epistemology, and his
science is only a partial picture. What of him as a social, political
and moral being?	 The former areas cover the ways he tries to
understand and describe the world. But from this is it possible to get
to a description of the way in which he judges and acts? There is, as
well, an important complication to add to any description of these
areas, which refers back to the Wittgensteinian notion of a language
game, but now with an added twist. As Berlin says(28):
...men's beliefs in the sphere of conduct are part of their
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conception of themselves and others as human beings; and this
conception in its turn, whether conscious or not, is intrinsic
to their picture of the world."
Now what becomes crucial is that the investigation of social,
political and moral actions, if it is to perform adequately, must
therefore fully take into account the interpretations, motives,
desires, conceptual schemes, and paradigms of the agents involved.
However, this means that a concept of a social science based on
perceived regularities in behaviour cannot be a full and proper
description.	 This is the major flaw with behaviourist accounts in
psychology.	 If an understanding of what human beings are is to be
gained, then the models that dominate their thoughts and action must
be understood as well. Any conception of the empirical that ignores
or underestimates the power and pervasiveness of these models is
emasculated. Thus a conception of the empirical that restricts itself
to publicly observable behaviour, and relegates such models and
interpretations	 to	 what	 is	 'merely'	 subjective,	 radically
misrepresents human action.
Berlin(29) notes that the models set by Plato, Aristotle, Christianity
and others, vie and contend with one another for legitimacy in men's
minds. But he makes a very revealing point when he says that:
...if men or circumstances alter radically, or new empirical
knowledge is gained which will revolutionise our conception
of man, then certainly some of these edifices will cease to be
relevant and will be forgotten..."
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All of which can, and it seems, should, be interpreted on the model of
human behaviour so far presented. The universal, in this case, is a
social, political or moral value, which is under the same sort of
stress from private/public interpretation, and finitist individual
additions to its central concept, and is thus constantly in the
process of change of meaning. Now these individual additions to the
universal, either in the form of occurrences which might or might not
be interpreted as coming within its boundaries of definition, or in
the form of factual knowledge which directly relate the value to the
situation in the world, all inform values and change them.	 At the
same tine, though, these values determine the selection of individual
occurrences and 'relevant' facts as well, thus producing a constant
interplay.	 These universals, values, paradigms etc. cling on
tenaciously through, firstly, not being falsifiable or rejectable by
one fact alone, and secondly, by conditioning the selection of the
facts brought to bear.
Thus these universals tend to have a very long life-span, and may
never be totally rejected. 	 Rather, they may come to seem to have
insufficient agreement with the 'facts', and may also fail to
harmonise with other universals within the value scheme. Madness as
the possession by demons is a good example. Such a concept does not
square with the scientific facts current in our society, nor does the
notion of demons and hobgoblins square with current notions of the
meaning of good and bad. The universal, then, gradually drifts out of
fashion, but is never entirely dispensed with. The similarities with
the work of Lakatos(30), mentioned earlier, are large and obvious.
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The links with Wittgenstein are explicitly brought out by Winch in his
writings on the idea and possibility of a social science(31). He
argues that the idea of a social science based upon the natural
sciences is a mistake. Now according to Winch(32):
"...the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts
which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation
offered in the natural sciences."
Winch argues that human behaviour is rule-governed, which presupposes
the existence of intersubJective conventions and agreements, and that
to understand the behaviour, the rules underlying the behaviour must
be understood as well. The close parallels with Wittgenstein and
language, with scientific paradigms, with Berlin's thesis, are very
apparent. Winch's own example is striking. He suggests that an
activity like voting makes no sense whatsoever unless the reasons for
the physical behaviour of placing an 'x' on a piece of paper and
putting it in a tin box are taken into account.
So far, so good. But what, for Winch, marks off such activities from
being called social science is that there can be no standards of
evaluation. As he says(33):
"Two things may be called 'the sane' or 'different' only
with reference to a set of criteria which lay down what is to
be regarded as a relevant difference. When the 'things' in
question are purely physical the criteria appealed to will of
course be those of the observer. But when one is dealing with
intellectual (or indeed any kind of social) 'things', that is not
so. For their being intellectual or social, as opposed to
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phy.ical, in character depends entirely on their belonging in a
certain way to a system of ideas or mode of living. It is only
by reference to the criteria governing tha system of ideas or
mode of life that they have any existence as intellectual or
social events."
This relativistic the.is can be countered to a large extent, it would
seem, by examining Carr's (34) notion of historical truth. In Carr's
thesis, an understanding of past events is conditioned by the
pre.ent's set of criteria for evaluation, and when earlier historians'
views of the same period are read, it is possible to see their biases.
It is rather like looking through different prisms at an object, and
then comparing the distortions of the prisms in order to gain a more
accurate view of what the object really looks like. 	 Again, as in
previous accounts, there can be no absolute objectivity, but there can
be different degrees of subjectivity.
Now Winch (and ourselves) do not need to look through the temporal
prisms historians must use because of the nature of their subject.
Rather, prisms may be used to look at the same time period, so
Winch's pessimism would seem to be misplaced. As Berlin(35) says:
"The ultimate test of the adequacy of the basic patterns by
which we think and act is the only test that common sense or the
sciences afford, namely, whether it fits in with the general
lines on which we think and communicate; and if some among these
in turn are called into question, then the final measure is
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direct confrontation with the concrete data of observation and
introspection which these concepts and categories and habits
order and render intelligible. In this sense.. .any form of
thought that deals with the real world, rests on empirical
evidence..."
There seems to be something of a movement then, which feels that
because	 the absolutes of Plato, Aristotle, etc., are no longer
viable, the baby must be thrown out with the bathwater. Louch(36),
for instance,	 in his discussion of the similarities and
dissimilarities between the physical and social sciences, argues that
universals not only are not static, permanent, and objective in human
endeavour, but that the belief and use of them is a positive danger.
Actions, for Louch, can only be judged in context, and there is no
universal context.	 What is vital, he argues, is the variety and
detail, not the general features of situations which social scientists
have tended to concentrate on in order to formulate laws like the
physical sciences.
It will be apparent by now that not only would this be an incorrect
characterisation of the social sciences, it would, on the present
account, be incorrect for the physical sciences as well. 	 By
concentrating on the particular, Louch loses sight of the fact that
the only way knowledge can be gained is via a conceptual scheme, which
in turn necessitates the use of universals. These universals, though,
do not have the permanent, evil nature Louch ascribes to them. And,
certainly, there is no need for his conclusions - reminiscent of more
extreme existentialism - when he says of morality(37):
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"...the only moral recommendations.. .a move here, a move there,
zig and zag, after the manner of Aristotle's recommendations
with regard to the Mean, everything tentative and subject to
change...men and situations rep esent a variety and a changing
variety, which makes the application of general laws trivial
or false, and universal moral principles a positive evil."
Bernstein(38) argues that what appears to be squeezed out as
illegitimate on this account is the genuine need to gain some
perspective on the many varied contexts in which human beings find
themselves, in order to understand and explain such contexts.
However, as the previous pages have argued, the reasons for thinking
Louch is wrong go deeper. In language, epistemology, science, and.now
morality, knowledge can only be sought through the employment of
conceptual schemes, and one of the fundamental units within these
schemes is the universal - the impermanent, changeable universal but
the universal all the same. And for Louch, or anyone else, to attempt
to dispense with them is simply to cut from under themselves the
ground from which they begin their search.
(5) THE HUMAN ORGANISM.
Language, Epistemology, the activities of Science, Politics, Social
Life and Morality, are all thus linked in characteristically similar
fashions.	 Why is this?	 What is the factor which enables the
application of the sane kind of description to each of the areas of
human activity which has so far been examined? The linking factor
would seem to be that they are human activities; in particular, that
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they are expressions of man's purposive, teleological nature. Human
beings are not, as Merleau-Ponty said(39), an automatism surmounted
by a will, but an organism, an individual, a person - someone who
experiences the 'throwness' of being in the world, who for his very
survival must constantly look to, plan, seek the future. The pursuit
of knowledge, all knowledge, is teleological by its very nature, and
this, in one form or another, is an abiding passion of man, for his
very existence depends upon his ability to face life's contingencies,
to be prepared for the unexpected. This means, necessarily, a mind
directed forward in time. The past is determined and gone: the future
can be open and free.	 This is the crucial insight of the
Existentialist.	 Heidegger(40) could look upon the future as the
exhibition of free will within the constraints of a temporary duration
upon this earth - before our death; Tillich(41), on the other hand,
can concentrate upon a freedom "...in an act of moral decision", and
upon a freedom to receive or accept "...the presence of the divine
Spirit..." But which ever way one views it, all existentialists can
see this freedom. It is not a mere literary phenomenon, but a real
feature of human existence. If the past is determined and gone, but
the future can be open and free, then only to the extent that the past
is carried into the future does free will and determinism become a
major philosophic issue.	 Freedom, as those in the existentialist
school saw, is a liberation, but it is also a heavy responsibility to
oneself and to the social and physical world around one. 	 This is
truly where the moral side of this account takes centre stage.
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This account, then, comes to the description of the features possessed
by the person. Human beings possess all of these characteristics:
(1) They are selective and evaluative in what they extract.
(2) They are self-defining in terns of the conceptual schemes they
adopt.
(3) They are purposive, teleological creatures, defined in terms
of temporality.
(4) Their understanding is permanently groping, finitist, and
necessarily subjective.
(5) They constantly attempt to construct schemes to explain what
they find and thus are pattern seeking.
(6) They generally accept that their best method of attack is to
adopt the value of impartiality - the trademark of science.
(7) They are based within a community whose conceptual scheme they
are constantly re-interpreting.
(8) They are determined by the past, but are capable of freedom in
the future.
(9) They are individuals, persons.
(6) IMPLICATIONS.
(a) Justification
If the above is an adequate description, then it suggests - one might
say demands - that the area under inspection - the person and his
world - be treated educationally in the manner in which it is
encountered and understood.	 This means that, with educational
material dealing with knowledge of the external world, there must be
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incorporated within the educational paradigm those constraints which
act upon perception and limit understanding. This would suggest an
approach in education generally which is rather more tentative in its
presentation of 'facts' than is normally the case. It suggests that
rather than including this perspective at the end of the child's
education, if at all, steps must be taken as early as possible to
appraise the child of the tentative nature of knowledge in general.
It must surely be the case that if a child is given an education in
which, throughout this tine, facts are presented as solid, permanent,
and objective, then any attempt at the very end of this period to
change this view will have very limited success. The process must
begin on the ground floor and move up with the child, rather than
being given to him when his attitudes are firmly inculcated.
If this is true with respect to the sciences proper, how much more so
with the social sciences? If there is, as has been argued, this extra
layer of ambiguity and distortion in an appreciation of the subject
matter, then how much more should this tentativeness be incorporated
at an early age? The justification for such an approach - tolerance
through the appreciation of ignorance - is implicit in the nature of
an epistemological search.
(b) Psychology
It will be apparent that the above description prescribes a least
necessary theory of the psychology of moral functioning and
development.	 Thus, it must be a theory which, in its initial
orientation, acknowledges the factors outlined above, and which
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investigates the moral functioning and development of the human being
as a consequence of all the above factors. As Cicourel said(42):
"...the moment to moment programming each member accomplishes
for himself and others, re-establishes the normative order
because of post-hoc linking with general policies or rules.
In attempting to socialise children this , as yet ambiguous
process of linking particular cases with general policies or
rules becomes a perpetual laboratory for discovering how
social organisation is made possible through the child's
acquisition of social structure."
Even the most cursory inspection of the features will make it very
clear that no one psychological theory at the present time is
sufficiently well-grounded or comprehensive enough to incorporate all
of the demands of the preceding description. However, the cognitive-
deveLopmentolapproach appears to have more mileage in it than most.
Thus, insofar as it and the description are both personal,
constructionist, and teleological, there is a considerable degree of
overlap.	 There are, however, failings within the school, the most
notable probably being the way in which developmental psychologists
like Kohlberg(43) develop a theory of morality upon the notion of a
final, objective, impersonal conception of justice. On the preceding
account, such a description is not viable.
	 It needs to be grounded
much more in the personal and subjective, whilst still allowing room
for criticism, clarification, and agreement.
Of the other failings,the two most important may be characterised as
failing to take account of higher and lower causes.
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With regard to the higher cau.es , the school generally fails to
incorporate within its framework the effects that adopted explanatory
schemes can have upon the selection and evaluation of the subject.
Though such a deficiency is not one ruled out by the theory's general
orientation, it would provide methodological p oblems, in that the
finitist nature of such conceptual schemes makes precise description
of th in most difficult, as would the fact that their influence could
only ever be inferred
With regard to the lower causes, it must be accepted that, de.pite
this section's gene al orientation towards the intellectual faculties
of mankind, the non cognitive, non rational part of man's make-up does
h ve a profound effect upon the individual's understanding, judgement,
and behaviour, Just as many and varied external stimuli have
rewarding, punishing and modelling effects as well. Indeed, as this
th is develops further, it will become more and more apparent that
the view is taken that a perspective limited to cognitive functioning
I. inadequate practically and theoretically; cognition on its own can
never explain why human beings are motivated to act in certain ways
rather than in others. To explain the regular occurrence of the
weakness of the will, to explain how superordinate actions are
possible, there is a need for an examination of those factors early in
life which cause the feeling that other people's f elings a e
Important - there is a need to look at that part of human psychology
which focus.es on these causes.	 Thus, whilst this chapter has
deliberately focussed on the individual as active and Judgemental, it
is argued that this activity is only possible through and within an
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internal and external environment; and any adequate theory of
psychological functioning must take fully into account the effects of
these variables. However, it is still maintained that moral education
must be education in accordance with the features outlined above; and
this is an active, questing, and hopefully, responsible person.
(c) Content and implementation.
The description so far given in this essay does not directly suggest
the subject matter of moral education as such, and other methods for
the description of content will be given shortly.	 However, the
justification of the approach directly leads into its implementation,
and again suggests a method advocating tolerance, patience, and
personal responsibility; it explicitly rejects any methods suggestive
of hard facts and accepted truths, at least in the sense of
permanence, and total objectivity.
(7) DISCUSSION.
This is all very well, one can hear the teacher reply, but what am I
to teach? What attitude am I to adopt? That there is no truth, that
I must make no moral judgements, that I must be tolerant of every
opinion, that everything is relative? The danger in this approach, it
may well be argued, is the opposite of the danger from the fanatic,
but dangerous all the same: that I sit on the fence so long, and
dither so long over whether I am justified or not justified in taking
action, that I never do take any action at all. Surely one of the
major purposes of moral education is to get people to behave in a
certain way, to act upon received information. One of the traditional
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criticisms of this area is precisely that it never seems to be able
to make the link between theory and practice, and this account, it
might be argued, is the perfect example of this failure.
To this, a number of things must be said.
Firstly, there are considerable impediments in the way of perception,
and to ignore these is to be guaranteed of false perception.
Nevertheless, there is a reality which can be referred to, and this
gives a defence against relativism, and assures the existence of
degrees of subjectivism, and in so doing, enables the belief in the
possibility of movement	 from a less certain to a more certain
opinion.
Secondly, tolerance does not imply acquiescence; there are situations
in the world where all the evidence that could be mustered points to
a certain form of action. In such cases, knowledge that total truth
is never to be had, need be no more than of academic interest.
Indeed, as responsible adults entrusted with the moral welfare of
those too young to be able to form mature judgements on subjects
potentially dangerous or even lethal to themselves (such as the
dangers of glue-sniffing, or drug addiction), to not take a stand
would be a simple abnegation of responsibility. This does obviously
raise the problem of indoctrination; for on what grounds does one
decide to interfere in one situation, and not in another? This issue
will be dealt with at greater length in forthcoming chapters, but for
the moment it might be as well to say that the moral agent, being a
participant in the world, and not a mere spectator, has to attempt to
blend a responsibility for youth, with an understanding of the limits
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of all knowledge, and a desire to aid the young to come to a mature
understanding of their own problems in much the sane way as he hope.
that he hin.elf has done.
Thirdly, in those 'obvious' situations mentioned above, academic
interest may at least cause reflection and examination in a cool
moment on all sides of the problem: the resulting conclusion may well
be that the obvious is not quite so obvious. In other words, an
attitude to situations is being advocated which is adopted and which
is at work at all tines.
Fourthly, the universal and particular both have their vital functions
to perform. The universal is the repository of past knowledge and
past experience. It is not there to be used unthinkingly, but is
there as a valuable standard and criterion to which attention should
be paid on the road to judgement. The particular is the situation 'n
which we find ourselves. It 1.8 always novel, always never quite
adequately described by universals, and it is here that we mu.t
exercise our judgement) free will and responsibility as adults. As
teachers, we must help the young to come to understand the process and
the responsibility that this places upon them.
So lastly, moral education, on this account, does not paralyse the
actor: but it does make him more reflective, more autonomous, more
responsible, and, by insisting that he takes each occurrence on its
merits, more personal and more caring. This is because, in so doing,
the person must attempt to understand the needs and pressures on the
individual with reference to that specific situation, rather than by
automatically referring to some universal principles which cannot, by
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its very nature, take all the different factors into account. If this
means that on some occasions the child looks before he leaps, it also
means that he is more likely to arrive at the right course of action
and behave in a manner with which others can live.
	 This, at a
cognitive level, seems to be a proper basis for moral education.
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f*R1r 2 CONTENT
CHAPTER 5
	
r THE NATURAL AREA OF MORALITY.
In the first section of this thesis, it was argued that there are five
separable, autonomous areas to morality, and that by adopting such a
perspective it explained the difficulties some writers found themselves
in, as well as making more sense of problems like the naturalistic
fallacy.
In this section, each of these areas will be examined in detail, beginning
with the natural area of morality. This natural area is perhaps the most
neglected part of morality in western culture. This chapter, by examining
attitudes to the place of animals in an overall moral scheme, will
attempt to throw some light on this neglect and on a further elucidation
of morality's content structure.
There have been a number of books in recent years(1) which have
documented in some detail, and explained at some length, the dominant
western tradition vis-a-vis thought on animals and morality. This
tradition has been, when it has considered them, mostly unsympathetic
towards them. For many people today, and for a considerably greater
number in past ages, animals and moral thought have had very little in
common. One can go through Plato (2), Aristotle (3), Aquinas (4),
Descartes(5), and Kant (6), and find that their regard for animals is
tangential at best. Animals are really not included in the moral sphere
In any serious way. Rather more sparsely in western thought, one can
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find thinkers like Rousseau(?), Bentham(8), and Mill(9), declaring that
animals and their consideration must be part of any plausible system.
This division of thought is particularly fascinating, because it is not
that the great philosophers cannot agree over the question at hand: it is
rather that some don't think that there is a real question to be answered
at all. Now this variance suggests a number of possibilities.
Firstly, that the tradition of the naturalistic fallacy may obscure an
important truth: that moral pronouncements may come of age when
sufficient knowledge of the factual area surrounding the moral
speculation is believed to be known.
Secondly, that 'seeds' of thought may be laid early in philosophic
history, and come to fruition when 'facts' are added to philosophic
speculation.
Thirdly, that 'animals and morality' may be an issue upon which people
may never completely agree because it depends upon Polanyi's(10) notion
of 'focal' and 'subsidiary' awareness - that is, if people focus attention
upon one part of the moral field, they may fail to see that another part
has a valid claim.
Fourthly,	 that	 either the Aristotle/Kant, or the Rousseau/Bentham
tradition may be simply mistaken.
Fifthly, that the topics on which morality dwells may shift their ground
through the centuries, and so what are moral issues in one era, are no
part of another.
Sixthly, that if an argument starts off with inadequate premises, then
philosophers may be so caught up in the process of logic that they will
fail to see that counter-intuitive conclusions are the fruit.
- 121 -
Seventhly,	 that if a conception of morality starts off with an
inadequate base, then it may have difficulty accounting for groups of
things to which one might normally wish to ascribe moral status.
In the first chapter of this thesis, the Naturalistic Fallacy was
examined, and it was	 argued that factual statements do influence
evaluative statements. This examination can now be taken a stage
further, firstly by a detailed look at the philosophic background to the
thought on animals and morality, and then by an examination of the
reasons for the current resurgence of interest.
Any survey of western philosophic history will show that the dominant
trend has been to not ascribe moral status to animals: they have most
often been given no moral rights at all, and duties to them have been, at
best, minimal. Perhaps Plato(11) started the problem with his tripartite
division of the human being, in which reason comes top, but the emotions
within us:
".-bestir themselves in dreams, when the gentler part of the
soul slumbers, and the control of reason is withdrawn. Then
the wild beast in us.-becomes rampant and shakes off sleep to
go in quest of what will gratify its own instincts.-it will
cast off all shame and prudence and stick at nothing.-"
There seem to be a number of philosophical problems here: the separation
of the cognitive from the affective in man; the denigration of the
affective; the association of this denigrated side with animals; hence the
denigration of animals. Animals hardly get off to a good start in the
western philosophic tradition.
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Aristotle, on the other hand, started(12) from the premise that the test
of a thing's perfection was its suitability for man's purposes, and thus
naturally arrived at the conclusion that animals are created for man's
sake. If this is married with a Christian(13) ethic which stated that
God gave man the world to use as he felt fit, then a distinct lack of
interests in animals' rights is the result. This Christian ethic, it must
be said, is not so common now: the ethic at present is more that of the
shepherd looking after the master's flock.
One finds a complementary strain of thought in the Stoics, in Augustine,
in Aquinas, in Descartes, in Kant - but this time stressing what they
believe to be man's supreme quality - his self-consciousness and
rationality. Kant(14) wrote:
"Animas are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means
to an end. That end is man...our duties towards animals are
merely indirect duties towards humanity."
So man is excluded from moral censure in his dealings with animals.
Indeed, for Aquinas(15) and Kant(16), cruelty to animals is wrong only
Insofar as it coarsens human nature and makes us more callous towards
human suffering. Descartes (17) took this point to its extreme and argued
that only the human mind - identified as consciousness - is a matter of
moral concern, the rest, lacking this, being mere machines which we can
manipulate without scruples.
This attitude to animals is embedded in our very language - animals have
a 'belly', whilst humans have a 'stomach'; animals are 'Its', whilst we
humans are 'hes' and Is:hes% It has led to a cleavage between humanity
and the rest of creation, and has added to the notion of humans battling
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against nature, rather than as seeing themselves as a connected and
interdependent part of the natural world. For Freud (18), the human ideal
is:
".-combining with the rest of the human community and taking
up the attack on nature, thus forcing it to obey human will,
under the guidance of science."
Again, for Marx(19):
"—nature becomes.-simply an object for mankind, purely a
matter of utility.-"
Such an attitude is not dead. China, long a subscriber to the belief of
working in harmony with nature, now under its Marxist ideology, can boast
headlines such as "The Desert Surrenders" or "Chairman Mao's thoughts are
our guide to scoring victories in the struggle against nature." (20)
However, there have been seeds of a contrary strain, and it may well be
because of events happening in the last twenty years that these moral
seeds are at last beginning to bear fruit. Such seeds can be seen in
Rousseau's thought(21):
".-if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow creatures,
this is less because they are rational than because they are
sentient beings.."
Such an attitude is bound up with certain capacities which both animals
and human beings share. Rousseau speaks of(22):
"—compassion, which is a disposition.-so natural, that the
very brutes themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it."
Bentham put the whole matter very succinctly when he said (23):
".-the question is not 'can they reason?' nor 'can they talk?'
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but 'can they suffer?'
Now there seems little doubt that ordinary people have always been aware
that animals feel pain. Philosophers may disagree over the problems of
other minds, but there seems little doubt that the person in the street,
and even more so in the country, does not bother with such subtleties.
They know, that a creature not too dissimilar from themselves, which
behaves in many circumstances in much the same way as themselves,
particularly when struck with a sharp instrument, feels pain in much the
same way as they do. So what is the reason for the curious moral
blindness to this fact for so long? How can it be that people can be
aware that animals feel pain to the degree that they do, and yet it
simply not gain entry into their sphere of moral action? Midgley(24)
gives a striking example of this divorce of fact from moral feeling when
she quotes from a book written in the last century by a certain R.Gordon
Cummings, a traveller and hunter in Africa in 1850, who encounters a
magnificent specimen of an elephant, shatters its shoulder bone with a
bullet, thus rendering it lame and unable to escape, and then proceeds to
make camp, have a drink, reflect for a while on what a fortunate man he
is, before performing the interesting experiment of seeing in how many
places he can shoot the elephant before killing it. Now this was no
prototype SS guard: this was (to his own eyes, and, one presumes, the
reading public of that time) a Jolly decent fellow. He really saw nothing
wrong. There was Just no link up in his mind between animals feeling,
and it mattering that they did. This lack of link-up in his, or other
people's minds, can only be down to a number of the following factors.
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Firstly, there was a general public ignorance about animals' lives. They
were only seen when they came into contact with humans, and that usually
meant when they were being hunted. Nowadays, there is not only the
benefit of scientists who study animal behaviour in its own right -
ethologists like Lorenz(25) and Tinbergen(26) spring to mind - but it is
possible to sit in comfy armchairs and watch their lives when not in
contact with humans. It has been realised that animals' lives are as
Interesting and complicated - and in many cases as feeling - as our own.
Secondly, and conversely, some of the more 'bestial' things the higher
apes do, make them only too like human beings. When Jane Goodall(27)
reported that chimpanzees not only catch baby baboons and colobus
monkeys and eat them, this caused enough surprise. When, however, she
went on to report some years later(28) that they practise cannibalism,
and what can only be called vicious tribal warfare, there is the initial
destruction of the tea-party chimp image, followed closely by the
(uncomfortable?) feeling that they really are nearer to human beings in
behaviour than is good for them. One begins to feel a fellow sympathy
with a creature capable of human monstrosities.
Thirdly, the infant science, Ecology, has struggled under its necessarily
interdisciplinary banner to acquaint humankind with the knowledge that
they are a part of nature, that what they do, affects nature, and that
what happens to nature affects them. 	 A bothersome species can be
exterminated, only to see that the species it preyed upon has unlimited
licence. Strains of wheat can be cultivated to produce larger yields,
only to find they are made more susceptible to disease. Attempts can be
made to eradicate rats and all that is done is that super rats are
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produced. Soil can be exhausted and deserts created. Very slowly, the
West, and those countries adopting western attitudes, have come to realise
that its mistakes will, in some not too distant future, come home to
roost, and with that realisation has come an urgency to understand the
workings of the world, and, through that, an appreciation of just how
wonderfully complex the world still is. Indeed, it has probably brought
to greater consciousness not one, but two, relatively neglected areas of
morality - that of the moral claims from the world at large, and also the
moral claims from a mystical, reverential attitude to life as a whole.
Fourthly, and intimately connected with the above are the twin spectres
of pollution and population expansion. Were pollution not a problem
which won't go away, if population expansion did not take on more
Malthusian overtones every year, then it seems more than likely that all
of the animal documentaries in the world, all the ecology degrees under
the sun, would not prod society into the sort of moral consciousness it
is now paying to the issues of conservation and animal rights. It seems
to need a threat to self-interest before society galvanizes itself, and
without this threat, the Rousseaus, Benthams, and Mills of this world
would probably be only voices in the wilderness.
Fifthly, the very new science of 'sociobiology', with practitioners like
Wilson(29) , who attempts to explain all human behaviour , including the
moral, in terms of genetic inheritance, has produced an even greater
awareness of the close genetic similarities shared with the animal
kingdom. It comes as a shock to discover that there is a mere one per
cent difference between man and apes(30), but it provides a perspective
to work on. As Midgley(31) put it:
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"-anything that puts us in context, that shows us as part of
a continuum.. .is a great help."
There seems little doubt that some sociobiologists overplay their hand.
By leaving out the personal, rational, and social parts of a description
of morality, and attempting a reduction of the subject to genetics, they
can become obsessed with a method of explanation for its own sake. In
so doing, the method tends to be used where it is unsuitable. Aristotle
saw this mistake a good time ago when he wrote:
".-it is the mark of the trained mind never to expect more
precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of
that subject allows." (32)
Now these factors - increasing understanding of animals' lives, the
studies of ecology and human genetics, the threats from pollution and
population growth - are, very baldly speaking, 'facts'. They are the
epistemological and scientific data perceived to impinge, or brought to
bear, on this area.
Rather more complicated is the final factor. This might be described as
the universals, or value schemes, impinging upon this value area. These
have been described as having a number of characteristics, and, for
present purposes, two of these are most important. Firstly, these
universals are never totally proved or disproved, but move into, or out
of, favour. And secondly, these universals share a variety of lesser
values with other universals, and so are never totally definable. They
slide into one another's meanings, and 'facts' affecting one may thus
affect another.
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Now on this account, change in three particular universals seems
important for the change in attitude to the moral status of animals.
Firstly, the decline in religious belief has seen the consequent
secularising of beliefs in what man essentially is. No longer the divine
spirit in a material body, man becomes a creature of this planet, and
thus more attention is paid to fellow inhabitants.
Secondly, the change in Christian attitudes to life mentioned earlier
has also had its effect. For those remaining within the traditional
religious sphere, the clear moral prescription is no longer to take what
you want, but to tend and conserve.
Thirdly, the decline in the belief of the supremacy of human reason has
further contributed to the change in attitude. No longer is it given the
status Plato assigned to it, but attempts are made to re-integrate it into
a model of man in which all parts are seen as contributing to the
functioning whole. Nan 'regains his nature' - and his emotions are no
longer dragged in the mud, along with the animals supposedly mirroring
them.
Strangely enough, whilst certain forms of religious belief have
undoubtedly declined, others have arisen. For example, there is now a
minority, but a vocal minority, which demands a concern for all forms of
life, not just the higher ones. This is of course not new - the Jains in
India have subscribed to such a belief for centuries - but as an
influential force in Western intellectual life, it is something
comparatively new. It is an ethic which asks for a consideration of the
view that life - any life - is precious and therefore should not be
abused. Trees and other plants may need to be utilised, but this must be
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balanced against the sanctity of life, of all life. Taking an example,
imagine that in centuries hence, when man has mastered space travel, he
discovers a planet covered in forests, but devoid of all animal life.
Suppose also that wood was in short supply on Earth. Suppose further
that man denuded this planet of all its plant life, and left it a barren
rock. Would this matter? A likely answer would be yes, he should have
given more thought to future human generations. But would it matter,
apart from that? Many today would probably say no, that plants are a
commodity to be used as man feels fit. But there are others who would
argue that regardless of human needs, there is something disturbing, even
tragic, in the thought of life, any life, being completely destroyed. It
is this kind of mystical belief that Schweitzer(33) adhered to - that
life is such a precious, fragile commodity that whenever anything dies,
the universe is a poorer place.
So far, then, a number of the possibilities for the lack of interest in
the topic of animals and moralities has been dealt with. It has been
indicated that the first three possibilities mentioned above may all be
correct - that developments of understanding in the factual area, and
changes in perspective and conditions in the world, may bring 'seeds' of
philosophic thought to fruition, and that people can be guilty of
focussing their attention on only one part of the field of morality.
To declare on the fourth possibility, that either the Aristotle/Kant, or
the Rousseau/Bentham traditions may be mistaken, one must obviously look
at the kinds of arguments used by both sides. The Aristotle/Kant
tradition tends to use as its main plank the notion of a supposedly
unique possession of man - his rationality, and in Kant's case(34), this
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leads him to the notion of a unique quality in the forms of man's self-
consciousness and autonomy. Because of these qualities, it is argued, man
is superior to the rest of creation, and therefore has moral obligations
only to those his equal or superior - man or God. This seems to be a
curiously inadequate argument, not only because there is plenty of
evidence that higher animals like chimpanzees and dolphins are
rational(35), but because, on this definition, babies and the mentally
incapable would have no moral rights as well. Such an argument seems to
reduce, if the inclusion of babies and the mentally incapable is desired,
to one in which the criterion for having a moral right is if one simply
is human. Singer(36) makes a fair criticism when he says that talk of
'intrinsic dignity' and 'intrinsic worth' when referring to human beings
is only so much philosophic waffle, unless it is backed up by something
more substantial. It seems to be an example of the overt 'speciesism'
which Singer(37) talks of, and which seems to place the onus of proof on
those who would hold it to show some unique human quality which
separates human beings off from the rest of creation. This is not
necessarily to agree with Singer - his position appears to be one of
trying to assert a supra-species morality by means of a combination of
utilitarianism and of an 'escalator of reason' (38) , and as will be argued
later, a morality founded on reason alone would have too narrow a base.
There are, of course, gradations of speciesism. From the extremists like
Descartes, there is movement through Aquinas and Kant to people like
Passmore(39) ;
 who would support a concern for animal welfare, believing
that they have a place in the moral scheme of things, but would argue in
Kantian fashion that man's culture and civilisation is, so far, the
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highest achievement of living things, the things most worth preserving.
Passmore puts it like this:
".-by any criteria, the liberal democratic West stands high in
liberty, science, philosophy, and art, it is unequalled.. .1
treat human interests as paramount. I do not apologise for
that-11(40)
This seems a rather curious argument for putting man top of the moral
sphere. It is nicely deflated by Midgley when she writes(41):
".-if man wants to set up a contest in resembling himself and
award himself the prize, no one will quarrel with him.-"
•-but then the cheetah could give one to itself as the fastest land
animal, the ant as the most highly social, the lemming as the most self-
sacrificing, and so on. Treating human interests as paramount is fine if
it is baldly declared as human self-interest; but if declared as morally
better, there seems to be no criteria by which it might be judged.
Midgley herself (12) tries to hold a difficult position between two poles.
She tries to argue that:
".-we should recognise nearness as a perfectly real and
Important factor in our psychology, and therefore in our
morality, but refuse to treat it as the sole or supreme one.-"
Midgley is thus attempting to assert that 'facts in the real world' -
human psychology, the nearness in physiology of other species to
ourselves, should have an effect on moral rules and judgements. Now
whilst there must be dialogue in this area, this could be seen as being
perilously close to the Naturalistic Fallacy proper. Perhaps, though,
what Midgley is saying is that these are natural factors which
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necessarily constrain a conception of morality because they define human
physical and psychological limitations. The danger is that even if
Midgley does escape the charge of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy,
she is in great danger of becoming heavily positivist, and stating that
what is the case, must be the case. It could well be argued that too
little in this area is known about our physical, physiological, and
psychological constraints, to be saying what must be the case. Even the
briefest excursion into anthropology shows the enormous plasticity of the
human being.
Of the others who would include animals as having a proper place in the
moral sphere of things, they tend to use an amalgam of three arguments
in proof.
Firstly, it is argued that if a creature is sentient and can feel pain,
then it should not be subjected to pain.
Secondly, a variation of the golden rule is used, to the effect that we
should only do to the rest of creation that which we would wish done to
ourselves.
Thirdly, there is what could be called a 'faith commitment' argument,
which starts from a belief in the sanctity of all life, and then argues
that because of this, animals have rights.
The arguments are moving but not final. After all, arguing that creatures
should not be subjected to pain, does not in itself amount to saying that
these creatures have rights. It may simply mean that we should not be
cruel to whatever there is in the world.
Moreover, the golden rule argument really will not do as it stands.
Human beings would not wish to be skinned, sliced up and boiled, and yet
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this is done to carrots all of the time, and no moral qualms are felt
about it. If the golden rule argument is limited to animals, then no
doubt human beings would not like to pull a plough, or be made to dive
under water and catch fish for a living, or have their hair used to make
clothes. But this is done to oxen, cormorants and sheep, and most of
mankind do not see anything wrong with this. The golden rule needs to
be trimmed, not only to specific instances, but to the atttributes of
specific species, and once one begins to ask what is 'natural' for a
particular species, the descriptive and the evaluative become so mixed
that it is doubtful if the golden rule retains much of its power. At the
very least, it is a subject in moral philosophy the surface of which has
been scarcely scratched.
There seems to be here a very real tension between moral rules originally
intended for human beings, and these rules being transplanted into other
areas of morality for which they were not intended, areas which have
their own autonomy and which can generate moral prescriptions at odds
with prescriptions from other autonomous areas. As argued in Chapter 1,
it is again being suggested that there are five, separable autonomous
categories, each capable of such prescriptive generation.
Firstly, there are the moral claims of the natural world, the belief that
the natural order of the world, its ecology, its inhabitants, have a right
to exist, without any reference to the interests of man. Thus pollution,
overpopulation, and usage by man, in the forms of hunting and factory
farming, have all to be balanced, it is argued, by the moral rights of the
world's other inhabitants.
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There is a second area, sometimes in accord with the first, more often
not, which argues that all life is precious. As Schweitzer puts it(43)
"The world is a ghastly drama of will-to-live divided against
itself. One existence makes its way at the cost of another:
one destroys the other.
Yet this area of morality argues that we have become conscious of this
precious life ethic in a way which other animals and plants of the
natural world have not, and that it is this ethic which should guide
human conduct:
world- and life-affirmation, and in ethics I carry
out the will of the universal will-to-live..."(44)
This second area	 which has previously been called the
mystical/religious - can also be generated from within the other areas as
well.
Thus the third area could be described as moral claims from the point
of view of individual human existence. This is the classic existentialist
position, and sees man as potentially free but enormously responsible. It
can, as Sartre(45) indicated, see man as never at ease with other human
beings, or indeed with any other thing.
It can therefore be seen as separate from a fourth area, the moral claims
from an interpersonal perspective. Such morality is naturally closely
tied to the individual area, and can be produced from it - as with the
thought of Heidegger(46) and Buber(47). It is the essence of Kant's(48)
moral position, postulating the existence of rational, autonomous beings
who interact with other such beings. It is the classic position of the
main stream of Western thought on moral matters.
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However, it is at odds with a fifth area of morality which stipulates
that social congregations of individuals have a prior claim to right over
the individual on his or her own, because, as they see it, the society
creates the individual. It is the essence of Durkheim's(49) conception of
human beings, and of the Marxist(50) position as well.
Because of the different approaches of the areas - the different 'focal
awarenesses' - they all tend to assert that their area has primacy. Due
to this, on many issues, they will not only fail to agree, but will even
fail to use the same language.
It is precisely because there are these autonomous areas, that principles
generated by them are contradictory at times, and lead to problems in
ethics and everyday life which seem quite unresolvable. To the extent
that there is a concentration on being individual human beings, and
living within societies, so the third, fourth, and fifth areas will tend
to occupy moral awareness. However, as awareness and knowledge of the
world in which we live increases, as our interdependency and species'
frailty is realised, as these move into our 'subsidiary awareness', so the
first two areas force their way into consciousness. Solving moral
problems therefore is much about the business of the relative weighting
of the importance of the claims of the different areas involved, and is
therefore never wholly soluble. This, again, is the third possibility,
that 'animals and morality' is an issue upon which people may never
completely agree because of the differential weight given by people to
areas in their 'focussing'.
It also helps to further understand the fifth possibility, which stated
that the topics on which morality dwells shift their ground through the
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centuries, and so what are seen as moral concerns in one era, are not in
another. This can be taken in two ways. It can mean a moral relativist
view, that morals vary with society, and are no more fundamental than its
rules; or it can mean that a moral category may lie dormant as a seed
throughout an era of thought, but will flower under the right conditions.
Whilst not wishing to totally discount the view that certain rules are
specific to certain societies, this account favours the latter
interpretation. The subject of animals and morality seems a classic case
of this tendency. It, of course, suggests a factor not always given
prominence - namely that categories are not perfect forms insulated from
the currents of social thought. The universals and conceptual schemes
this thesis has described are instead impermanent, shifting,
generalisations, open to the force of contrary and positive instances, and
to the influence of other universals and conceptual schemes around them.
Thus, social thought may be so strong that these categories are the
province of only a small minority, or are submerged altogether for a
while. It might need the 'right events' - an unexpected and unconnected
mixture - to bring them to the fore. As it has been argued in this
chapter, this is precisely what has happened in the last thirty years
with regard to the categories providing moral thought on the status of
animals. This, again, is the second possibility, that 'seeds' of thought
are laid early in philosophic history, and come to fruition when 'facts' -
instances at the empirical, scientific level - are added to philosophic
speculation.
What of the sixth possibility, that if an argument starts off with
faulty premises, then philosophers are so caught up in the process of
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logic that they will fail to see that counter-intuitive conclusions are
the fruit? This may seem a little tangential to the main flow of the
chapter, but seems to be important for reasons which it is hoped are
becoming clear. Take, for example, Rawls' monumental work in political
theory, "A Theory of Justice"(51). It is a criticism of some force of
his work that there is no place in it for the rights of animals or non-
rational creatures. This is because the work is premised upon the notion
of an 'original position', in which human beings, in possession of
rational faculties, but with no knowledge of their personal circumstances
in the world, attempt to design a system of government most favourable
to themselves.
It would be most unfair to say that Rawls is unaware of the difficulty.
He explicitly states(52) that it is:
"—outside the scope of a theory of Justice, and it does not
seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to
include them in a natural way.."
So the problem is recognised, even if it is not resolved. A theory of
Justice, as he describes it, cannot accommodate the rights of animals,
babies, or mental defectives. As they cannot fight their corner, they
have no voice. This at face value seems a terrible indictment of Rawls'
theory, and yet, looked at from another angle, shows both the strengths
and weaknesses of his position, and throws an interesting light on the
structure of moral thought as a whole.
The criticism, that Rawls' theory only takes account of the rights of
articulate, linguistically rational creatures, only has force if it is seen
as the total extent of morality. And yet contract theory is an account
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of only one part, one area of morality. Contract theory is intimately
bound up with human social justice, with what constitutes a fair and just
society. By its very nature, it cannot account for the rights of other
kinds of creatures, or of the nature of some interpersonal exchanges
(like friendship), or of the feeling of reverence for the sanctity of life,
or of other transcendent urges. It cannot incorporate the other areas of
morality. It is clearly not meant to do so, and this points, not to
Rawls' theory being wrong, but to it only being applicable to and
possibly correct for that part of morality dealing with social justice
between human beings. It points to the seventh possibility, that if a
conception of morality starts off with an inadequate base, then it will
have difficulty accounting for people, beings or things to whom or to
which moral status would normally be ascribed.
It is little wonder, then, that there have been so many theories of
morality over the centuries. So often, the whole of moral experience is
squeezed, like an occupant of Procrustes bed, into one perspective, one
area of production, with the result that it looks and feels wrong, and
fails to satisfy as a complete explanation. However, morality was never
meant to be so squeezed. The limits of each area have to be recognised,
and it be accepted that morality isn't all of a piece.
Such an account naturally spells out the limitations of a theory of moral
development such as that of Kohlberg(53). For a start, any theory which
uses, as part of its philosophic base, Rawls' conception, must, on the
preceding analysis, be too limited. But secondly, and probably more
Importantly, the scope of its questions, what it is looking for, will be
grossly limited by its initial assumptions of what morality is.
	 If
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morality la generated by five separable areas of experience, it would be
expected that children's Judgements would be considerably more
diversified early in life than has generally been thought to be the case.
Such a notion would accord much more with findings produced by people
like Williams(54), Steward(55), and Huntsman(56), who all found that
children's moral attitudes showed a considerable complexity from very
early ages, and suggested that developmental sequences found by other
researchers might be as much a function of adult socialisation processes
as any physiological maturation. This issue will be dealt with at
considerably greater length in the final section of this thesis.
There would seem, then, to be four major conclusions.
Firstly, moral ideas may exist independently of social attitudes. Their
seeds may lie dormant for a considerable time.
Secondly, 'facts', in the sense of new knowledge of events in the world,
of awareness of their implications for other areas of understanding, may
bring to flower these seeds. Thus morality cannot and should not be
studied independently of other disciplines.
Thirdly, other universals, values, and perspectives, close to a chosen
'seed', may change and thus influence the germination of this 'seed' Just
as much as 'facts' do.
Fourthly, morality is not all of a piece, and to try to make it so only
produces awkward and contradictory positions. The problem of making a
coherent, personal, moral map is one which must vary from person to
person and age to age. Morality, therefore, can never have an answer.
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Having thus looked at the first of these areas of morality, the next
chapter will consider what can happen when reflections on this area take
on a transcendent dimension. The natural area, it will be argued, is but
one point of entry into the mystical/religious area. The thought of
Albert Schweitzer - a writer who takes this approach - will be examined
in some detail.
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CHAPTER 6 ALBERT SCHWEITZER AND THE TENSION BETWEEN MORALITIES.
In previous chapters, it has been argued that five origins must be
included for a full account of the structure of morality, and that
there must be a constant attempt to achieve a balance between the
five. The term 'moral' is not used here in a loose or contradictory
way: rather this term merely serves to point up that, ordinarily, no
differentiation is made between the five areas, that there is thought
to be a unified wholeness to the moral sphere. It is only when
seemingly equally valid principles conflict, that a disharmony is
realised.
This, of course, does not prove that there are separate areas, let
alone five. Therefore, this thesis has attempted to establish in two
major ways that these areas do have a real independence from each
other; firstly, by showing that there is a very real tension between
moral rules originally intended for human beings, and their being
transplanted into other areas of morality for which they were not
Intended; and, secondly, by using the idea of the five areas in an
attempt to explain the so-called naturalistic fallacy, the
illegitimate travel of an argument from the descriptive to the
evaluative.
In this chapter, the first method of proof will be continued, a method
which points to the stresses and tensions which arise for a view of
morality which attempts to unify all five areas. So far, the areas of
morality of human social justice, and the natural world have been
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examined. In this essay an example of a system of thought
representative of the mystical area will be investigated - that of the
ethical mysticism of Albert Schweitzer.
At the moment, Schweitzer and his thought is rather out of fashion.
Thirty years ago, he was regarded as a virtual living saint, but
reassessment has set in, and Schweitzer's better qualities have tended
to be clouded by his paternalism, his authoritarianism, and
colonialism, and these have done his reputation no good at all.
However, these are personal characteristics which have no necessary
connection with his system of thought. His system of thought might
have produced his actions of going to work in Lambarene, but he could
just as well have been a humble, democratic, anti-colonial. 	 But
perhaps this is to anticipate. This may only be proved by a
consideration of Schweitzer's thought, and this is what will be
examined now.
Schweitzer's thought is both remarkably contemporary in the fact that
his mysticism does not spring from a conception of the universe, but
rather from a conception of himself, and an old-fashioned
Cartesianism, in that he should attempt to build a philosophical
system from those facts of existence in which he is certain. Not for
him a Kantian theory of ethics built upon a questionable theory of
knowledge, a life view derived from a total view of the universe.
Rather, like Descartes, he asks what is the single fact of which he is
certain. But the result he arrives at is not that he thinks, but
rather that(1):
"I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life
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which wills to live."
We all wish to live, we all have this reverence for life, and this,
Schweitzer argues, must be the cornerstone of any ethical system. The
'good', therefore, is the maintenance, furtherance, and fullest
development of life, of all forms of life, as they partake of this
will-to-live, as we ourselves do:
"It is good to maintain and to encourage life: it is bad to
destroy life or to obstruct it."(2)
Schweitzer has thus taken as a primary datum of consciousness that we
live, and want to live, and has asserted that this is the fundamental,
irreducible element of moral life, and that this life force which we
feel within us is present within every other living creature.
Schweitzer at times seems almost to be saying that we are mere cyphers
for this life force: that it flows in and through us, that we
experience it, but it is something more than us. At the sane time,
though, Schweitzer is at pains not to advocate an abstract ethics,
because, for him, ethics is a living relationship to animate life.
This is one of the reasons that it is difficult to call Schweitzer a
Christian: Schweitzer's reverence for life has its origin and its
field of action in the particular living being. The Christian ethic,
on the other hand, has its origin in the transcendent.
But, more than this, the will-to-live is divided against itself:
"The world is a ghastly drama of will-to-live divided against
itself. One existence makes its way at the cost of another:
one destroys the other. One will merely exerts its will
against the other, and has no knowledge of it."(3)
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Individual wills, then, are constantly in conflict with one another.
Indeed, it is their fate to live in this world only at the expense of
others' lives. However:
"...in me the will-to-live has come to know about other
wills-to-live. There is in it a yearning to arrive at
unity with itself, to become universal." (4)
Only human beings can therefore be ethical beings, for only they are
conscious of this conflict and tension between what is and what should
be, and therefore only they are capable of attempting to achieve what
should be, the union of, and with, this will-to-live. Compassion and
love are the forces to overcome this division, and the extent of one's
compassion and love are the measure of one's ethical force, depth and
union with the infinite.
Therefore, if we would attempt to achieve union with the infinite
will-to-live, we should devote our own life in the aid of other wills-
to-live. As Schweitzer says(5):
"From an inner necessity, I exert myself in producing
values and practising ethics in the world and on the world
even though I do not understand the meaning of the world.
For in world- and life-affirmation, and in ethics I carry
out the will of the universal will-to-live which reveals
itself in me."
The only escape necessary or possible for the individual, then, is to
tear oneself sufficiently free from the workings of the world in order
to be able to practise the will-to-live that is implanted in each one
of us.
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It is curious and illuminating to note that whilst Schweitzer writes
of the division within universal will-to-live and the will-to-live
that seeks to overcome division, Tillich(6) writes:
"Actualization of one's potentialities includes, unavoidably,
estrangement: estrangement from one's essential being, so
that we find it again in maturity..."
and of a power of reconciliation that attempts to heal this
estrangement. The analogy, it would appear, is not just chance; both
seem to have hit upon a similar insight and expressed it in different
words. Both appear to be instances of what Happold(7) calls "the
mysticism of love and union".
Schweitzer's mysticism is, however, never personalised into a
Christian god-figure. There has been considerable argument over
whether his will-to-live was God in the personalist sense, or a more
pantheistic conception. He stated on one occasion that "pantheism and
theism remain in undecided conflict within me"(8), but there does not
seem to be much doubt that his thinking - his belief in our ignorance
of the world, of the death of ethics through abstraction - would not
let him contemplate too seriously a personalist conception of a deity.
For instance, in "Civilisation and Ethics"( g ), Schweitzer wrote:
"The essence of Being, the Absolute, the Spirit of the
Universe, and all similar expressions, denote nothing
actual, but something conceived in abstractions which for
that reason is also absolutely unimaginable.. .How does
thought come to such a meaningless proceeding as making
man enter into a spiritual relation with an unreal creation
- 150 -
of thought?"
However, Schweitzer's system of thought is not quite complete; there
may be the ethic of reverence for life, and of the way to union with
the infinite will-to-live, but there is no figurehead, no outstanding
example of such an ethical stance. It was here that Schweitzer
thought Jesus the perfect example. In the "Quest of the Historical
Jesus"(10), Schweitzer attempted to demonstrate that nineteenth
century liberal Protestantism had got Jesus all wrong. Such
Christians were committed to the belief that Jesus had cone on earth
to plant a seed of spirituality within each person's heart, which
would eventually blossom, spread to others, and in this manner result
in the kingdom of God on earth. On this view, then, Jesus was
primarily a man of moral example and precept who could inspire others
to follow his ways, and God's love of humanity was translated into
Jesus for all to see and copy.
Schweitzer's view of Jesus was not this. Jesus was an extraordinary
figure, that he granted, but of a rather different nature from that
normally conceived. Schweitzer's readings of the Bible led him to see
Jesus' words and deeds as wholly directed to the task of telling the
world of the immanent coning of the supernatural kingdom of god,
whether humanity liked it or not. Jesus' was not a message by
example, but an eschatological warning.
The tragedy of Jesus, thought Schweitzer, was that this coming did not
cone, or at the very least was delayed. Jesus, being a man of his
tine, knowing that the coming of this supernatural kingdom must,
according to ancient Jewish apocalyptic belief, be preceded by trial
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and tribulation, cane to believe that it was his destiny to
precipitate this coming by shouldering these trials and tribulations
himself. Hence the delivery of himself into his enemies' and captors'
hands. The real tragedy lay in the fact that even with his sacrifice,
the coming did not come. Jesus was simply mistaken.
This did not, however, dismiss or diminish Jesus' contribution for
Schweitzer. Far from it. Jesus' act of self sacrifice was the
perfect embodiment of an ultimate belief in a reverence for life. By
the exhibition of this degree of brotherly love, this degree of
compassion for others, by sacrificing himself for others, Jesus had
shown the ultimate in commitment to the universal will-to-live, simply
because he had sacrificed his own life in the desire to harmonise
other conflicting wills-to-live. As Langfeldt said(11):
"...Jesus' importance...lies exclusively in the fact that He,
as a mighty, timeless and still living spirit, stimulates the
will-to-live implanted in us through the overwhelming
impressions we receive from his ethical personality."
Jesus, then, cannot be an authority for the understanding, but can and
is one for the will.	 Jesus stands, for Schweitzer, as a unique,
spiritually and ethically strong personality. 	 As Langfeldt points
out(12), there is little doubt that Schweitzer to a large extent
identified himself with Jesus. Schweitzer's own will power was quite
legendary - studying for his doctor's degree at night, keeping awake
during his studies by sitting with his feet in bowls of cold
water(13).	 Here then were two men of seemingly indomitable will,
choosing to commit their lives to a universal will-to-live. And so
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here Schweitzer believed he had his figurehead, a supreme exemplar for
his ethical system. The strange thing is that Schweitzer could not be
called a Christian, at least not the sort that previous Christians
could recognise. After all, they had belonged, so they thought, to
the Church of Christ's teachings. Schweitzer was a Christian, but
only in the sense that Jesus now belonged to Sc4weitzer's system. The
sense of belonging was reversed.
So far, then, the foundations of Schweitzer's ethical system have been
seen as lying within one's own personal consciousness, of its
development through to other living creatures, of the achievement of
mystical union through the ethical acts of compassion and love, and of
the primary exemplar as being a novel interpretation of Jesus'
character. The question to be asked is: will this system hold water?
And more exactly, and more importantly for present purposes, will such
a system, based as it is on the areas of morality of the personal and
the mystical, be able to incorporate successfully the other areas of
morality - the natural, interpersonal and social?
The following analysis of Schweitzer's system will be divided into
seven questions:
(1) Can Jesus act as a figurehead?
(2) Is Schweitzer's will-to-love consistent with his belief in
world purposelessness?
(3) Is reverence for life a necessity of thought?
(4) Is reverence for life more primary than the will to survive?
(5) Can an ethic of reverence for life cope with the problems of
birth control, of voluntary euthanasia, of the possible
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legitimacy of certain form of suicide?
(6) Where does Schweitzer stand with regard to universal reverence
for life and the status of civilised values?
(7) Is Schweitzer correct in believing that social ethics are
qualitatively inferior to personal ethics?
It will be argued that the first two questions point to purely logical
inconsistencies in Schweitzer's thought. It will be argued, however,
that the last five point to inconsistencies of the kind which this
chapter set out to prove must always occur when a system of thought,
developed within one area of morality, attempts to explain and apply
its principles to other areas. Specifically, it will be argued that
questions (3) and (4) point to the tension between the natural and
the mystical, question (5) points to the tension between the personal
and the mystical, question (6) to the tension between the social and
the mystical, and question (7) to the tension between personal,
social, and mystical.
(1) Can Jesus act as a figurehead?
Schweitzer rejected Schopenhatker resignation from the world as
'pusillanimous', and passionately believed that his ethic must be
optimistic and world-affirming. Ethics must be created, not by talk,
but by action, action in and of this world.
	 This was the essence and
the motivating force behind his work at Lambarene.
	 And yet
Schweitzer, by his own researches, discovered a Jesus who appeared to
be denying what Schweitzer was asserting. Jesus' Kingdom of God was
coming, regardless of the ethical actions human beings might attempt.
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On this account, Schweitzer's own life made no sense. The true irony
is that Schweitzer was wrong in two opposite ways. If Jesus' message
is eschatological, then the creation of the Kingdom of God by human
will is in direct contradiction to this message. And if Jesus allowed
for an element of human intervention - the sacrifice of his own life
to ease its coming - then Jesus was unsuccessful. It never came.
Whichever way he takes it, Schweitzer was wrong.
This is not to deny Schweitzer his use of Jesus as a model, pure and
simple. If he wishes to use Jesus in this manner, to show the
strength of will capable within each human being, then he is perfectly
at liberty to do so. The question comes when we ask: for what end?
Jesus was wrong, unsuccessful, so Schweitzer believed, so is it really
a wise move to use him as a figurehead? The historical Jesus would
have disagreed with Schweitzer's purpose, so is it wise to see a
'purified'	 version?	 And lastly,	 in a world of seeming
purposelessness, what can Jesus the model advocate to such a world?
(2) Is Schweitzer's will-to-love consistent with his belief in world
purposelessness?
Whilst Schweitzer rejected Schopenhauer's negation and resignation
from the world, and condemned the self-fulfilling excesses of
Nietzsche's thought, he agreed with the notion that ethics must be
grounded in the subjective experience of the individual, for our true
knowledge of the world is hopelessly limited, to the extent that we
are incapable of discerning any purpose, good or bad, in the external
world of events. It seems curious, then, that Schweitzer should build
as one of his props a will-to-love, to transform an amoral will-to-
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live into an ethical stance. It is a bit like pulling a rabbit out of
a hat: from where, and why, did this will-to-love cone? With an
epistemology as subjective as Schweitzer's, it is hard to explain how
he can explain this in a rational manner, and yet Schweitzer's Kantian
inheritance led him to attempt precisely this.
(3) Is 'Reverence for Life' a necessity of thought?
This question is much along the same lines as question (2). If one
renounces certain knowledge of the world, if one renounces certainty
about nature in general, then there seems little justification in
claiming certain knowledge about human nature. Schweitzer's argument
rests on the premise that, to be consistent, one must accord other
wills-to-live the same reverence with which one accords one's own will
-to-live. But this definition of consistency rests on a mystical
premise - precisely this notion of reverence - and the movement from a
mystical premise concerning reverence to a conclusion about the
natural world looks to be illegitimate.
(4) Is Reverence for Life more primary than will to survive?
Here, we seem to cone to the nub of the problem with Schweitzer's
concept of reverence for life, for it could well be argued that the
will-to-live, which Schweitzer sees as coursing through every living
being's veins, is much better translated as the will to survive. All
too often in the natural world, the will-to-live is seen as ruthlessly
in competition with other wills-to-live.
	
Indeed, many have argued
that the natural world is based on this kind of order. It is a
problem which Schweitzer acknowledges without his being able to
reconcile it with his total conception:
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"...the world is a ghastly drama of will-to-live divided
against itself. One existence makes its way at the cost
of another: one destroys the other...it remains a painful
enigma for me that I must live with reverence for life in
a world which is dominated by creative will which is also
destructive will, and destructive will which is also
creative. "(14)
The will-to-live seems to be a constituent of the natural area of
morality, and the reverence for life which Schweitzer and many others
feel, seems to be part of the mystical area. The will-to-live is a
part of the natural world's morality, rather than as purely a brute
fact to be evaluated upon, simply because many people are coning to
believe that the animals and plants within this natural world have a
moral claim all of their own. Such a moral claim includes that of
being able to live in the way in which nature designed them, which
necessarily means pursuing their own will-to-live at the expense of
another. Schweitzer is, it seems, incorrect in describing this as a
'horrible drama' - rather it is a drama of which we have all too
little understanding and which, with Schweitzer's own admitted limited
epistemology, should have led him to acknowledge that he was in no
position to pronounce judgement. This natural area may conflict with
the mystical, and consequently Schweitzer's reverence for life, but
this contradiction does not mean that one must be wrong and the other
right: rather it might mean that it is our lot to try to draw a
balanced life-view from the supposed contradictions as they stand.
Thus, Schweitzer cannot move naturally from the concept of the will-
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to-live to that of a reverence for life, simply because the two do not
cone from the same areas of morality. By failing to acknowledge this
distinction, Schweitzer poses himself a problem he cannot hope to
answer.
(5) Can an ethic of reverence for life cope with the problems of birth
control, of voluntary euthanasia, or the possible legitimacy of
certain forms of suicide?
These three controversial areas are lumped together for one reason:
they all argue that, at a personal level, there are, on occasions,
acts which should be accorded more importance than a complete ethic of
reverence for life would allow. It could be argued that a country
like China should, because of the supremacy of the ethic of reverence
for life, allow its population to multiply uncontrolled, with the
ensuing problems of poverty, famine, and disease. Or that a rational
person, racked with pain by the last stages of an incurable cancer,
should not have the choice to bring his life to an earlier, more
dignified end. Or that a person about to be horribly tortured and
brainwashed for his beliefs, and with no chance of rescue, should not
take the decision to finish his life at a point prior to these things
happening to him. But there must be many in this world who would feel
that such actions are valid. If this is the case, this points to a
contradiction between the personal and social areas of morality, and
that of Schweitzer's mystical reverence for life, which can only be
reconciled by the acknowledgement that no area has primacy, but must
again be blended into a balanced judgement.
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(6) Where does Schweitzer stand with regard to universal reverence for
life, and the status of civilized values?
To put the question another way: does Schweitzer's ethic of reverence
for life mean that there can be no difference in quality between the
life of a warren of rabbits, and that of an advanced civilisation? If
Schweitzer wants to make reverence for life an all-inclusive ethic,
how can he place one form of life as higher than another?
In fact, Schweitzer does seem to experience difficulties with this
problem. He did state that human life is morally more valuable than
animal life because man is more capable of a consistent cultivation of
altruistic impulses. He continues(15):
"To the man who is truly ethical all life is sacred,
including that which from the human point of view seems
lower in the scale. He makes distinctions only as each case
comes before him, and under the pressure of necessity, as, for
example, when it falls to him to decide which of two lives he
must sacrifice in order to preserve the other. But all
through this series of decisions he is conscious of acting
on subjective grounds and arbitrarily, and knows that he
bears the responsibility for the life which is sacrificed."
Here it seems that Schweitzer is arguing that reverence for life is an
attitude rather than an inflexible rule of conduct, but further, he
has no real grounds for decision, these being 'subjective' and
'arbitrary'. This seems a most unhappy position, and has little to
offer, as it stands here, as a prescription for action. Anyone giving
the advice that a situation could only be solved by adopting an
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attitude of mind which must necessarily be subjective and arbitrary,
is hardly helping at all, unless there is good reason to believe that
a more satisfactory approach is impossible. And there seems greater
chance of a satisfactory resolution if one grants that, in this
instance, moral values are derived from two different areas, a
mystical one, and a social one. From the first area is derived an
instinctual reverence for life, whilst from the second we value as a
symbol of our life force and creativity those intellectual, aesthetic
and cultural productions which capture a uniquely human way of living.
As the two may at some point conflict, our best offices must be used
to arrive at a balance of both.
It might well be asked at this point if these 'best offices' are any
better than Schweitzer's 'subjective' and 'arbitrary' grounds.
Certainly, they are to some extent subjective - the analysis in the
first section of this thesis accepts that a totally objective account
is impossible; but, having said that, there are clear grounds for
believing that degrees of subjectivity are possible: this seems a
clearly more palatable alternative.
Secondly, these best offices are by no means arbitrary - they are
carefully constructed, logical procedures which recognise man's
fallibilities and limitations, but also recognise the possibility of
progress. On such an account, then, this procedure is neither totally
subjective nor in any way arbitrary. Schweitzer's resignation, then,
is unnecessary.
(7) Is Schweitzer correct in believing that social ethics are
qualitatively inferior to personal ethics?
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It is a strange fact that Schweitzer acknowledged the existence of a
social area of morality, and then proceeded to reject it totally:
IS
	
great mistake of ethical thought down to the present
time is that it fails to admit the essential difference
between the morality of ethical personality and that which
is established from the standpoint of society and always
thinks that it ought, and is able, to cast them in one
piece." (1)
Here it is possible to agree with Schweitzer: but instead of drawing
the conclusion that a balanced judgement means an attempt at a balance
between the two claims, he continues(17):
"The result is that the ethic of personality is sacrificed to
the ethic of society. An end must be put to this. What
matters is to recognise that the two are engaged in a conflict
which cannot be made less intense. Either the moral standard
of personality raises the moral standard of society, so far as
is possible, to its own level, or it is dragged down by .it."
Thus Schweitzer fundamentally objected to social ethics because he
believed that such ethics tend to sacrifice individuals to the general
welfare. Whilst society can express, through its norms and legal
code, some of the elementary principles of morality, yet in the end,
Schweitzer believed, only the individual, who actively discovered and
constructs through his own life, can practise a true morality.
It is clear from this, and what has gone before, that Schweitzer's
ethics are of a mystical nature actively discovered by the individual.
He gives little or none of his time to a conception of morality which
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can only be produced by the consideration of the interactions of
groups within society. He is such an individualist that his atttention
Is devoted almost exclusively to those issues produced and resolvable
by the individual. His morality is totally at odds, speaks a
completely different language, from the kind of morality described by
Durkheim and Marx. And yet it is surely a major flaw in Schweitzer's
thought that he, just as much as Jesus, was at least partially a
product of his tine. For Schweitzer to exclude a social conception of
morality seems not only blind but illegitimate.
It is not surprising, then, that he tends to remain silent on issues
more to do with the rights and wrongs of groups and societies than of
the individual's search. His condemnation of colonialism is
remarkable by its absence, and though many would say that this is
because Schweitzer was a product of his time, yet there were others of
his time who appreciated the immorality of the practice. Indeed, the
fact that he was a product of his time is a good example of the
influence that the social area of morality can have on the individual
- even one as forceful and self-willed as Schweitzer.
Moreover, he had very little to say about the exploitation of cheap
negro labour, other than to say that this was a problem which would
eventually work itself out. Thirdly, he took a long time to pronounce
publicly on the terrrors and horrors of nuclear war. Lastly, hardly
ever does his thought move to the notion or concept of what might
constitute a just society.	 His thought worked from the individual
outwards, and saw society in terms of individual interactions. He
totally failed to grasp that there is another level, the social and
- 162 -
political, which can only be appreciated and dealt with by concepts
concerning bodies of people, rather than by considering people in
isolation. Such exclusions, then, are both the cause and the result
of a system of thought which squeezes five areas of morality into one
or two.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has attempted to point to sufficient
deficiencies in Schweitzer's system of thought to indicate that it is
not really viable. But the danger here would be to throw out the baby
with the bathwater. Schweitzer centred in on a very real and
important strand of moral thought: that which understood and valued
the uniqueness of life. 	 There can be little doubt that, for most
people, this is one of the core notions which motivates their moral
lives.	 But there are other notions which are, for some people,
equally pressing.	 At least Schweitzer was aware of many of the
problems that any complete system has to face. Clark(18) clearly
highlighted the problems which Schweitzer faced when he began his book
by saying that:
"His chief philosophical problem will be to combine the
compelling authority of Kant's altogether rational, altogether
objective system, with the profound and ardent subjectivity
of men such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. He will be seeking
an ethic which grows out of the individual's experience of his
own will to live; on the other hand, he must come out with an
'ought' that makes the self-expansion of self-devotion a
necessity of thought, and therefore equally binding on all
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rational beings. He will not be satisfied with an ethic which
excludes sub-human forms of life from the circle of compassion,
for such an ethic has been condemned as disgracefully partial.
Finally, he will hope to find an ethic which can revitalize the
church by restoring to it a vital notion of the Christian life."
It has thus been argued that Schweitzer did not manage to reconcile
the contradictions within his system. He was trying to do too much
with too small a conception of the ultimate derivation of the 'Good'.
His system was faced with a variety of tensions - that between
subjectivity and objectivity, between a general ethic of a reverence
for life, and a belief in the values of civilisation, and finally
between a profoundly held belief in the ultimate unity of all life,
and yet surrounded on all sides, and by his own actions, by the
predatory existence of one life form upon another. Confronted by such
tensions, his system simply cannot cope. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how any system, whether founded on natural, personal,
interpersonal, social or mystical premisses, which failed to recognise
the autonomy of the other areas of the genesis of our morality, could
possibly cope with such problems. Contradictions such as those to be
seen in Schweitzer's system, it is argued, are bound to arise. Only
by accepting the independence of these five areas, can one make sense
of the contradictions generated.
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CHAPTER 7 THE PERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL AREAS OF MORALITY.
Schweitzer's conception of morality started from the personal and
worked outwards, and in so doing found itself in conflict with the
natural and the social areas of morality. Instead of seeing that each
area has its contribution to make in an overall appreciation of
morality, he saw meaningless conflict. He saw the individual as the
supreme fund of values, if only in the sense of being the vessel for a
universal will-to-live and love. The individual is seen as the
source of values, and to the extent that he or she is one origin of
these values, then there can be no quarrel with such an approach.
But Schweitzer's is not the only variety of personal morality
possible. Perhaps more influential has been that kind of thought
stemming from the individual, characterised as 'existentialist'. In
this chapter, the varieties of existentialist thought possible will be
examined in some detail, as well as the sorts of questions raised, and
replies provided to the enquiry being conducted. As this school of
thought tends to begin with the
	 individual's experience,
consideration will be given to the extent to which it is capable of
dealing with moral ideas emanating from other areas. And as the
personal, and interpersonal tend to be so closely linked, it will be
instructive to see how well a really personalist philosophy, like
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Sartre's, can cope with the interpersonal. In so doing, not only will
it be shown that the personal and interpersonal areas are logically
distinct, but that they ask different kinds of questions about human
existence. Existence, then, is the key word.
As its name implies, existentialism is one side of a perennial
philosophical debate - that of existence versus essence. The debate
began as early as Plato, and has tended until the modern age to lean
towards the essentialist position. Barrett(1) argues persuasively
that Platonic essentialism in the guise of Plato's Ideal Forms has
inclined Western thought to a belief in objective absolutes throughout
the last two thousand years, a belief buttressed by belief in a
supernatural order in the form of a Christian God. These notions have
co-existed with increasing difficulty with the Aristotelian notion of
the essentially rational nature of human beings. However, with the
advent of Copernicus, of Newton, of a scientific method which reduced
the universe to a mechanical model which needed no personal
intervention by any omnipotent being, and which further reduced man's
conception of his own importance in it as well, it increasingly called
into question the possibility of a rational grounding for orthodox
religious beliefs. The more man knew, or thought he knew, of his
predicament, the less he was prepared to venture by way of grand
philosophical systems. The Age of Reason passed, and more and more
the great system builders came to be seen as:
"...like the man who builds a huge palace and himself lives
next door to it in a barn." (2)
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Buber(3) once proposed that the history of the human spirit might be
thought of as an affair of alternation between 'epochs of habitation
and epochs of homelessness'. The Middle Ages was a period of such
habitation, but since then this feeling of homelessness, of
rootlessness, has been heard more and more. Pascal was one of the
first to feel this, and in his Pensees(4), can be seen the draining
away of that confidence which man had experienced when he thought of
himself as the centre of his Creator's universe, being replaced by a
terror at the encroaching belief of his existence's absurdity in an
unhearing, uncaring cosmos. Eliot(5) describes it well when he thinks
of man like:
"—bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind."
Existentialism tends to be thought of as a movement more literary than
philosophical, which had its heyday with the beatniks in the 1950s,
and has now passed out of fashion. By noting instead that the
origins of the philosophic conflict go back to Plato, it can be seen
to be no seven day wonder. It, more than any other philosophical
movement of the twentieth century, asks questions which are not only
of supreme moral, but of religious importance as well. Why be moral?
What am I doing here? Is there any reason for my existence? By
asking questions not only about human existence, but more centrally
about personal existence, it moves the shift of philosophy from a
consideration of the universal and general to the particular. It is,
as Grene(6) says: "a new expression of an old despair." And when
comparing the questions it asks with those dwelt upon by Logical
Positivists and Linguistic Philosophers, one would be hard put to
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argue that the Existential approach is not as pertinent to a
philosophical investigation of the roots of moral and religious
education as they are.
What, then, are the central ideas of the movement which link in with
present concerns? There seem to be five.
Firstly, there is the notion of subjective truth - that we must turn
into ourselves and come to a 'truth' for ourselves, simply because the
'objective' can never be attained. This notion of subjective truth
is, of course, fraught with difficulties and dangers.
Secondly, and because of this subjectivity, the world as such appears
alien, inaccessible, and unintelligible, and man finds himself in an
absurd situation - a creature of consciousness of no apparent
importance whatsoever. He finds himself, like a character from Kafka,
thrown into a situation without sense or meaning, knowing only that
there is the sentence of death upon him, and not even knowing why. In
such a situation, the question 'why be moral?' becomes even more
vital.
Thirdly, because of our very consciousness, of our awareness of
ourselves and our situation, we are paradoxically much freer than we
might like to think. The considered exercise of this freedom, that
this personal responsibility must be chosen or avoided, is a key
concern of the movement in that it urges the individual to face the
problem of making some personal sense of life.
Fourthly, this predicament is normally, truly, understood when the
extreme or boundary situation is met. It is when suffering, sorrow,
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struggle, and death are met that our finitude and vulnerability are
fully realised.
Finally, the existentialist asserts the primacy of individuals and
their relationships over that of society, or 'the herd'. Most
existentialists are quite abusive about the social world of the
present day, but their cry is fundamentally a moral and Kantian one -
that human beings should be regarded as irreplaceable and never
interchangeable, and that much of the present day world attempts to do
this - making man an interchangeable productive unit, rather than
recognising the fundamental uniqueness of each human being. This is
the essential point in Berdyaev's criticism(7) of Marxism.	 "For
Marx", he says, "class is more real than man."
The primacy of individual action is seen at its most extreme in the
work of Soren Kierkegaard. Indeed, other human beings are seen by him
as a barrier to a relationship with God. Now there can be little
doubt that Kierkegaard's experiences in life were the prompt for part
of the orientation of his thought - his sense of solitariness, his
feelings of subjectivity, of the lack of true communication between
people.	 But it would be too facile to say that his experiences
explain his thinking. To reduce the penetrating insights which
Kierkegaard did have to a sensationalist psychoanalytic interpretation
is an unnecessary impoverishment. What can be said, however, is that
Kierkegaard's cast of mind led him to explore certain avenues to the
exclusion of others, and in so doing, did limit his perception of
personal possibilities.
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Take, for instance, his three stages of personal growth(8).
Kierkegaard argues that as the human being moves through this world,
if he or she truly meditates upon his or her experiences, then three
stages of personal growth - the aesthetic, ethical and religious - can
be discerned. But this growth cannot be attained by an understanding
of any general relationship between God and man, nor by the
construction of elaborate theological edifices, but only by turning
inwards. It means turning from the impersonal which, because
Impersonal, must be superficial and trivial, to the profoundly held
personal truth which may, from an impersonal point of view, seem
profoundly paradoxical and contradictory. At the supreme moments of
crisis in one's life, instead of following the railroad tracks of
moral convention, one must take the 'leap of faith' and do what is
right for oneself, asserting the unique importance of one's own
existence. For Kierkegaard, then:
"Morality is the sphere of abstract principles of behaviour:
to religion alone belongs the unique historical moment, the
moment that cannot be told because it tells so much."(9)
This is the meaning of Abraham's intended sacrifice of Isaac in "Fear
and Trembling"(10). By all conventional moral rules, the father
should have protected the son, but as the supreme declaration of what
his life meant, he must make the ultimate choice and take the leap of
faith into a life position, which he cannot fully 'know', but which is
uniquely his.
The example of Abraham and Isaac is no doubt meant to shock, but to
shock in order to awaken people from their dogmatic slumbers - to make
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people realise that if Christianity was to retain its true meaning,
then each individual must appropriate for himself what is true within
Christianity: and this must be done again and again at each crossroads
of crisis. This is the reason for his sometimes quite astonishing
invective against his native Danish church, which he saw as co-
conspirator with the individual and the State in keeping the painful
truth of each man's personal quest from himself. Christianity proper,
then, for Kierkegaard, is the individual's discovery - the leap at
each crucial time in one's life.
Now the point has been made that Kierkegaard's personal temperament
led him to dwell on, and over-emphasise, the purely personal category
of human experience. This, indeed, is the essence of Buber's
criticism of him(11): do we find God by turning away from others into
ourselves, or by turning outwards towards others? Kierkegaard totally
fails to give meaning or credit to the interpersonal side of man's
nature and morality, and, by so doing, inevitably distorts his thesis.
Similarly, his description of the second, ethical stage of personal
growth, seems to be highly artificial and unconvincing, for it totally
fails to locate the individual and morality within some community,
some social area of morality. 	 Particularly here, one feels that
Kierkegaard's twisted introvert nature has blinded him to the richness
possible in human experience, and in the diversity of moral genesis.
However, in the midst of the overstressed and the biased, there are
both dubious emphases and gems of insight which others picked up on
and expanded. These seem to be four in number.
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Firstly, from a Christian standpoint, the reaction was delayed, but
profound all the same. The historical scholarship of people like
Strauss and Schweitzer(12) destroyed the cosy picture of Jesus as
essentially a great practical moral teacher, a picture which had
shored up liberal Protestant faith in the nineteenth century, and it
was because of Kierkegaard's leap out of the rational that his
interpretation was untouched by such findings. It was for people like
Barth to build on this blind faith, but with all the problems which
attend a non-rational approach.
Secondly, Kierkegaard rejected the philosophical tradition remarked on
earlier - the Platonic notion that universals are truly real, and that
the particular is real only insofar as it is a poor approximation of
the eternal. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were the first major thinkers
in the nineteenth century to reverse this Platonic scale of values
and assert the primacy of the individual existent, the belief in the
validity of the exploration of one's own selfhood as a starting point
for an investigation of all else.
Thirdly, there is a belief in both the freedom of the individual to
chart his own course, and his personal responsibility for doing so as
well. Life is, therefore, a project - a thing to be made by oneself.
And finally, there is the belief that society, or its institutions,
does not hold the answer - that blindly following conventions is the
inauthentic path, and, more than this, is essentially dehumanising as
well.
However, Kierkegaard's work is still located within a tradition - the
Christian tradition.	 Kierkegaard's Christianity is radical in the
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extreme, but there is still something to hold onto if one dares to
make the leap. The problem is really one of communication - between
man and God. Kierkegaard never seems to doubt that there is something
or someone with whom to communicate. Thus, though he may have sown
the seeds of something infinitely disturbing, it was for other
Existentialists to reap them. And it was for Nietzsche to ask the
ultimate question - what is left if there is no God? Kierkegaard has
made the leap and found God. Nietzsche has made the leap and found -
nothing.
But there is more than this, much more. Nietzsche is convinced that
this is not his solitary discovery. He is convinced that Western man
is in the process of tearing up his psychological roots - of stepping
out from beneath the comfort of a protective God - and standing on his
own two feet in the world, alone. The only trouble is that Western
man has not yet recognised this. In a famous passage, Nietzsche
describes Just this situation:
"Have you heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the
bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried
incessantly: 'I am looking for God! I am looking for God!
...where has God gone?' he cried 'I shall tell you.
We have killed him- you and I. We are
all his murderers...is not the greatness of this deed
too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods
simply to seem worthy of it.. .Here the madman fell
silent and again regarded his listeners: and they,
too, were silent and stared at him in astonishment.
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At last he threw his lantern to the ground and it
broke and went out. 'I cone too early' he said then;
'my time has not come yet. This tremendous event
is still on its way, still travelling - it has not
yet reached the ears of man...deeds require time
after they are done before they can be seen and heard.
This deed is still more distant from them than the most
distant stars - and yet they have done it themse1ves!"(13)
Western civilisation had revolved around the figure of Christ, and was
now, in Nietzsche's image, like a planet detaching itself from its
sun, only of this it was not yet aware. There is no God, says
Nietzsche, and the existential problems which face men today are a
direct consequence of this loss of faith in God. God is dead, and we
humanity - have killed him. As Albert Camus said in 'The Rebel' (14):
"Contrary to the opinion of certain of his Christian critics
Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God. He simply
found him dead in the souls of his contemporaries."
Nietzsche found at bottom a radically secular outlook and determined
to lay bare the situation where man is alone in a world with no
meaning apart from that which he brings to it himself. Not that he
can expect a hero's welcome by the general populace. This recognition
involves immense courage, an ability to stand back from a culture or a
religion's norms and standards, and recognise them for what they are,
to look inside oneself and re-evaluate them in the light of oneself.
This will need a new kind of man, a veritable superman who has the
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courage to do it. But the most ordinary men will baulk at it. Freud
put the matter very succinctly when he said(15) that:
"A man who has for decades taken a sleeping draught is
naturally unable to sleep if he is deprived of it."
Humanity, then, is deeply, profoundly, disturbingly free. The issue
of where morality comes from cannot be avoided. If the responsibility
cannot be placed at God's feet any longer, in what does morality lie?
Ha are responsible for our actions, our values, and our purposes, and
it is only in facing up to this recognition, that we can overcome our
psychic sickness.
It is easy to see how the depiction of such a man - courageous, alone,
self-willed, anti-Christian (both in opposition to the existence of
God, and in the need for self-assertion as against the Christian
virtues of meekness and submissiveness) could be perverted into a
corrupt philosophy for the Nazi master race. But there is little
doubt that this was not part of Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche was
not advocating a new absolute code of morality, but a re-evaluation of
one's own in the light of the death of God and any other transcendent
authority.
This is not to say that Nietzsche is not partly to blame, as indeed is
Kierkegaard for what happened to his thought. Kierkegaard introduced
a very dangerous idea when, in the move from the Ethical to the
Religious stages, he argues for a "teleological suspension of the
ethical" (16). Bartley has pointed out, in criticism of both
Kierkegaard and Barth(17), that sanctioning an irrational commitment
to Christ means that one loses the right to criticise other irrational
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commitments, such as commitment to the Fatherland, racial superiority,
or anything else. Much the same criticism can and should be directed
at Nietzsche,
If man is to claim for himself the moral freedom which the
existentialist urges, then there must accompany such a claim a
heightened sense of responsibility, and an analysis of how his freedom
will square with another's, and, indeed, an explanation of how in
practical terns, it can. Nietzsche's and.Kierkegaard's subjectivity
are so extreme that it is difficult to see how they can explain this
adequately.
A much more systematic and closely reasoned account is that given by
Sartre.	 For many people, Sartre is seen as the culmination of
Existentialist thought. Certainly, Warnock, in her survey of
Existentialist ethics(18) does precisely this, and thereby, to her
satisfaction, shows that there is no ethical mileage in the
philosophy. Warnock, in effect, argues that Sartre dug himself into a
pit of self and alienation, of nausea, out of which he could not drag
himself. It is because of this, she implies, that Sartre turned from
Existentialism to Marxism, thereby proving that the Existentialist
tree is barren, There are, then, two different questions to answer.
Firstly, is Sartre's exposition a dead end? And, secondly, if it is a
dead end, is it the dead end of Existentialism? 	 The first question
will be dealt with immediately.
Certainly, Sartre's is a pretty morbid picture of the human condition,
consisting as it does of a nexus of three different ideas - freedom,
dread, and comforting frauds,
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The first part, freedom, is a common enough theme - the realisation of
the responsibility to make of my world what I alone can. The dread,
the terror, comes in the realisation that I alone, with no cosmic
meaning or any rational grounds, have to make a meaning out of the
world, and in this awareness I cone hideously face to face with the
utter stupidity, absurdity, meaninglessness of the meaning I try to
make. As Sartre says:
...ontology and existential psychoanalysis.. ,must reveal to the
moral agent that he is the being by whom values exist.
It is then that his freedom will become conscious of itself
and will reveal itself in anguish as the unique source of
value and the nothingness by which the world exists." (19)
The comforting fraud cones with the attempt to hide from this
responsibility, to evade the acknowledgement of the freedom, and the
dread, the lifetimes spent in activities of 'seriousness' and 'bad
faith', in the attempt to live out a societal role rather than
constructing one's own life.
And to those who claim that this is no mirror of the human condition,
that this experience of dread is such a seldom occurrence as to be
unrepresentative, Sartre would only say that this shows Just how
difficult it is for anyone of us to bear our freedom and to confront
our dread, how easily and willingly we slip into our comforting frauds
to avoid them. How few would want to face this imperative:
"You are free, therefore choose - that is to say, invent. No
rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no
signs are vouchsafed in this world." (20)
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Thus each person must invent his own values. The individual is
moral, is 'authentic', to the extent that he strives to realise them.
But then, is this any further on than Nietzsche? Dostoievsky said
that if there is no God, then everything is permitted, and on the
individualist basis set before us, it is hard to argue with him. In
his book "Existentialism and Humanism"(21), _Sartre illustrates the
impossibility of Judgement or prescription by the case of the young
Frenchman at the time of the Nazi occupation, who is faced with the
choice of either going to help the free French forces in England, or
staying at hone to be with his mother who lived only for him. Sartre
holds that no ethical doctrine can arbitrate between such claims. The
point is, of course, that the boy must create his own values in his
own situation. As Grene says(22):
"...he can only do what he is and be what he does; no
supernatural values appear in the heavens to guide him."
This can be accepted, but certain features of the situation need to be
fleshed out.
Firstly, the conflict is between a claim from the interpersonal area
of morality, and another from the social. If the claims are from
these genetically different areas, then a final resolution is not
possible, only a balanced Judgement. This does not, however, have to
be arbitrary, for, secondly, the young Frenchman is both spectator and
participant - he finds himself 'thrown' into his relationship with his
mother, and he must Judge as a participant in an ongoing relationship.
And finally, whilst the final choice will never be a perfect one, this
does not entail that it must then be arbitrary, based on the toss of a
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coin as well as any other procedure.	 There are degrees of
subjectivity, and a considered, thoughtful decision can be better than
a quick unthinking one.
Perhaps the choice is so difficult - and hence so arbitrary - for
Sartre, because of the kind of theory of interpersonal and social
relations he espouses. His theory at least goes someway to escaping
the kind of solipsist positions into which Kierkegaard's and
Nietzsche's theories always seem in danger of falling. But hardly
much further, tied as it is to his theory of the person and his own
view of humanity.
My relation to another, Sartre says, is revealed in the moment in
which, sitting in a park, I find a stranger looking at me(23). This
fact of another's looking at me, Sartre believes, reveals the
existence of another subject to me, but also, in this very moment, I
feel myself becoming a mere object in someone else's world. My
awareness of another existence observing me has a two-fold effect.
Firstly, the "the cogito a little expanded"(24) affirms the existence
of other beings like myself, but, secondly, because it perceives me as
an object by its gaze, it is actively seeking to reduce me, to
annihilate me.	 Interpersonal	 relationships are therefore,
necessarily, relationships of conflict. 	 "The Other exists for
consciousness only as a refused self" (25).
This nightmarish quality - the fact that another object intrudes on my
created world - threatens all kinds of disorganisation for me. The
presence of a stranger causes an 'internal hemorrhage' of my world, my
world 'bleeding' in the direction of the stranger(26).
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Even the sexual relationship is similarly affected - either I try to
absorb, or allow to be absorbed by the other - sadism, masochism, or
indifference are the only possible outcomes.
It is not surprising that the only positive social union is one where
individuals submerge their conflicts in a common fight against a
greater aggressor. This, then, is the nature of class conflict - the
oppressed joining forces against the oppressor. What, though, happens
to this union when the oppressor is overthrown? The personal
conflicts, it would seem, must rise to the surface again, and resume
their perpetual struggle against one another.
It is clear that, given Sartre's premises, there can be no other
conclusions at the interpersonal and social level. And yet, one can
ask: are these premises needed? Is not Sartre selling the human being
terribly short? One could maintain that the original relation of
myself to another lies in the recognition of another like myself, who
enriches and completes my freedom, rather than threatens to annihilate
it. If but one such relationship can occur, in which two existences
did not endanger but encouraged and strengthened each other, then
Sartre's depressing circle of observer and observed, the threatener
and threatened, can be, is, broken. And surely such relationships do
exist. There is no reason to believe that the existential I cannot
join with another I, instead of being in permanent conflict.
Again, are there not activities, where to achieve their end, human
beings must act of like mind and body - where the community acts
almost as an organism in the interdependence of each of its members?
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Could it not be claimed that these are as representative of the human
condition as individual, atomistic, relationships?
Similarly, Sartre horribly misdescribes love. He is not talking about
love, but rather control. His inability to see the possibilities of
the relationship is really more his problem than ours. Consider the
possibilities inherent in love pointed out by,Grene(27):
'What the lover of Aristophanes' story wants is not just to be
loved but to be made whole again, to become wholly himself in
union with the other from whom an unnatural cleavage has
divided him... love is not so much the desire to be loved as it is
the sense of one's completion in another through shared insights
and aspirations."
As noted above, one of the central ethical concerns of Existentialism
- perhaps the central concern - is that man be not made a part of
society's machinery, that the importance of each one as an individual
should not be lost. It is this kind of appeal which inspires much
Existential literature. Witness De Beauvoir's cry:
"You can excuse every misdemeanour and every crime, even, by
which an individual asserts himself against society; but when
a man deliberately sets about to debase man into thing, he lets
loose a scandal on earth which nothing can make amends for.
This is the only sin against man there is, but once it has been
brought to pass, no indulgence is allowable, and it is man's
business to punish it."(28)
And yet, on Sartre's account, it is the only possible relationship
between human beings. He surely has gone horribly wrong. If Sartre's
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existentialism suits us, it must be as much our failure as his
success.
Sartre's exposition, it would seem, is a dead end. By misrepresenting
the possibilities of growth from the personal to the interpersonal to
the social, Sartre provides a lopsided and twisted view of the human
condition which need not be accepted. More fruitful is the Camus
approach, whose ethic, whilst still fairly grim, is both more
congenial and more hopeful for an interpersonal and social ethic.
Like Nietzsche, like Sartre, Camus starts from the position that there
is no God, that there is nothing further than man, that existence is
essentially meaningless and absurd, and that there is only one
certainty - that we will die. Now, as noted above, it is a position
which can lead to both pessimism, and the belief that anything goes.
But, for Camus, such a position would be to take sides with the Absurd
against man, for there is only one value that makes sense in such a
world, and that is man himself. And it is through this belief - that
one must hold onto the value of man - that Camus comes through as a
philosopher of dignity, strength, and even optimism. We may live in a
world brutally indifferent to human life, but at least we can choose
to be for man and against whatever would bring distress and
humiliation to our brothers and sisters. And when this is what we
commit ourselves to, then we have, in effect, chosen to resist the
world's absurdity. Camus' vision of man is eloquently put in "The
Myth of Sisyphus"(29), where man is likened to Sisyphus, condemned to
role a boulder up a slope for eternity, only to see it come sliding
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back down to the bottom just as he nears the top. As Camus says(30):
"One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
Camus also goes somewhat further in breaking with personal
subjectivity by arguing that my freedom must not destroy another's:
we are in the boat together and we must sail together. On Sartre's
previous accounts, one must draw the conclusion that my freedom will
inevitably feed off someone else's. Camus is in no such difficulty:
he can transcend Sartre's problem of freedom by asserting a human
ethic, a shared human ethic. He shows that even with a committed
atheistic position, it is still possible to argue for the possibility
of interpersonal and social areas of morality. Camus shows that it is
possible to transcend the purely subjective, but still insist on man
facing the unpleasant facts of life and death, and that only by so
doing can we make sense of existence.
Heidegger seems to take us further, but he certainly makes us pay for
trying to stay with him. Many must have total sympathy and agreement
with Warnock when she writes(31):
"One common effect of the truly Existentialist writer is to
provoke in his readers the exasperated desire to rewrite what
he says in plain language, and to show tht it doesn't after
all amount to more than a platitude. If this is indeed a
distinguishing mark of the Existentialist, then none is so
unambiguously an Existentialist as Heidegger."
Like other existentialists, Heidegger is acutely aware of the fact
that we simply find ourselves in this world - s throwness' is the
graphic word he uses - and there seems to be no rhyme or reason to
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this throwness. So there is already the sense of meaninglessness and
absurdity so familiar a theme in Existentialist thought. And of
course there is the absurdity of death as well. However, Heidegger
turns this fact of the certainty of non-existence, of finitude, into a
means of appreciating what we have. He draws the notion of Death into
the circle of Life, and argues that it is the _very recognition of
Death which can make one aware of the preciousness of life, and only
in so doing can one escape the inauthenticity, the seriousness, the
bad faith, which threaten to make life less than it might be.
Heidegger is not, of course, the first to say this. Dostoievsky re-
lived his own reprieve in front of the firing squad in "The Idiot",
and his outpourings there could not be a more perfect appreciation of
the value of life(32):
"What if I had not had to die! What if I could return to life
- oh, what an eternity! And all that would be mine! I should
turn every minute into an age, I should lose nothing, I should
count every minute separately and waste none!"
The point is educationally valuable, if education is thought of as a
life-long process, for who, with the thought of his death and
disappearance from this world, would spend his time on trivia, on
doing only what others expected of him, rather than on those things
which really matter to him? Recognition of our finitude can only make
us more honest in our dealings with ourselves, and our relationships,
and make us value and appreciate that which we have.
This recognition of our death need not, then, turn us solitary and
introspective. It may instead make us look outward to what we have,
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and make more of it. Instead of retreating from the interpersonal and
social, it may stimulate us to reach out further. And to add to this,
Heidegger seems to be saying something quite novel for Existentialists
which lifts him out of the subjective pit which Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche dug, which Sartre made deeper, and out of which Camus
valiantly tried to climb. Heidegger simply says that man never was
in this pit in the first place. He may have been thrown into this
world, but not as an isolated enclosed being: what characterises us is
that we are already in the world. Leibnitz had said that the monad
had no windows, but Heidegger would say that man does not look at the
external world through windows, from the isolation of his ego, for he
is already out of doors. Barrett(33) has described this part of
Heidegger's theory as his 'Field Theory of Being' - that part which
Heidegger dubbed 'Dasein' - and by this he means that the region of my
care and concern is never defined by that area enclosed by my skin.
Rather, it extends as far as my care and concern, my loves and
relationships, extend. So, to try to describe someone without taking
this into account is to miss the whole point of a person's Being - for
a person is precisely a Being-in-the-world. This destroys the
Cartesian conception of man at one blow, for Descartes - and most of
the Existentialists - picture man as a solitary, introverted thinker
locked in his dark room. Heidegger is saying that this isn't a human
being at all - we are thrown into a world of relationships and cares,
and our definition of ourselves must include these networks if it is
to describe who we are.
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The more is known about young children, the more Heidegger's assertion
is borne out in real life. As will be seen in the last section of
this thesis, psychological theory is pointing towards agreement with
such a conception. For example, the psychologist, Hoffman(34), has
investigated the very earliest period in the child's life, when the
child is confused as to the difference between his and other peoples'
identity, and out of this has developed a theory of the child's moral
growth. Both philosopher and psychologist appear to be saying that,
given minimum conditions early in life, we are naturally moral beings
in the interpersonal and social meanings of the word, for our
definition of ourselves normally includes the recognition of others,
so our care for ourselves naturally extends to them.
There seems to be, then, the means to link the different areas of
morality. The natural area can be understood, for human beings are
creatures of this planet as much as anything else. Further, we are
all confronted by the dilemmas of personal existence; and if minimal
developmental conditions allow, the care for others at the
interpersonal and social levels is naturally incorporated within our
caring for ourselves. What, then, of the mystical/religious area?
The full treatment of this area must wait until the next chapter, but
It does seem appropriate at this point to complete this account with
the work of Buber - for he seems not only to complete the
philosophical circle, but go some considerable way to completing a
psychological one as well.
Buber, then, appears to be saying much the same kind of thing as the
'Field Theory of Being' in his account of 'I-Thou'(35). Whilst it may
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well be that Heidegger saw this as a 'given' of human existence,
rather than as a thing to be desired(36), Buber is undoubtedly saying
that the relationship of 'I-Thou' is, and should be, prior to both 'I'
and 'Thou'. His attitude to others is, of course, in striking
contrast to that of Sartre. For whereas Sartre sees human beings as
locked into themselves, a world of separated divided beings, Buber
sees the world as composed of two sorts of relationships - 'I-It' and
'I-Thou'.	 The first of these is those human relationships with
things, the second are the relationships between people. 'I-It'
relationships are necessarily ones of manipulation and control, but
'I-Thou' relationships should be ones of exploration and discovery -
for both persons have between them that which it is to be human.
Buber is thus making the point that I-Thou relationships are essential
because they are. caring, love, and respect, and that a person cannot
exist in this world without such things coning from others. This is a
basic psychological insight, and from it springs the notion that human
beings are interpersonal and social creatures, and that without
environments which generate love, respect, care, and security, people
will wither in their humanity. Buber is thus pointing through the
interpersonal to the truly social, and arguing that the ethos of the
community, the society in which one lives, is vital, for it sustains
that which comes naturally as part of ourselves.
Buber is undoubtedly a mystico-philosophic writer, but his Judaism is
of the Hassidic variety, which also stresses the practical and the
community-involved, and whilst his thought is not psychologically
systematic, it links in, in quite astonishing ways, with some current
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psychological thought. Thus, in the next section of this thesis, it
will be	 argued that a cognitive developmental theory of moral
development is an inadequate description of the whole person's moral
growth, and it will be suggested that other, non-cognitive factors
are needed as well. Central will be:
(a) a sense of value as a person, which depends upon being liked,
loved and respected;
(b) a rewarding experience of involvement with others, which
depends upon being secure and free from threat; and
(c) a sense of responsibility towards others, which depends upon
being needed and experiencing success in the company of others.
These are all grounded in Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship, and point to
a fundamental weakness in the stage-development approach exhibited by
theorists like Kohlberg(37). If it can be accepted that an 'I-Thou'
relationship is a fundamental unit of moral language in interpersonal
relationships, then it is implicit that each person's essential
uniqueness is recognised. Human beings must be seen as irreplaceable
and not interchangeable. What, then, does this make of Kohlberg's
stages five and six, or the universalisability criterion in general?
If the irreducibility of each person is accepted, then such a
criterion may prevent us from being egocentric in our dealings, but
can be little better than a rule of thumb, for if taken too literally,
it makes each person exchangeable - it reduces them to 'its' rather
than 'thous'.	 It means that in moral dealings, in moral education,
the particular, the individual, the ground of our being must be
acknowledged, and forever referred back to. 	 There must be a refusal
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to be drawn into the geometrical precision and ease of simple
universalisability. Here there is, yet again, the tension between the
areas of morality, and rising up behind is the ghost of Plato, asking
which is the more valuable, the individual or the universal, the
particular or the Ideal, the existence or the essence. As was
answered before, so it must be answered now. They need each other.
It is the tension between them which produces the moral conflict, but
It is only by reference to them both that a Just resolution can be
hoped for. As this is a chapter on the personal and the
interpersonal, though, it should be stressed that once one starts to
generalise about human beings, rather than recognising each one's
uniqueness, then something is lost - the particularity, the feel, the
commitment, the care. 	 By universalising too glibly, Justice is
dehumanised.
Now this would mean that Kohlberg's higher stages are no better, in
reality, than his 3rd stage, or at least to those people whom he would
classify at stage 3, because they would refuse to leave the personal
to move to the general. Both sides have got hold of one part of the
moral equation, thinking that they have got the whole. Noddings(38)
points out that such people at stage 3 have a very characteristic way
of solving Kohlberg's dilemmas. Instead of saying 'let's assign
weighted values to the principles involved here', and then shuffling
people around in a game of moral musical chairs, the stage 3 person
asks for more information. Such people are content oriented, and seek
to reconcile the situation from within. They do this by seeking out
what is unique to each person within the situation, by attempting to
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know each person better. Rather than making people interchangeable in
terms of formal principles, they try to make them irreplaceable in
terns of content.
Nevertheless, whilst it may be argued that the initial ground of
human morality lies in the personal and interpersonal areas - those of
the existential question and the 'I-Thou' relationship - yet it is
patently obvious that these, as they stand, are inadequate for solving
the major problems of the world today. It is one of the strongest
criticisms of Existentialist thought that it is incapable of dealing
with problems concerning the relations between groups of people -
international bodies, races, trade unions, and the like. And it is
one of the strongest appeals of the Kohlbergian higher stages that
they appear to be 'fair' to all, and therefore are much to be
preferred at the social and societal level. However, taken at their
bleakest, they can be no more than rules of thumb which provide little
more than a starting point. A link is needed between the personal and
interpersonal, and social areas of morality. Perhaps it is suggested
in the example Noddings(39) gives of the Roman commander Manlius, who,
in order to remain consistent in the application of a harsh law he had
made, executed his own son. Now Noddings does not argue that Manlius
should have excused his son because he was his son (but continued
executing others). Nor does she agree with what Manlius did. What
she says is that if Manlius had started out at the 'I-Thou' level, he
would never have made such a rule in the first place. In other words,
I-Thou relationships must inform the construction of rules at the
social level, just as they must be used in the application of such
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rules. Whilst there can be no universal solutions, we can do our best
to understand what motivates the other, what are his or her special
circumstances which make him or her unique,and which call upon us to
treat him or her in a way slightly different from rule-of-thumb
universal principles. People are deep and mysterious creatures, and,
as argued in Section I of this thesis, the byword should be tolerance
because of the acknowledgement of ignorance. Only with these thoughts
to the front of our minds can there be a hope of formulating and
applying rules even half-way Just.
CONCLUSIONS
Morality is an untidy business. 	 Western man's need to fit his
experiences into neat labelled compartments is largely the inheritance
he brings with him from his rational, objective-minded, scientific
forbears, but it will not do for an adequate description of morality.
A much more complex picture presents itself, which is initially a very
uncomfortable one because it points to a host of problems. 	 It is
uncomfortable, but it is also richly suggestive.
Firstly, it means that in the final analysis, moral concepts will be
unnanipulable.	 In other words, they will refuse to fit any one
theory, and therefore will refuse to yield straight rule-of-thumb
prescriptions for all situations.	 Each must be approached with
criteria, with logic, and with principles, but essentially each
situation will be new, and will have to be explored and dealt with as
such.
Secondly, we will always, sometimes, fail. There can never be a moral
system which gives the correct answers every time. There will always
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be mistakes in perceptions, and in understanding, but the attitude of
tolerance through the acknowledgement of ignorance will tend to
prevent commitmene before a problem is thought through fully. Though
the depths of the human situation will always surpass a capacity for
total comprehension, yet the realisation of its depth will mean a
better chance of getting nearer to its true resolution than merely
using the short circuit of objective principles.
Thirdly, though, we are not thrown on our own resources. There is a
perspective to work from - the primitive relationships of care, of I-
Thou meetings, which can inform our efforts in whichever direction we
turn.	 They provide the basis for dealings with individuals: they
provide the basis for the construction of principles for groups, and
they provide the evaluative perspective for the application of these
principles. They do not, then, leave us on our own.
Fourthly, it means that moral education should be viewed as the
recommendation of the adoption of an attitude, rather than the
agreement with, and application of, bald theory.
	 It is an attitude
which has to be worked at from the moment of birth until the moment of
death. If Education for Life means anything, it means it most of all
for Moral Education.
Fifthly, it re-emphasises the profound importance of the models which
children see.	 What they see is what they tend to become.
	
And
children see further than school. Teachers may exhibit the attitude
needed, the school may in its organisation subtly underline this
caring approach to the individual, but society as a whole is
infinitely more pervasive in its effect.
	 At the personal level,
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parents have the crucial role to play. 	 At the social level, big
business, trade unions, bureaucracy, government, all provide the
example. If they apply general principles thoughtlessly, without
considering the individual, they pass on a clear message to the child
that the individual does not matter, and a little more of the child's
humanity will be crushed. He will treat others as he himself has been
treated, as he has seen others treated. Moral Education is for life
for everyone.
Finally, all the preceding should make us aware that existential
paths through life may lead to different destinations for each person.
It might mean a stoic belief in the ultimate absurdity of existence,
but at the same time in a human ethic which makes sense because it is
chosen to make sense. Or it might mean the belief in something which
lies beyond present concerns, but which is grasped through immersion
in them. However, to the extent that each path is grounded in care,
in the I-Thou, there need be no conflict between people arriving at
different conclusions. The path is both the same and different for
each one.
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CHAPTER 8 THE MYSTICAL/RELIGIOUS AREA OF MORALITY.
As one might expect, the mystical/religious area has quite profound
connections with the personal and interpersonal area, and, for people of a
non-religious * bent, the Existentialist approach might, again, be the
easiest to understand for an initial consideration of this, the most
difficult of areas to comprehend. Mohammed(1) once described the
philosopher who writes about mysticism, without having had any mystical
experience himself as rather like a donkey carrying a load of books. The
present writer feels like that donkey.
However, mystical philosophy may be characterised in the manner Russell
describes it(2), as having these four propositions as central to its
belief system:
(a)the achievement of insight through intuition or revelation, rather
than through rational analysis;
(b)a belief in the ultimate reality of all things;
(c)the denial of the reality of time - it being a creation of man
produced by the recognition of his finitude and the temporal
concerns so derived;
(d)the denial of ultimate division between good and evil, these again
being manifestations of human existence. At the higher level,
there is only a divine sense of peace.
The point to be noted is that Existentialism and these propositions are
not necessarily in conflict. What Existentialism demands is that a start
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is made from each unique person and a respect is given to his or her
subjectivity. The approach does not necessarily put limits on where
people's existential thought will lead them. Its quarrel with Plato is
rather that he denigrates the individual, and relegates existence in this
world to the peripheral, the shadow of the Real. Writers of an
existentialist leaning argue that the individual is intensely real, and
some go on to say that reflection by that individual may enable him, to
some extent, to transcend his subjectivity to something more complete.
For some existentialists, of course, there is no mystical/religious area.
Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus - the atheists - would have said this, but in a
curious sense, their approach was religious, or at least was inspired by
religion. After all, their work is directed to an examination of what can
remain of our values in a world where God is dead. Of the others,
Kierkegaard's problem was more a problem of the means of communication,
than a problem of God's existence. Heidegger's work in this respect is
confusing. His later work suggests the need for an almost Oriental
passivity in achieving an understanding of a Being which transcends the
human. Whilst this notion is suggestive, it is also so elusive that no
more time will be spent on it. Again Buber would seem to be the
person to turn to(3), for whilst he is very down to earth in his
description of the primacy of the 'I-Thou' relationship, he goes on to say
that in each breath of the relationship there is interfused the feeling of
an 'Eternal Thou' - that each special friendship has something
transcendent within it which points beyond. Buber is asserting that not
only must the 'I-Thou' relationship be seen as irreducible, but that also
within this irreducibility lies the glimpse of beyond. Buber's belief is
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actually a variation of one of the two principal types of mysticism
described by Happold(4) - the mysticism of love and union. This is very
clearly one of the major themes in existential literature, but it is, of
course, not located solely within this context. It is also one of the
fundamental themes running through much of the Christian theology of
this century.	
_.
One of its more recent advocates is Dykstra (5), who argues that human
beings are insecure on a permanent basis, and that we need the greatest
love to make us feel secure. This, he is sure, no mortal can give, even
though this love and security is constantly sought after in our
relationships with others. Indeed, says Dykstra, we even perform mental
tricks upon ourselves and upon others in order to be noticed by them.
But all this does is make matters worse because the vision of the truth
and depth of our relationships is obscured. This creation of veils of
obscurity is, for Dykstra, 'sin', and we break out of this system by the
recognition of a Being perfect, omnipotent and eternal. Were such a Being
to exist and love us, were we to acknowledge him, we would have that
degree of psychic security which would enable us to throw off this veil
and see things as they really are, to achieve truly satisfying
relationships.
Dykstra writes beautifully and says many wise and insightful things,
but, crucially, this belief in a Supreme Being is, and can be, no more
than wish-fulfilmenE, or mystical revelation for himself. Dykstra is
really trying to re-live the life of the medieval Christian, whose world
was guaranteed by the Eternal Father figure. As the last chapter argued,
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it is precisely the breakdown in such psychic security which brought
about the present Existentialist movement in the first place.
Not all Christian writers have taken this line, though. One of the most
radical, Cupitt(6), traces a very existentialist line from the end of the
Middle Ages to the present day. He sees Kierkegaard as standing at the
crossroads for Christianity, for in personalising man's religious
,
experience, and making this experience primary, Cupitt believes that he is
subjectifying God as well. Religious truth, for Cupitt, is not fixed, but
changes with its age. The tide of faith recedes as people feel the
current interpretation does not match their problems and experiences, and
the tide returns as it re-interprets itself to fit the current realities.
For Cupitt, then (7):
"God (and this is a definition) is the sum of our values,
representing to us their ideal unity, their claims upon us
and their creative power. Mythologically, he has been
portrayed as an objective being, because ancient thought
tended to personify values in the belief that important words
must stand for things.-.Values do not have to be independently
and objectively existent beings in order to claim our allegiance.
—thinking of values as objective beings out there does not
help us in any way to progress towards a clearer understanding
of the special part they play in our lives. We can do without
that mythological idea."
Thus Cupitt argues that realist views of an omnipotent being were really
only techniques used by religious teachers to get their people to
appraise their way of life from a new perspective. For Cupitt, then,
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there appears to be no transcendent 'good' - the 'good' is each person's
good, which each person holds up in front of him like a mirror and which
shows him how to behave.
It is hard to imagine two Christians farther apart on what Christianity
ultimately means. This only goes to show that existentialist sympathies
can have markedly different ultimate orientations on individuals in
related fields. The sorts of feelings so characteristic of
Existentialism, the sorts of questions it poses, lead one into
subjectivity, into introspection, but they do not necessarily leave one
there. It is just as likely for the person tackling existentialist
questions to move beyond the purely human to a mystical/religious
viewpoint, one which transcends a solution of human dilemmas at the
human level, and which believes it glimpses something further. And such
an approach, precisely because it recognises the uniqueness of each
Individual, the necessity of his freedom to choose, would seem to be
precisely the sort of ethic needed in both moral and religious education.
As Morris(8) says:
"The consideration of such questions completes the ethic
by bringing that which is experienced by all men into the
arena of open discourse. It fulfils the real meaning of a
pluralistic society."
Given the above, it is surprising to find that Downey and Kelly(9) say:
"There is no logical connection between morality and
religion. Any connection that exists is merely contingent."
The fact is that only one kind of approach has been dwelt upon, one which
Downey and Kelly don't take into account. Much of the force of their
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assertion comes from a much-repeated and seemingly powerful argument
which was quoted in Chapter 1, and which derives from Plato(10). It, in
effect, argues that either one ought to do what is right because it is
right (this being why God commanded it in the first place), or one ought
to perform an action purely because God has commanded it. If the first
alternative is accepted, then the introduction of God into the argument
appears superfluous. If the second is accepted, then the most monstrous
cruelties are allowed just because God has commanded them: there would be
no means of distinguishing between a 'good' God and an 'evil' one, as
there would be nothing left for a criterion, apart from the sheer might
of this superior being.
There are at least three ways of countering this argument. The first,
that God is co-existent with the good, indeed is, by definition, the Good,
seems to be a nice sleight of hand, but it does not get much further on,
because it does not answer where the definition of the 'Good' is to come
from, nor does it prove the objective existence of this Deity.
The second counter, which has already been mentioned to some extent,
seems a better one. This suggests that the original argument only works
against one type of religious attitude. This, then, will be examined in
more detail.
On the account given so far it would be a crude misunderstanding of the
religious attitude to believe that it is comprised only of that which
believes in an omnipotent being. Leuba(11) included in an appendix a
list of 48 different definitions given by various writers. Certainly, a
writer like Campbell(12) might have difficulties as, for him, religious
experience is:
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".-a state of mind comprising belief in the reality of a
supernatural being or beings endued with transcendent power
and worth, together with the complex emotive attitude of
worship intrinsically appropriate thereto."
As will be seen shortly, even this attitude may be defended. However,
what is to be made of the kind of religious attitude described by
Thouless(13) where he describes religion as:
".-a particular kind of attitude toward the world as a whole.-
the space and time in which our bodies live is not the only
part of the environment to which we must be adjusted.- there
is also some kind of spiritual world which makes demands on
our behaviour, our thinking and feeling."
This attitude is symptomatic of a move within Christians...Ey over the
last 100 years, which moves the religious orientation away from
considerations of the external objective existence of a personable God to
considerations of man's situation in this world as the starting point for
exploration of what religious thought might mean. This is why
Robinson(14) can say that:
".-we are reaching the point at which the whole conception
of a God 'out there'-. is becoming more of a hindrance
than a help."
Look further at Tillich's proposals for the two formal criteria for
theology (15):
"The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately.
Only those propositions are theological which deal with
their object in so far as it can become a matter of
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ultimate concern for us."
"Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or
non-being. Only those statements are theological which
deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter
of being or non-being for us."
"Ultimate concern", "being or non-being": this is real existentialist
territory . Why do we live and die? What is the purpose of it all? Why
be moral? Obviously one does not need to be religious to ask these
questions. Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, atheists all, asked them. They got
very different answers from Robinson and Tillich, but they asked them.
So it might be fairer to say of religious thinkers like Robinson and
Tillich that they start from ground common to all, ask questions of
ultimate concern to all, but go a little way further down the path, or
take a turning others don't, or any other metaphors one cares to use
which doesn't suggest that, necessarily, their approach is 'further on',
'better', or any other description which labels it as 'superior'.
Certainly, having already looked at the thought of Dykstra and Cupitt, it
is quite apparent thaEit is nearly as difficult to define 'Christian' as it
is to define 'religious': Dykstra believes in an objectively existing
omnipotent loving Being; Tillich believes in something transcendent but
is rather more guarded in his categorisation; Cupitt has no need of
anything external to man at all save his own personal creations.
Clearly, then, any argument that wants to say that there is no logical
connection between religion and morality because, using the Divine
Command argument, religion has no moral force, misses its point.
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However, there is a third counter to the argument, since the argument
fails to recognise that there is a temporal movement from the secular
viewpoint to a mystical/religious one, and that morality is not a whole.
Thus, it is being argued that a mystical/religious approach to life is
preceded by consideration of the calls of other areas of morality.
Reflections upon the workings of the natural world, on life on this
planet, can lead some to a conception of something which transcends the
creatures which inhabit the Earth, a conception that their life flows in
and through them, but is in some sense eternal.
Again, reflection upon the mystery of the chemistry between two people
meeting - the I-Thou relationship of Buber - can lead people to a belief
in something intimated by, but transcendent to such a relationship. And
finally, the writings of Durkeheim and Hegel are replete with notions of
something greater than the sum of the parts - the spirit that continues
when the constituents pass on.
In each case, there is an initial conception of morality which points to
something beyond. For some, of course, it does not. For Downey and
Kelly it does not. For Midgley it does not. For Marx it does not - or
at least, he tries it not to! But the essential point is that it can -
that the secular areas of morality can all point to a religious area,
which then, if taken up, re-interprets these areas in a new light.
Now this is not an argument to say that there shouli be movement from
the natural, personal, interpersonal, or social areas to the
mystical/religious - it seems that there can be no answer to this, simply
because the justification for such a move can only come if the move
produces a clearer, more valid conception of morality - and that can only
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be eventually judged by those who make the move. It boils down to
Mohammed's donkey again.
However, rather than saying that there should be this movement, what this
argument does state is that this transition does, factually, occur, and
that because it does occur, morality from the mystical/religious area is
necessarily, temporally, second. Now because of this temporality, the
religious person could argue that even if he does believe in this
omnipotent God delivering his commands, that he can and does obey them
because he came to a belief in this God through a secular morality. His
religious morality now enhances, makes more real, that which he groped
for before, but he in no way subordinates his own moral choice, he
argues, because his choice is a personal choice founded on previously
secular thought.
On the above account, a statement like the following of Wright(16) must
be mistaken:
"The relationship (between M.E. and R.E.) is asymmetrical in
the sense that moral considerations enter into our decisions
regarding religious education, but religious considerations do
not enter into our planning for moral education. In this
sense, moral education is primary."
If the mystical/religious area of morality is a possible destination in
the individual's personal growth, and this destination is reached through
one or more of the other areas of morality, then a curriculum which did
not acknowledge this, and incorporates such knowledge into its original
planning of the content, would have to be deficient. Again, this does
not mean that the aim is a 'religious outcome' for the child. Rather it
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means that the possibility is recognised and provided for. 	 At the
boundaries of the personal, interpersonal, natural and social areas of
morality, there is, for many, a 'pull'. The pull should not be taught, but
its meanings, its possibilities should be. And these include the pull
from the mystical/religious area.
Many have felt this pull.
	 Tillich(17) describes how, for many, the
-
secular moralities are insufficient, when he writes:
"Autonomy is able to live as long as it can draw from the
religious tradition of the past, from the remnants of a lost
theonomy. But more and more it loses this spiritual foundation.
It becomes emptier, more formalistic, or more factual and is
driven towards scepticism and cynicism, towards the loss of
meaning and purpose—At the end of this process autonomy
turns back to the lost theonomy with impotent longing, or it
looks forward to a new theonomy."
Mitchell uses a 'pull' argument as the central argument of his book(18),
when he claims that religion has a real and necessary part to play in
any overall consideration of morality and its implications. He attempts
to show that the various humanist theories of morality do not hold up on
their own, and yet that some humanists (notably Murdoch and Hampshire)
still have deeply held moral convictions that they find difficult to
justify. Mitchell argues that if it is to be a straight choice between
one's profoundly held moral convictions being wrong, or a humanist stance
being wrong, then the latter should be rather carefully examined, to see
whether, with the humanists' apparent failure to justify their approach, a
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religious approach does not have rather more to say for itself as an
anchor for moral convictions than some philosophers have given it.
Now this argument is very limited. For a start, there are plenty of
humanists who do not feel the 'pull'. Moreover, a 'pull' does not prove
that there is anything real to be pulled to. As Mitchell himself
ooncedes(19), his argument is no substitute for a reasoned case for
theism. However, even without this reasoned case, the fact is that people
do make a move into viewing morality from a mystical/religious area. To
ignore the existence of this area is simply to fly in the face of the
evidence, to neglect what many regard as the cause for many of man's
supreme achievements, and to leave a curriculum which does not consider
it, an infinitely poorer place. Even if, as a humanist, one disagrees
with the impulse, this disagreement should be based on knowledge of the
area and not on ignorance.
Looking further at the nature of this pull, and at the possibility of
assessment of value positions held within this area, Mitchell writes(20):
"...if, instead, we place morality in the context of human needs and
insist that moral judgements require to be supported by reasons,
and that these reasons must relate to some intelligible and
defensible conception of human well-being, it becomes clear
that an adequate understanding of morality is no longer
attainable in total independence of our beliefs about the
nature and destiny of man."
The phrase 'the nature and destiny of man', is strongly reminiscent of
Tillich's 'matters of ultimate concern.' It also seems to closely
parallel the thought of Toulmin(21) who, in seeking to understand the
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reciprocal relationship of religion to morality, pointed out that the
domain of moral reasoning is not fully self-enclosed, but that moral
questions can point beyond themselves to the religious domain. In the
terminology used so far, Toulmin would be saying that the secular areas
of morality can point beyond themselves to the religious area. He argues
that if we continually ask for reasons why a particular norm should be
upheld, we will, after a time, exhaust the possible secular moral reasons
supporting this norm. We will find ourselves asking 'why be moral at
all?' For some, this reason appears at the limit of secular moral
inquiry, raising the question of the fundamental meaningfulness of human
activity, and, for some at least, points beyond to another area of
Justification - the religious/mystical area.
Kohlberg argues in a similar vein(22), when he says that at the highest
level of ethical principles, Justification by reference to the human social
order is inadequate, that such a morality 'requires' an ultimate stage of
religious orientation, which he proposed to call 'stage 7 1 (since when he
has dropped the stage(23)). As he says, at this level, the answer to the
question 'why be moral?' entails the answer to the question 'why live?'
and glow face death?' He concludes(24):
H .-ultimate moral maturity requires a mature solution to the
question of the meaning of life. This, in turn, is hardly a
moral question per se, it is an ontological, or a religious one."
Thus all three - Mitchell, Toulmin, and Kohlberg, not only acknowledge the
pull, but also appear to accept the Justification for this pull - that
matters cannot be adequately explained without reference to a
mystical/religious orientation and adherence to it. As has already been
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argued, this adherence is not essential for an acceptance of the simple
consideration of this area, and this is all that is being argued for.
Perhaps, though, there is something more at the back of Downey and
Kelly's mind, and this might be the perceived problem of the irrationality
of faith, of commitment, and of an impermeability of the religious stance
to reasoned analysis and discussion.
	 Certainly, the perception of
religion as the province of the fanatic can dispose one to wanting no
connection between it and areas which seem to be more open to assessment
by the production of relevant factual data, by the use of logic to spot
Internal inconsistencies, by the fact that people holding views within
these other areas at least attempt a rational Justification of their
position. The image at hand is of a Kierkegaard who makes his leap of
faith into a religious stand which is distinguishable primarily by the
fact that it is non-rational. Kierkegaard's example of Abraham being
prepared to sacrifice Isaac(25) shocks the humanist to his core - how
can one argue with a man prepared to sacrifice his own son for an ideal
he cannot or will not Justify, indeed, with a man who proclaims that his
beliefs are characterised and validated by their non-rational, non-
Justificatory nature?
Kierkegaard, Barth and others like them have a lot to answer for. A
position like theirs opens the flood gates to lunacy and fanaticism, and
diverts secular attention away from attempts by others within the
Christian tradition to a much more considered, sensitive and careful
approach which appreciates the madness that lurks around the corner for
those who let go of reason.
- 211 -
If one dispenses with the Kierkegaardian leap - and it seems, both
morally and educationally, it is much too dangerous - then one moves to a
view of 'faith commitment' as more of a perspective which interprets
experiences as having a transcendent dimension, but which leaves room
within the individual for change both within the perspective, and out of
it as well. Again, the parallells with Kuhn's scientific paradigms(26)
seem clear and viable - as long as one accepts that a person committed
to a paradigm does not remain imprisoned forever within its 'gestalt',
There is little reason to believe that one must. Scientists change
perceptions of the 'true' meaning of their field of study, philosophers
come to a different view of the same subject, the ordinary man in the
street changes the perspective of his life and of other people as he
moves through it. Sometimes this is done in a leap - usually in times of
crisis - but normally it is a gradual widening and elucidation of the
same perspective. The religious perspective seems to be no different, for
it seems that the average 'religious' person is not a different kind of
animal from the secular person, but one who interprets experience in a
different way, a way which can differ from the secular, from slight
through to very different. The point to be made, though, is that the
religious-minded person of non-Kierkegaardian persuasion is not someone
to be distrusted or even feared by the humanist, for the grounds of his
experience are ones which are common to all, even if his perception of
these grounds is different.
This seems to be the sort of approach Webster takes when he asks(27):
",-how can teachers help their pupils to understand what it
Is like to believe in religious faith?"
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He argues that Christians come to know God, i.e., to have religious
experience, in five ways. These are:
(a)through personal relationships;
(b)through sudden overwhelming experiences;
(c)through the experience of suffering;
OD through the given Christian path;
(e) through recognising the limits of our understanding.
He then argues that these five ways are part of adolescent experience,
and that adolescents are particularly open to them. Thus,
(a)they encounter the problems of personal relationships more than
before or after in their life;
(b)they feel things more deeply in this stage of life;
(c)they question the present political and social order more;
(d)they find themselves called to a personal autonomous commitment
for the first time;
(e)they begin to recognise the limits of human understanding for the
first time.
Webster argues that running through each of these five problems is the
belief that there is an answer - that hope exists. The problems may be
translated by the individual into either a religious or a secular
understanding, but they provide the teacher with the kind of questions
with which he or she should confront the child. Hope, humility, and
tolerance are ever present in this quest because:
"...truth always lies ahead and ever raises the question of
the beyond..."(28)
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Finally, and implicitly dealing with the thorny question of indoctrination
and values education, Webster says of teachers that though
"-they cannot climb the ladder for their children, they can
secure it, adjust it, and advise on ways of ascending."(29)
This seems to come back to forms of an I-Thou relationship, ones in
which we are committed to the other person and his or her potential
growth. Look how similar this is to Macquarrie's view of teaching:
"—teaching is seen as a mode of being with, a positive mode
of solicitude in which one leaps ahead of the other so as to
open his possibilities for him, but never leaps in for the
other, for this would be really to deprive him of his
possibilities." (30)
There seem to be, then, three major conclusions.
Firstly, there is a logical connection between morality and religion - the
connection of identity. It has been argued from simple observation that
many people in the world come to hold a religious/mystical morality
through their thoughts and dealings in a secular morality, and that
through this commitment, the secular areas can be reinforced with a new
urgency and colour that was lacking previously.
Secondly, any moral education programme that did not include an
appreciation of this area would be both deficient and impoverished.
Thirdly, there are forms of this commitment which do disengage
communication from people who hold secular moralities, through an
insistence on irrational leaps, but this form of commitment is neither
necessary nor characteristic of the religious thought of most kinds.
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These kinds are those which admit their limitations of vision, accept
with humility their constricted viewpoints, and whilst holding a religious
faith commitment, do so in a manner not dissimilar from secular faith
commitments - ones which leave room for doubt, expansion and change.
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CHAPTER 9 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF MORALITY
The line taken so far in this thesis has tended to be a personalist one.
The epistemological account of the first section examined the problem
from the point of view of the individual attempting to come to grips with
the world. Similarly, the references to psychology have so far tended to
concentrate upon the influence of, or upon the individual. Yet there are
glaring deficiencies in such a view, despite their many merits. On an
individual level how does one account for the morality of the people who
fought, killed and died in two World Wars, or any war for that matter?
Particularly in the First World War, any account of its four year
duration, and its millions killed, becomes implausible to the point of
absurdity if it simply accounts for person A or person B's individual
motives. One needs to look at the macrosociological and institutional
level to account for how men could play football with each other on
Christmas Day, show each other photographs of their loved ones, and then
return to their trenches to kill each other the following day. Perhaps it
is by understanding this social level of morality - the forces it brings
to bear upon the individual - that such obscenities can be prevented from
happening again.
Thus, in this chapter, this social area of morality will be examined, by
examining its roots and its varieties, its role in the school, its
expression in psychological practice, and its place in the balance of any
scheme of moral education in the school.
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PROLOGUE
Parekh(1) has argued that it is a common fault of Western liberal thought
that it tends to contract the scope of an adequate concept of morality
because it takes the individual as its essential unit of study, and
further that it tends to be positivistic in regard to the nature of men,
and to the nature of the relations that hold between them. 	 Man's
,
economic nature within a capitalist society, then, tends to be seen as
'natural', as does the notion that man is essentially self-centred. Thus,
Hart(2) takes it as one of the basic facts about men that they are at
least partly selfish and have limited sympathies, that they should not
be expected to do too many things involving sacrifices of their
interests, and that a legal framework is therefore necessary to regulate
their affairs. Rather more strongly, the same assumption is found when
Rawls(3) enunciates his famous 'original position' - what would each
person do out of self interest - as if genuine altruistic thought for
others is a later, grafted-on addition to the human character. This
notion clearly influenced both Piaget(4) and Kohlberg(5) in their
developmental notions of morality, as altruism and selflessness come
later in their hierarchies of moral development.
It is quite possible to argue with Parekh about the role of the individual
in morality. There seems to be no logical reason why the notion of the
individual as the essential unit of study should contract the scope of
morality. The fact that it does tend to prevent people from looking at
the plight of groups, nations, and other creatures on this planet suggests
a lack of imagination on their part (and their teacher's part) than on
any logical difficulties per se. However, to the extent that this does
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tend to hapIrn, then Parekh makes his point - if the focus on the
individual restricts the moral vision, then the focus must be changed or
expanded.
The second point Parekh makes - that of positivism - is again an
indication of tendencies rather than a logical point, but it is still well
made, for this assumed basic selfishness of human beings may well be
,
only a product of an individualistic morality, and on the psychological
account suggested earlier, is not only misleading, but simply wrong -
empathy for others, as described by Hoffman(6), and altruism, as
described by Johnson(7), start as early as the first year of life, and
develop in tandem with other - notably egocentric - attitudes. Following
on the argument made in the first section of this thesis(8), if individual
instances are interpreted and evaluated within an existing conceptual
scheme, and if this conceptual scheme is not one enunciated by the
individuals - because they are too young to have incorporated it within
their experience in a conscious, articulated manner - then such a scheme
can only come from the social group or the society within which they
find themselves. And if this group's value scheme is a personal, selfish
one, then notions of empathy and altruism will necessarily be hindered in
their development, in contrast with more egocentric notions. This is at
the core of those arguments against Kohlberg's theory(9), which claim
that, rather than it being universal in application, it is merely the
reflection of an individualistic, competitive Western social ethic. If
these arguments have force, then they have profound implications for any
theory of morality and moral education. These implications would include
the following.
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Firstly, the influence of society in general, social groups, schools, and
teachers - the values that all of them pass on in all of their overt and
hidden curricula - should be carefully scrutinised by teachers and pupils
alike.
Secondly, a moral education curriculum must include a sociological
component, and preferably a comparative sociological component.
Thirdly, the lobJective i stages of developmental theories are likely to be,
at least in part, reflections of the prevailing social norms of the
society in which these stages are investigated.
Fourthly, educators should be highly aware of the psychological
techniques used on pupils, and they should give careful thought to their
use or non-use. If education is, from this perspective, "the manipulation
of consciousness"(10), then there are necessarily grave moral issues at
stake.
ROOTS AND VARIETIES
The roots of this area go back at least as far as the thought of the
Ancient Greeks, and take as many forms as it does. However, the three
central tenets of those approaching morality from a social orientation
appear to be:
(a)that the group is prior to the individual;
(b)that the individual is to be defined as achieving his identity
through participation in the group; and
(c)that morality is a phenomenon of social life, and a product of
society as a whole.
Durkheim(11) expressed it as eloquently as anyone when he said:
"...the domain of the moral begins where the domain of the
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soc141 begins.. ,we are moral beings only to the extent that
we are social beings."
Nisbet(12) sees the present state of sociology as being the development
of sociology during the nineteenth century. He classifies its essential
'unit ideas' as community, authority, status, the sacred, and alienation,
and that its growth was a reaction to the Age of_ Reason of the previous
one hundred and fifty years, with its emphasis on the individual. For
sociological thinkers of this time, he argues, personality was seen to
derive from society, and alienation was the price to be paid for release
from its constraints. The spirit of optimism and progress was replaced
by one of pessimism and "a kind of craving for new forms of moral and
social community"(13). Curiously, then, the mainstream of sociological
thought in the nineteenth century was essentially conservative in nature.
This can be more clearly seen in an examination of the causes of the
movement, which can be encapsulated in two revolutions - the French and
the Industrial.
With the French Revolution, the stability of aristocratic rule was rocked
to its foundations, to be challenged by arguments for equalitarianism and
democracy. Whilst many today would regard this as 'good thing', most
sociologists of the time saw instead the impersonality of the process,
and the lack of identification with the system for the individual.
Likewise, the Industrial Revolution destroyed much of the personalness of
relations in essentially rural communities, and replaced it with an
anonymous cog-in-the-wheel description of the individual. This alienation
of labour is a recurrent theme throughout the nineteenth century, and
again, and perhaps curiously, it is the conservatives rather than the
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radicals who attack this revolution the most strongly. Marx(14), for
instance, didn't like the change, but saw it only as a necessary step to
the socialist utopia. For the more conservative thinkers, there was no
such consolation, only a desire to return to pre-industrial relations at
work. Carlyle(15) echoed the thoughts of many when he wrote:
"Men are grown mechanical in head and in heartyas well as in
hand...Mechanism has now struck its roots deep into men's most
intimate, primary sources of conviction..."
So thoughts of the influence of the community came from both the right
and the left of the political spectrum, and for more than one reason.
They were moved to write from different causes and for different ends,
but all have this in common: the individual is lost without the
community.
However, the left and right is not the only dimension of community: there
are others which bear no allegiance to it whatsoever. Perhaps the two
most important dimensions are those of nationalism and religion.
Nationalism's present upsurge has been traced by Kedourie(16) at least as
far back as Kant, indicating the production of the philosophic seeds of a
political and. social theory which sees the individual reaching true
fulfilment through something greater than himself, this something being
the nation state.
This, again, is a totally different dimension from that of the politics
of the left and the right. Thus nationalists of 1848 - Mazzini and
Kossuth - were regarded as men of the left, whilst nationalists of the
twentieth century - Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco - have been seen as men
of the right. Again, Soviet theorists have classed nationalist movements
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as left wing or right wing depending upon whether or not they further
the cause of social revolution. This indicates clearly that whilst the
left-right dimension is concerned with freedom and equality, to
nationalists these are fairly incidental to the cause of national self-
determination, and the identification of the man as part of this nation
state. As Lord Acton(17) said:
"—nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity,
both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of
making the nation the mould and measure of the State."
What these two dimensions have in common is this belief that the
individual, and his morality, are to be defined by the social dimension.
However, as Kedourie(18) argues, nationalism is a messy idea, and the
definition of 'a nation' is notoriously difficult to pin down. It can cut
across geography, race, religion, and language, and seems to be more a
semi-irrational expression of a social need than a legitimate claim.
Having said this, it must still be acknowledged that it is indicative of a
need to belong, and this it seems to have in common with all social
movements. Similarly, the upsurge in fundamentalist Islamic belief in the
present day can be viewed in very much the same light, though now
another dimension is involved - that of religion. It is very easy to see
how man's existential need for a belief in something transcendent can be
personified at the level of the community, and when both community and
religion are fused into one ideal, the appeal is doubly enticing. It is
little wonder, then, that Durkheim(19) could see religion as deriving its
power from the feeling of oneness with fellow believers which the
individual acquires, rather than in the belief in the existence of any
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objective deity (except to the extent that the existent deity is the
community).
It would be possible to expand at great length on other possible
dimensions which focus men's ideas on community - factors such as
geographical isolation, racial identity, or linguistic similarities, but
this seems to be unnecessary. The essential point has now been made at
some length. Those features which unite an individual into a sense of
community with others have the same characteristics. They generate a set
of values which directly influence and form other individuals born into
this same group. This, then, is a radically different genesis for morality
from others so far described, and its importance in any school curriculum
should be both acknowledged and explicitly understood. An examination
will now be made of two very different accounts of this moral genesis -
those of Durkheim and Marx.
DURKHEIM
Durkheim was both conservative and visionary. He considered that those
forces in European society which gave cohesion and stability were in the
process of disintegration. This he saw as ominous for European man
because he saw man as healthy and sane only through identification with
a healthy community.	 If this community was in the process of
disintegration, so then must the individual's psyche.
He saw the community as extraordinarily pervasive in its influence. Not
only did it define the categories of knowledge man could use, it was also
the ultimate derivation of religious faith, and of suicidal tendencies.
All three traditional individualistic categories are made the province of
the community. Thus for instance, religion is at bottom nothing more
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than man's respect for society carried to a supreme degree of intensity.
Speaking of Totemism, Durkheim says:
"—the totem is before all a symbol, a material expression of
something else. But of what?...In the first place it is the
outward and visible form of what we have called the totemic
principle of god. But it is also the symbol of the determined
society called the clan. It is its flag—the visible mark of
its personality—so if it is at once the symbol of the god and
of the society, is that not because the god and the society are
only one?" (20)
Further, there was his effort to show in "Suicide" (21) that the greater
Immunity of the religious person to suicide was the result, not of
religious doctrine or belief, but of the stronger element of community,
which religion still gave to the members of a church. For society as a
whole, Durkheim argued, it was only when science and liberal democracy
were rooted in a decentralised society, in the same way in which religion
and kinship were rooted in medieval society, that man would ovecome his
present state of rootlessness.
How, then, can the school help? It can do for the child what a
decentralised society can do for the adult: it can, through reduction in
size, enable the child to feel a part of the society in which he lives.
But he goes further:
"If then, with the exception of the family, there is no collective
life in which we participate, if in all the forms of human activity
we are in the habit of acting like lone wolves, then our social
temperament has only rare opportunities to strengthen and
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develop itself,. .It is precisely at this point that the role
of the school can be considerable-n(22).
Durkheim thus saw the school very clearly as the half-way house for the
child - between the family and the larger community. The school is vital
not only because it enables the child to understand that rules are not to
be obeyed merely, and because, one is within the confines of the family
situation. They are also to be obeyed because the school gives the
child the necessary distancing from personal relationships, and the child
can therefore grasp their abstract conception. But also, and conversely,
the school is vital because it is small enough for the child to feel a
part, and not merely an alienated, isolated individual in the crowd.
There are many valuable insights in Durkheim's work. His is a very
healthy antidote to a totally individualistic conception of morality. He
brings out with great clarity the individual's need for, and existence
within, the group. He describes the necessary intermediate role of the
school in the transition from childhood to adulthood, and he makes one
aware of society's, the school's, and the individual teacher's duties and
responsibilities - because the way in which they interpret and apply the
rules has permanent effects upon the child. He is, then, a much needed
corrective and valuable therapy, for he establishes the independent
existence of a social dimension of morality, and therefore of its place in
moral education. But his account is flawed, and for three main reasons.
Firstly, if
	 morality is the creation of society, then how does one
evaluate this morality? It is not clear in Durkheim' writings whether he
really wants to adopt a relativist thesis for morality, but he seems at
times to be very near to it. Similarly, on his account, how does one
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distinguish the creative deviant - the Socrates or the Christ - from
those for whom deviance is no more than a form of assault upon the
social order? By loading morality into one area, Durkheim is confronted
by the same tensions noted earlier in the writings of people like
Schweitzer, Rawls and Kohlberg.
This leads directly into the second flaw - t4e lack of individual
autonomy in moral judgments. Now Durkheim specifically made autonomy
one of the three cardinal elements of morality (23). 	 However,
individuality is formed through the interaction between what he calls 'the
two natures of man' - the biological and the social - and he generally
casts this view of individuality within a context which stressed its
'negative or pathological effects'(24).	 Little time is spent on
creativity, on rationality, on reflection, on consciousness, leaving one
with the notion that individuality is, necessarily, activity totally within
society's norms, rather than allowing for the possibility of
transcendence.	 By locating the religious within the social, Durkheim
leaves no room for the transcendence of social norms via religion, either.
Nor, of course, does he allow for the possibility that the religious urge
might be true. There seems little doubt that what Durkheim describes,
does occur. The only trouble is that it is not, cannot, be the full story.
By overplaying his hand, Durkheim distorts his thesis.
Finally, one can go right to the heart and question his most fundamental
assumption: that there is a community with which the individual ought to
identify. Is society really modelled on the basis of a community? There
are those who, whilst acknowledging Durkheim's claim that morality is a
social phenomenon, nevertheless deny that society as it exists at the
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present time is a valid or worthy representative. Instead of seeing a
reasonably harmonious, interlocking, interdependent, functionalist model,
such people see society characterised by discord and struggle, and
necessarily so, because of the power positions held by groups within
society. Whilst one group holds the true power, economic power, the
control of the means of production, there must be struggle. In such a
society, then, morality, and moral education, takes on an altogether
different characterisation. This is, of course, a description of the
Marxist tradition.
MARX
For all the moral urgency with which Marx's work is imbued, for all the
sense of moral indignation at the conditions of the working class people
he saw, Marx says that "The communists do not preach morality at all"(25).
Despite the fact that Marxists claim to be scientific, predicting the
coming of socialism in the same way as another scientist might predict
earthquakes, yet they have made it clear that they work for the coming of
socialism and will welcome its arrival.
And again, Engels can say(26);
"We maintain—that all former moral theories are the product,
in the last analysis, of the economic stage which society
reached at that particular epoch. And as society has hitherto
moved in class antagonism, morality has always been a class
morality; it has justified the domination and the interests of
the ruling class, or, as soon as the oppressed class has become
powerful enough, it has represented the revolt against this
domination and the future interests of the oppressed."
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Yet despite this avowed belief in the determining of all moral codes and
beliefs by specific historical and social situations, it is clear that
Marxists are committed to the moral superiority of socialism over other
systems, and thus to the belief in a non-relativistic standard by which
other moralities may be judged. As Kamenka has put it(27):
"...we find an uncritical conflation of ethical relativism,
evolutionary ethics, the ethic of self-determination and
self-realisation, utilitarian strains, the ethic of
cooperation and a kind of social subjectivism, all assumed
or proclaimed rather than argued for."
Despite the fact that this ethical theory seems to be so badly worked
out, there is truth in the argument, and it was Marx more than anyone
else who pointed to a recognition of moral codes as social products, as
functions of power groupings within society. However, if the Marxist
thesis is totally correct, then not only is Durkheim's belief in community
irrelevant (at least at this stage of social development), but so also is
the argument put forward so far in this thesis, that morality has its
genesis in five areas. If Marx is totally correct, then not only is
morality the creation of one area, but little more than the reflection of
the interests of the ruling class within that society. It is therefore
vital to examine the Marxist argument in some detail. This examination
must necessarily range much further than an examination of morality, for
if, as the Marxists argue, morality and education are the products of the
kind of society from which they originate, and nothing more than this,
then arguments pertinent to the broader canvas must be examined.
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To explain this further, it is instructive to examine the Marxist account
of education. It follows a clear argument. What can schools be but a
reflection of the power groupings within that society? As Bernstein (28)
has put it:
"How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits
and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be
public, reflects both the distribution of power and the
principles of social control."
Education, and moral education, then, can do little but replicate the
existing status quo in values and economic relations. This conflict
model is curiously a functionalist one as well, in that the primary role
of education is transmission. Marx argued (29)
"And your education! Is not that also social, and determined
by the social conditions under which you educate, by the
intervention, direct or indirect, of society, by means of
schools etc.? The communists have not invented the
intervention of society in education; they do but seek to
alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue
education from the influence of the ruling class."
For the liberal democrat, brought up on a meal of self-development and
individual aspirations, this description of society and education is both
discomforting and repugnant. The average unreflective liberal accepts
that part of the curriculum must be devoted to the selection of a content
which equips the individual for a role in society; but this is a two-way
bargain, as the individual gets what he needs to pursue a fulfilling and
creative life, and the society gets suitably qualified people for the
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operations it needs to keep functioning. How repugnant, then, is the
sausage-machine description of the individual presented by Albury(30),
who says that they:
".- are formed with the habits, the attitudes, and the
conceptions which are appropriate to the places in society that
they have to occupy. Moreover, this 'processing' presents
the existing system of social relations as 'natural', as
unquestionably 'given'. Thus the constant reproduction of
ideologies contributes to the reproduction of the social
formation as a whole by constantly forming individual subjects
who are suitable for insertion into the existing system of social
relations, while at the same time masking the reproductive aspects
of this process so that these relations seem natural and self-
subsisting."
Repugnance, though, is no answer to this kind of argument - it would be
interpreted by the Marxist as precisely that form of 'false consciousness'
which Albury and others see in the liberal democrat. This feeling that
the Marxist is wrong, that he misdescribes the actual process, has to be
based upon something more substantial. The argument, therefore, will be
examined from three different angles:
(a)by an historical examination of the aims and objectives of the
educational systems in the U.S. and the U.K. for the urban working
classes;
(b)by an examination of the relationship between education and social
mobility in liberal-democratic and socialist societies;
(c)by an examination at the microsociological level, of the nature of
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teacher-pupil interactions in school, in order to examine how they
relate to macrosociological forces.
(a) History.
Whilst the official ideology for education in the U.K. and the U.S.A. has
been a combination of democratic ideals, egalitarianism, meritocracy, and
the provision of skills relevant to an industrialtsed society, little has
been said of the 'control' functions of education. Yet there seems little
doubt that one of the more compelling reasons for the introduction of
public education in the U.K. and the U.S.A. was precisely this. Certainly,
equality and democracy do not appear to have been uppermost in
Jefferson's mind(31) when, in 1779, he proposed a two-track system of
education with the explicit intention that:
"By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from
the rubbish annually.-"
Similarly, Bowles and Gintis present evidence to show that:
"Educational change has historically played the role not of
complement to economic reform, but as a substitute for it."(I2)
In England, education appears to have taken a very similar line.
Marsden(33) quotes the Editor of the School Board Chronicle, who
described the working class as "the barbarian class.. .the uncivilised", and
states that the School Board:
".- have to instil into the minds of the children Knowledge.-
not to undertake the Quixotic task of indoctrinating the rising
generation of the working and labouring classes with the dogma of
equality.-" but "—knowledge of their place in society".
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Further, it is extremely salutory to read Coleridge(34) describing the
purpose of education:
"Its real tendency is to preserve the existing map of society while
it softens its demarcations."
How similar this is to the comment made by Marx(35) that:
"...the more a ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost
-
minds of a ruled class, the more stable and dangerous it becomes."
Macdonald(36) argues, with respect to nineteenth century textbooks that
they were pervasively religious and exhortatory in character, encouraging
the working class not only to work hard and behave soberly, but also
attempted to inculcate an acceptance of, and resignation to, the
prevailing social conditions. Look, for instance, at the third verse of
one of the more popular hymns written in Victorian times, "All Things
Bright and Beautiful"(37):
"The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate,
GOD made them, high or lowly,
and order'd their estate."
Thus control through acceptance of one's lot appears to be one reason for
the setting up of the education systems. Closely allied to this is
another already mentioned: the production of the 'right' kind of worker.
Toffler argues that:
"Mass education was the ingenious machine constructed by
industrialism to produce the kind of adults it needed.. .The
solution was an educational system that, in its very structure,
simulated this new world...The most criticized features of
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education today - the regimentation, lack of individualization,
the rigid systems of seating, grouping, grading
and marking, the authoritarian role of the teacher - are
precisely those that made mass public education so effective
an instrument of adaptation for its place and time—the
child did not simply learn facts that he could use later on:
he lived, as well as learned, a way of life modelled after the
one he would lead in the future."(18)
The above leaves little room for doubt that socialisation and control
were large contributory factors in the establishment of the educational
systems in question; however, whether they were the complete, or even the
dominant factors, is something else. It is remarkably easy to quote
selectively in the above manner, but this really does little but prove
that the factors were present. There were, after all, quite genuine
religious, humanitarian, and democratic motives as well. Thus, Bowles and
Gintis(39), in describing Mann's proposed educational reforms in the U.S.,
declare that they had:
"—the intent of forestalling the development of class
consciousness among the working people..."
Yet they had said previously(40) that Mann was convinced that:
"—expansion of wealth through industrialisation could provide
the basis for a fuller and more abundant life for all citizens.."
Further, Mann himself wrote:
"—nothing but Universal Education can counter-work this
tendency to the domination of capital and the servility of
labour—Education, then, beyond all other devices of human
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origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of man...u(41)
Bowles and Gintis seem to be mixing up two quite distinct theses here.
One is that education's sole function was as an instrument of capitalist
oppression. The other is that education, in spite of the valiant,
altruistic efforts of individuals, can do no more than what it does -
replicate existing economic relationships. The former is, as a complete
description of the establishment of the two systems, quite clearly wrong.
The second is not proved one way or the other by selective quotation. A
move must therefore be made to more concrete data in order to gain a
clearer understanding. One way would be to examine the comparative data
as regards social mobility in the U.S. and the U.K. If education is being
used as something more than just a means of control, then one should find
that with the expansion of the educational systems, there has been an
increase in the amount of social mobility by the working classes in their
respective societies.
	 This evidence on social mobility will now be
examined.
(b) Social Mobility.
Some of the more recent evidence on social mobility in England comes in
the books by Halsey(42) and Goldthorpe(43), which substantially agree in
their findings - and which largely replicate the earlier work of Blau and
Duncan(44) and Jencks(45) in America - that educational reforms have
significantly failed to reduce the level of inequality of achievement in
both educational and economic terms, and have failed to alter the rates
of mobility to any significant extent over the last fifty years. This
bald fact, then, is not good news for the liberal account. Halsers(46)
line of reasoning is quite similar to that of Boudon's(47) for France:
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that though educational opportunities might have increased, the extra
places created in the system have been disproportionately occupied by the
higher status levels. Goldthorpe(48) puts it rather differently, but what
he says amounts to much the same thing: that whilst in absolute terms
the number of upwardly mobile people has increased, in relative terms
mobility has not changed significantly at all. Goldthorpe tries to
explain the reason for this absolute increase as follows: there has been
an economic and bureaucratic expansion since the 1950s, which has meant
that there have been more service and intermediate level jobs created,
which in turn has created greater opportunities for working class
children. However, this economic and bureaucratic expansion served to
hide the fact that there was no increase in the relative numbers of
working class children moving into these positions. Goldthorpe, writing
in 1980, foresaw a time not far off when economic growth contracted,
bureaucratic expansion ceased, and further jobs were not created at
higher levels, and it would then be that this lack of mobility became
more apparent.
Thus far, then, the data on social mobility are not very comforting for
those who would like to believe that the education system in liberal
democratic societies acts as a socially mobilising force for the working
classes as a whole. However, there is another way of examining the
problems - to examine with what force such factors as socio-economic
background, levels of education, and IQ have on future economic success,
and what the correlations are between these factors. If the meritocratic
theory is correct, then one would expect to find strong correlations
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between IQ and economic success, and correspondingly lesser ones for the
amount of schooling and socio-economic background.
Now it seems that all shades of opinion would agree that more years in
education produces more income, but opinions are divided when it comes to
deciding precisely why this is so. There are at least three possible
explanations:
(a)more education produces higher cognitive abilities;
(b)more education produces certain character traits consistent with
higher paid jobs;
(c)more education has high status value, and allows one to get a job
through 'snob' values.
The traditional belief is (a), the meritocratic thesis, that what matters
most is IQ plus effort. However, as Bowles and Gintis(49) point out, if
(a) is correct, then IQ should be the main determinant of income. And
yet whilst there is a correlation between IQ and economic success, there
are stronger correlations between levels of education and economic
success, and levels of social class background and economic success.
Another way in which Bowles and Gintis tackle the question(50) is to
assess the number of times one is more likely in the U.S. to be top of
the economic ladder if one is top of the IQ, educational, or social
background ladder. All seem to contribute quite markedly. However, when
they control for two of the variables whilst measuring the other, the
results are quite striking. They find that to attain the highest economic
success, one is only 1.4 times more likely if top of the IQ ladder,
whilst one is 3.3 times more likely if top of the educational ladder, and
2.7 times more likely if top of the social background ladder.
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Thus it seems fair to say that IQ does not play the part normally
assumed in the meritocratic conception of the U.S. educational system -
non-cognitive aspects of the situation appear to be considerably more
Important.
The question which naturally comes next seems to be why is IQ given the
importance normally ascribed to it, if it does not deserve to be billed
so highly? Bowles and Gintis take a very critical view of things. They
argue(51) that advanced industrial societies, like the U.S., look for a
means of legitimising their inegalitarian aspects, things such as their
stratified nature and their unequal monetary rewards. To this end, they
argue, an education system is produced in which, ostensibly at least, IQ
and effort are the main vehicles to success within education, and hence
to the attainment of economic rewards afterwards. This, they argue, is
really not the case: IQ and effort have only a very limited effect;
however, if the workforce can be convinced that the system of rewards la
built on this, that everyone has an equal chance (provided they have a
good IQ!), then, naturally, those who come to be placed low in the
hierarchy will be more disposed to accept their situation if they believe
that this position was fairly come by. Thus the concept of IQ is used,
so they argue, in a capitalist society to legitimise an inegalitarian
system.
Now a number of things must be said about the Bowles and Gintis thesis,
and therefore about Marxist theory in general.
Firstly, their correlations are only correlations, not causal connections.
Their work, therefore, is suggestive, rather than proof of their argument.
At the same time, it is only fair to say that it is highly suggestive.
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Secondly, the technique of controlling variables while testing for others
is the technique used by Jencks(52) in his book "Inequality". And yet, as
Karabel and Halsey(53) point out in reference to this research, the
procedure may be statistically proper, but it remains highly dubious
whether in real life, variables could be held constant, and would not
affect variables being tested, if only indirectly, ,  through variables not
considerered at all, like race, sex, and personality.
Thirdly, the issue can be clarified, or at least placed in wider context,
when comparisons are made between the mobility rates in the U.S.A. and
the U.S.S.R., and European capitalist countries. Feldmesser(54), for
instance, showed that mobility rates do not fall into simple
capitalist/socialist categories - rather, that whilst the Russian student
from a non-manual background has only a two-to-one advantage over his
manual counterpart, and the American student has a four-to-one advantage,
they are nearer to each other, than the U.S. is to its European capitalist
relations.
Now this must surely shift the focus of explanation of social mobility
from a simple classification of economic systems, if only because the
U.S., being the primary exponent of capitalism, should have been the least
similar nation to the socialist ones. Perhaps what could be looked at
Instead is the way in which a country's overall ideology is delivered in
Its practice - the extent to which the people believe what the official
message is. However, one must be very careful in assigning blanket
causes. Douglas' findings in the U.K., for instance(55), suggest that
children's achievements at school are a complex interplay between the
opportunities available, parental experiences and aspirations, and teacher
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expectations. These could all be mediated by belief in the official
message, but this is not necessarily so.
Fourthly, Parkin(56) and DJilas(57) have argued that, in Communist
countries, the official party membership is in many respects similar to
the property owning class in the West, in the sense that it can, and
does, manipulate its privileges in order to take ,  the best advantage of
the educational system. Moreover, Parkin argues that non-party
intelligentsia also derive more benefit from the educational system for
their children than the manual classes. What he says is highly
significant: appropriation takes place, not simply because of the nature
of capitalist society, but also because of what would appear to be 'human
nature' with regard to family - the use by parents of all legitimate, and
sometimes illegitimate, means to secure the best part for their children
in life. Unless one wishes to abolish the family, it is difficult to see
how such an effect could be eradicated. However, and quite rightly,
Parkin argues that the matter be kept in perspective - it is still
relatively much easier to rise from the working class in a socialist
society to the elite, than it is to do so in any capitalist country which
he researched.
Fifthly, even looking at the historical thesis, it could be argued that
things have now changed. After all, the third verse of "All Things
Bright and Beautiful" now reads(58):
"The purple-headed mountain
The river running by,
The sunset, and the morning,
That brightens up the sky."
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No doubt the Marxist would argue that this indicates little more than a
subtle shifting of ground to cope with a more vocal underclass; but this
then becomes little more than a difference of interpretation. More
telling would be a criticism which said that the content may have
changed, but the form has stayed much the same. But this is where
Bowles and Gintis' approach, the macrosociological one, falls down. It
tends to adopt a 'black box' approach to education. Schools are thus
viewed in terms of inputs and outputs, but what actually goes on in the
school is neglected. This, then, is the move which must now be taken.
The actual running of the school, and in particular teacher-student
interaction, must now be examined.
(c) Teacher-student interactions.
"The difference between a lady and a flower girl is not how she
behaves, but how she's treated."(59)
A useful way to approach this topic is to examine working class
children's scholastic underachievement as a function of their supposed
'deprivation'. This approach had been common both here and in the U.S. in
the 1960s and 1970s, and tended to take the form of explanation in terms
of a genetic deprivation in intelligence, alluded to by Jensen(60), or a
socio-cultural deprivation due to the child's home background or language
code, described by Bernstein(61), or a combination of these. The
approach is well illustrated by the assumptions underlying the Headstart
programme in America, and the E.P.A. scheme here in England. As
Grace(62) points out, such an approach tends to locate the problem of
underachievement with the recipient of education, and hence to blame it
on them, whilst taking for granted the efficacy and blamelessness of the
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educational institutions and its practitioners. Thus, both Keddie(63) in
England, and Cicourel and Kitsuse(64) in the U.S, show that the judgement
of individual pupils by teachers and educational bureaucrats, can be as
much a function of the pupils' dress, behaviour, attitude, and educational
stream, as it is of the child's actual performance. For instance,
Keddie(65) showed that a reply by a child in a higher grade at school
tended to be judged as relevant and meaningful by the teacher, whilst
precisely the same reply would be judged as displaying of poor
comprehension if given by a child from a lower form. Similarly,
Rist(66), utilising both a labelling theory approach, and the phenomenon
of the self-fulfilling prophecy developed by Rosenthal and Jacobson(67),
showed that a teacher's judgement would be internalised by the child, who
would himself come to accept the teacher's assessment.
The question to ask, surely, is: is this a function of the replication of
power relationships within a capitalist society, or simply a description
of patterns of interaction between individuals? The latter description
simply will not do as it stands, as it fails to explain why the teacher
labels and assesses in this manner in the first place. If, in Keddie's
example(68), the teacher treats children's replies differentially on the
basis of their differing social class, the problem is answered by simply
warning teachers to be aware of this possibility in their interactions.
The question to be asked is: why did it happen in the first place? If
the answer is because capitalist society produces these class divisions,
then it would seem that the teacher is, unconsciously, replicating these
class differentials, and that the Marxist account is substantially
correct.
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However, some points must be made against this interpretation.
Firstly, it may be that the teacher did behave in this way, but the very
fact that other teachers within the system can be made aware of this
effect, and that they can and are encouraged to avoid it, shows that
there is considerable room for movement and change within the educational
system as a whole. In other words, as Humn arguep(69), there is not the
close 'fit' between society and school that Marxists assume. Within the
system, teachers can question and change prevailing orthodoxies. S o
where do these orthodoxies originate?
Humn argues(70) that schools are confronted by the problem of having to
transform an institution bearing the heavy marks of its original aims in
a past historical epoch. On this account, talk should not be so much
about conspiratorial capitalist machinations, nor even the inexorable
transmission of power status values, but more of educational inertia.
This is much like the analysis Silberman(71) gives when he argues that
educators must realise that:
".-how they teach and how they act may be more important
than what they teach."
He argues that when considering teachers:
".-it simply never occurs to more than a handful to ask why 
they are doing what they are doing - to think seriously or
deeply about the purposes or consequences of education.(72)
In a word, Silberman calls it "mindlessness."(73)
This "mindlessness" lies at the heart of the concern over the Hidden
Curriculum in schools. If teachers see their function only as the
transmission of knowledge, and this curriculum existed before they
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arrived, and the manner of its transmission was already 'laid in' in the
school, then if these said teachers proceed unthinkingly, three major
problems arise.
Firstly, the manner of transmission may well be precisely that of another
historical epoch - when there was a genuine desire to 'gentle' and control
the working class to a much greater extent than there is today - and the
teacher will then be continuing this process.
Secondly, as Harris(74) argues, the curriculum of any school in any
society is, necessarily, a selection of all available knowledge. Further,
he suggests;
"Education should be looked at not in terms of knowledge
ideals that are tied to truth or objectivity, but rather as a
deliberate attempt to get people to see the world in a
particular way, through particular glasses..."
Now this goes too far. Knowledge ideals seem to be a tension between
truths and objectivity and the transmission of particular viewpoints.
But the point remains that an uncritical teacher will possibly transmit a
selection which does not belong to the side of truth and objectivity, in
the tension mentioned above.
Finally, the unreflective teacher will be more than likely to adopt a
concept of education like the 'banking concept' described by Freire(75);
knowledge as having a given, absolute, and objective status, which
teachers dispense, and which pupils humbly and compliantly receive;
rather than, as argued in this thesis, as of a finitist, impermanent,
changeable status, in which the teacher may have the greater experience
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and background to his understanding, but in which he, as well as the
pupil, is engaged in a never ending process of exploration and discovery.
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this section on Marx, morality,
and education? Three major ones would seem to follow.
Firstly, and historically speaking, there is good evidence to believe that
control and socialisation of the working classes- were major reasons for
the setting up of education systems in the U.K. and the U.S.A. The
evidence, however, does not indicate that this was the only reason; nor
does it indicate that this aim has the same force as it did then.
Secondly, social mobility studies indicate that socialist countries do
exhibit greater social mobility than capitalist ones, but that there are
probably further factors to take into account, in:
(i)the match between expressed egalitarian ideology and its match in
practice; and
(ii)parental involvement in their children's educational chances .
Thirdly to the extent that the school unwittingly replicates old, control-
oriented techniques and curricula, and to the extent that teachers may
unwittingly aid in this, then teachers may ensure that a 'fit' between
microsociological and macrosociological aims does occur. To the extent
that they are conscious of these aims, they can go some considerable way
to allowing the educational system a large amount of freedom in its
dealings with children - always assuming that the macrosociological
pressures are not too repressive.
It would seem then that a simple Marxist thesis has been shown to be
deficient. But neither has it been shown to be wrong. At least to the
extent where there are power interests, it is only realistic to assume
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that they will attempt to maintain their status, and education would then
be one of the primary means for this maintenance. As Harris says(76) in
writing about the ideal, where there were no vested interests:
"The absence of power in a learning situation might not
guarantee that the resultant learning will be free of illusions,
errors, distortions, or misrepresentations; but-it must surely
guarantee that the knowledge gained in such situations will not
embody misrepresentations and distortions that are particularly
favourable to a ruling interest group."
All that can be added is that this seems to apply to any society, not
just the capitalist. It seems to be an aim to which all educational
systems should aspire.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
Before this section is left, it is important to indicate some of the
effects and influences which the social area can have upon the individual.
These have already been dealt with from the perspective of the
sociological, in the shape of community, class, religious and historical
factors. They must also be described from the psychological.
Now in the next section of this thesis, the kinds of psychological
factors important for moral growth will be described. These factors will
be dealt with in the main by three major psychological schools:
(a)the behaviourists;
(b)the social learning theorists;
(c)the cognitive-developmentalists.
It will be argued that each in its own way is deficient, but with
regard to the social dimension, it would seem that the cognitive
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developmentalists have the most explanatory gaps to fill, simply because
they tend to argue from the position of the active, engaged individual.
In this respect, the behaviourists and social learning theorists, despite
their imperfections, appear to have much to say worthy of note, for
theirs is a perspective which views the individual as essentially a
passive being; and when describing the genesis of morality as a social
phenomenon, this is perhaps the most profitable way of beginning to
understand the individual - to understand the effects upon him.
Certainly the human being is active, questing, and searching, but one
must understand the constraints upon him as well. As Harris says(77):
"...the child does arrive into a material world of already formed
ideas and means of human interaction; he arrives into a specific
social and historical context within which he shall do his
living and learning. Thus the child is not born with all his
options open: his options are largely determined for him, and
their parameters are set, by social and historical factors."
This, then, is the crucial caveat which must be placed on the account of
morality given so far. Whilst the teacher must be sensitive to the
questing of the individual, to the impermanence of knowledge, he or she
must also be aware, firstly, that the individual is a social being who
needs to be a healthy part of a healthy society, and secondly, that there
are techniques of psychological persuasion which by-pass those faculties
which the cognitive-developmentglises are so keen to stress - the
cognitive and rational faculties. In the teacher's hands are available
techniques for good and bad - such as the use of modelling, the different
kinds of nurturance techniques, positive and negative conditioning, and
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the use of group pressures. Of course, they are not only in the hands of
the teacher. They are present in the temper, rules, and actions of
society at large, and in the overall running of the school as well. These
techniques are the life blood of the hidden curriculum of the school and
society. Now many of the unspoken assumptions of the hidden curriculum
are for good, but to the extent that they are hidden, they can be judged
neither one way nor the other, and may instead be doing positive harm.
It therefore becomes vital that the hidden curricula of the school, and of
society, become the overt curricula.
The teacher thus has the truly awesome task of being sensitive to these
influences from society and school, of judging them, and of exposing the
child to them, or protecting the child from them, and of gradually
sensitising the child to their influence. As the child grows, he or she
can then become less and less the pawn and the passive recipient, and
more and more the aware, active and responsible participant. With such
development, the individual is needed by the society as much as the
society is needed by the individual.
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PART 3	 PSYCHOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last two sections of this thesis there have been a number
of references to a psychology of moral education. The first section, for
example, which described the nature of moral enquiry from an active,
personal, constructionist and teleological point of view, suggested that
the cognitive-developmental approach was more appropriate. The second
section, examining not only the activity of the individual, but also the
effects of the environment, both physical and social, upon the individual,
argued that the behaviourists and social learning approaches, which
stressed more the passive, non-cognitive and affective side, also had a
considerable amount to contribute to an account of moral and personal
growth.	 It is now time to attempt to put these approaches into
perspective, to assess their relative contributions to a curriculum of
moral education.
To the extent that the second section located morality within different
areas of human experience, it is to be expected that the forthcoming
analysis will see a psychology of moral development along much the same
lines - that is, as a disparate, multifaceted affair which contributes in
diverse ways to the child's moral growth. The assessment, then, will
begin with a reflection of this fact: that each school of thought has a
part to contribute, No one school will be assumed to have a monopoly on
the truth. This does not mean, of course, that each approach is equally
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valuable. It will be the task of this last section, firstly, to assess
their relative contributions, and, secondly, to continue to recommend an
approach which blends and utilises these contributions.
Thus, it will be apparent that such an assessment is not only a
psychological one: it must be a philosophical one as well, Psychological
theories are inevitably based to some extent upon a prior conception of
what human beings are perceived to be, and this perception determines to
a large extent how they will be treated and taught. So the choice of a
psychological theory is not value free.
Moreover, what one believes children are capable of at a certain age, and
what will influence them at this 'stage' of their development, will partly
determine what they are taught, and what materials are selected.
It would be as well, then, to re-state the philosophic position of this
thesis so far. It asserts the following propositions.
Firstly, that man is a multifaceted creature , and the adoption of any one
approach on its own will be inadequate.
Secondly, that all levels of psychological theory have something to
contribute.
Thirdly, that all levels of society - individual, group and particularly
institutional, have a responsibility for creating a moral climate in which
children may develop.
Fourthly, that within such an environment, individual moral action should
be rational and consciously understood.
Lastly, that this previous prescriptive statement does not conflict with
the descriptive statement that moral action is not based on purely
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rational processes, but is deeply affective, apparently of an empathic
kind.
This section will begin with an assessment of the behaviourist school of
thought, most notably with the work of Skinner. It will then move to the
other end of the scale, and review the contributions of the cognitive-
developmental school, particularly the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. It
will attempt to show that, psychologically and philosophically, both
schools misrepresent the true state of affairs. In the final chapter, an
attempt will be made to combine the insights of social learning theorists
(whose account on its own, again, is seen as inadequate) with the work
already discussed.	 This should produce a viable perspective on the
psychology of moral development, and thereby suggest implementation
strategies for moral education curricula.
CHAPTER 10 BEHAVIOURAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL EDUCATION.
This chapter will be an exposition of both the behaviourist approach in
general, and also of the thought of Skinner, perhaps the most influential
thinker in this school of thought. Whilst there are many who do not
,
wholeheartedly endorse the more extreme Skinnerian propositions, there is
little doubt that Skinner's thought is very representative of the motive
force behind much thinking of this school. Thus in evaluating the
general Skinnerian approach, and extrapolating from it to other possible
stands, the aim will be to adequately place the role of behaviourist
thinking, and its contribution to the education of children, in context.
The term 'education' rather than 'moral education' is used because it
should become apparent that due to the behavioural psychologist's general
approach, the two concepts are inseparable.
This chapter will therefore begin with an outline in general, then point
out the implications of the wholesale adoption of such a theory, move on
to criticise the theory, and conclude with a final evaluation.
Behavioural psychology was one of the reactions to a nineteenth century
psychological perspective which stressed the individual's introspection.
Whilst it has been argued elsewhere(1) that this approach has at least
philosophical validity when it comes to a consideration of what morality
comprises, for a scientist it is necessarily limited. One reaction was
the Freudian/psychoanalytic tradition - to concentrate on those hidden,
subconscious urges and thoughts which introspection could not possibly
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reach. The other was to concentrate upon that area which was totally
observable - the behaviour of the organism.
Probably the best date to start with is 1913, when Watson published a
paper in the "Psychological Review" in which he declared that:
"Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective
experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal
is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms
no essential part of its methods..."
Other behaviourists expanded on Watson's original ideas until Hull,
another giant of the movement, could claim that all human behaviour
should soon be capable of being reduced to automatic, mechanical
processes, identical for men and for animals. The point of all this, as
Hull(3) said was:
"...the satisfaction of creating a new and better world, one
in which, among other things, there will be a really effective
and universal moral education."
It was an approach which, as Skinner put it, meant a movement from the
inaccessible to the manipulable, and this indeed was seen as its great
merit. The story of how this choice of subject matter, for reasons of
precision and objectivity, became one almost of holy writ, with the
abolition of mental events to the realms of the fictional and
sacreligious, is too well known to be worth recounting in detail.
Koestler(4)	 described it as "a demonstrative act of semantic self-
castration", whilst Ornstein(5) characterised its mistake as confusing
"behaviourism as a useful tool" with "behaviourism as the total extent of
knowledge."
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The reaction to extreme behaviourism set in during and after the Second
World War. It was during the war that psychologists came into contact
with machines such as servo-mechanisms, with which words like 'purpose'
and 'intent' could be genuinely applied, and it was because of such
experiences of connecting machines with mentalistic words (6), that
psychology gradually began to break away from extreme Watsonian
behaviourism, and the 'black box' mentality of viewing the workings of
the brain, and has once again become, to some extent, the science of the
mind.
However, for a considerable part of this century, it held sway as the
psychological paradigm. It meshed perfectly with the logical positivism
of the same period of time - for both in effect stipulated that any
question which was not amenable to immediate empirical testing should
not even be asked. Moreover, Shotter(7) maintains that many
psychologists of this time, in their eagerness to sever the baby
psychology's umbilical cord from its mother, philosophy, tried to do so
by becoming a fully fledged experimental science, and attempted to do
this by adopting the aims and methods of the nineteenth century physical
sciences. The consequences of this were slow to emerge, but extremely
damaging for psychology.
Firstly, in attempting to adopt a scientific paradigm (which many
claimed, due to Heisenberg's work in theoretical physics(8), was already
out of date), they constricted the field of interest to such an extent
that anything interesting was excluded. As Westland(9) puts it:
"What is worrying the critics is the fear that—the light
under which psychology has been working has revealed mere
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trivia, of interest only to the initiated."
And secondly, in adopting this scientific paradigm, they hoped to exclude
philosophy and philosophical thinking from psychological work altogether.
And yet there is no escape from assumptions in psychology. 	 The
psychologist of every school always makes a judgement about the nature of
man, and about the way in which man can be understood. Such assumptions
,
are the point of departure for the kind of research he will perform, and
his evaluation of the results of that research.
Why then dwell on behaviourism? Are not Skinner and his followers now
old hat? To some he may well be, but there are good reasons for dwelling
at some length on such a viewpoint. 	 One is that under certain
conditions, the techniques of the behaviourists undoubtedly work. Its
central technique - operant conditioning - has a proven track record on
animals, and in human areas such as behaviourally disturbed children,
mental and autistic patients, and in the treatment of borstal offenders.
Secondly, with its emphasis on praise and reward, and its dismissal of
punitive techniques, it can be very appealing at first meeting. And
lastly, its use has not really died out at all, but appears to be on the
increase in 'normal' institutions in this country, most notably for the
purposes of discipline and socialisation in the classroom. So for a
variety of reasons, it is well worth examining.
The paradigm case, as mentioned, of the behavioural approach is operant
conditioning - the shaping of behaviour towards some specified, desired
end. The technique is remarkably simple: one decides on the behaviour
one wishes to create or emphasise within the individual. For a rat, this
might be pressing a lever; for a pigeon, pecking a button; for a dog,
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Jumping through a hoop; for a child, completing a piece of work; for an
adult, eating more nutritious food. In each case, whenever the desired
behaviour is produced, it is 'reinforced' by means of some reward - a
pellet of food for the rat or pigeon, a lump of sugar for the dog, praise,
encouragement or monetary reward for the child or adult. Of course, some
behaviours are too complex to expect the subject to complete in one
,
performance - the dog is hardly likely to Jimp through the hoop for no
reason at first go.
	 So the behaviours leading up to that specific
behaviour are themselves reinforced - the movement towards the hoop, the
lifting of the front paws, any Jumping, are all rewarded until the dog
performs the entire set of behaviours in sequence, and eventually the
animal Jumps through the hoop.
This is, of course, nothing surprising or new - it is how circus animals
have been trained for generations. But this seemingly simple technique
has quite enormous ramifications. For one simply defines the behaviour
one wants to see, then one breaks down the behaviour into a sequence of
sub-behaviours, and rewards the occurrence of these.
	 There is no
punishment, no noxious side-effects, and its range is very extensive. It
would seem that it could be used to produce pro-social behaviours in
humans in most situations. It could surely lead to greater care being
shown for old people, to animals, to neighbours, to the environment in
general. Even undesirable behaviours such as alcoholism, drug addiction,
and aggressive behaviour can be eliminated, not by punishing these
behaviours, but by rewarding alternative behaviours which are
Incompatible with the behaviour one wishes to eliminate.
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Skinner(10), for one, believes that the adoption of such techniques can
revolutionise society, and do so in a highly beneficient way. He points
out that society as it stands is essentially a punitive one; there are
rules, laws, and regulations, with which everyone is expected to comply.
Non-compliance results in anxiety, tension, aggression, in evasive
behaviours which, if they work, result in the reinforcement of these anti-
,
social avoidance behaviours. Punishment, he points out, can work, and the
experimental evidence for its success is considerable. But so also is the
experimental evidence for its deleterious side effects(11). With such
weighty evidence behind him, Skinner argues that what is needed is a
shift from a punitive society to a rewarding one. Such a transition
would eliminate the noxious side-effects of punitive measures, and
ultimately make for well-balanced, co-operative social beings.
It is easy to forget that the title of one of Skinner's books is "Beyond
Freedom and Dignity"(12), but Skinner is aware of the philosophical
Implications of what he is advocating - or at least some of them. As he
says (13):
"The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the
application of scientific method to the study of human
behaviour. The free inner man who is held responsible for the
behaviour of the external biological organism is only a
prescientific substitute for the kinds of cause which are
discovered in the course of scientific analysis. All these
alternative causes lie outside the individual—These are the
things that make the individual behave as he does. For them
he is not responsible, and for them it is useless to praise
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or blame him."
Thus, on Skinner's scenario, concepts like 'freedom' and 'dignity' become
not so much incorrect as out of date: they are words from a vocabulary of
a different psychic age, an age when people talked about freedom of the
will, of people being responsible for their actions and therefore
deserving of punishment for misdeeds. In this age, argues Skinner, when
we know that the individual is the product of heredity and environment,
and nothing more, it is not only superfluous but positively misleading to
talk in these terms. Freedom, for Skinner, is really nothing more than
leaving events to chance, of leaving what causes people to behave in
certain ways to uncontrolled variables. We can do this, he argues, but we
must not fool ourselves into believing that this is freedom. Now,
however, the behavioural technology is available to shape the environment,
and to shape ourselves. With human existence on this planet threatened
as Pirages puts it(14) by:
"...the four new Horsemen of the Apocalypse - Progress,
Production, Population and Pollution"
it becomes an imperative that the behavioural technology possessed is
utilised.
Skinner thus envisages a shaping of human behaviour at the individual
and at the institutional level. Indeed, one is given the impression at
times that whilst operant conditioning sprang from very humble
beginnings with a rat pressing a lever to receive a pellet of food, its
true inheritance is at the institutional, the global level - the
fashioning of institutions and policies which reward those who respond in
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the correct way, the 'correct' way being one which shapes behaviour
towards socially desirable goals.
How does this affect Moral Education? That of course depends upon one's
model of Moral Education. The preferred model of the present writer is
one similar to the layers of an onion, but layers which overlap and
interact. These layers are:
(a) 'taught' lessons in moral education;
(b)lessons from other disciplines which take a 'moral' slant;
(c)the manner in which lessons are taught;
(d)the manner of person-to-person contact in the school;
(e)the hidden curriculum of the school;
(f)the institutional policies of the school;
(g)the policies of society which the school implements;
(h)the more general values of society which are passed on in school.
To the extent that all these layers have specific values which could be
defined and shaped, and to the extent that a system of rewards could be
devised to enhance this shaping, then these overlapping and interacting
layers are all grist to the behaviourist mill.
Now it must be said that much of this goes on already, sometimes
consciously, sometimes unconsciously. Behavioural psychology is very
highly conscious of its aims in a way that some schools, at the present
time, are not, at least in any clearly verbalised sense. In those schools
where behaviour modification takes place at the present time - and it is
usually applied to disturbed pupils under the guidance of educational
psychologists - the pattern is a microcosm of what it would be if
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adopted schoolwide. 	 The pattern is usually applied in the following
manner.
First, define what specific behaviours are causing trouble in the school.
Phrases like 'he is very troublesome', 'she bothers other children when
they are working', 'she finds it very difficult to concentrate on her
work' are less than helpful because they are too general in their
descriptions. So the teacher is asked to define the behaviour much more
specifically, as, perhaps, 'after five minutes of a lesson she will get up
and walk round the class', 'she pokes other children in the chest with
her pencil', or 'he draws pictures on the cover of his book instead of
completing written exercises.'
Second, draw up specific policies which will reinforce behaviours
Incompatible with the undesired ones. These 'reinforcements' may be such
things as simple verbal praise (though this is unlikely to be the whole
strategy), stars on a star chart, extra privileges, a token system, the
chance to complete some favoured activity once the specified task is
completed. By the application of these reinforcements, the desired
behaviour is made to occur for a longer period of time, or to be peformed
more frequently. In the case of the child walking round the class, the
child may be informed that she normally lasts for only five minutes of
the work; she is told that if she lasts for ten, then reinforcements
agreed upon beforehand will come into operation. When she has made ten
minutes work consistently, this is increased to fifteen, and so on. Other
Incidental reinforcements may also strengthen the desired behaviour, such
as the satisfaction of completing work, the improved relationship with
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the teacher, and possibly relationships with other pupils as well, along
with the increased self-esteem the child may feel.
Coulby and Harper(15) believe that the process can be split into a five-
stage model of working, which they describe as:
(1) referral;
(2) assessment;
(3) formulation;
(4) intervention;
(5) evaluation.
Their model is based on their work with a Schools Support group in the
ILEA, and is a clear derivation from behavioural psychology. Having said
that, their work avoids many of the criticisms which can be levelled at
'pure' believers, because in their practice they remain sufficiently
flexible to take on board other non-behavioural strategies when
appropriate - including, crucially, the child's conscious participation in
the intervention.
It is easy to see that drawing up the correct policy is vital. If, for
example, the child gets up and walks round the class because the work
given her is too difficult, then it is most unlikely that reinforcing the
child for simply remaining in her seat and at her work will produce
lasting results. In this case, the problem behaviour has to be split into
sub-behaviours - that of reading and writing behaviours, the correct
materials supplied, and then these sub-behaviours reinforced. This, so
the argument goes, is not a deficiency in the technique but a deficiency
In the application of the technique.
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At this stage, though, it seems valid to ask to what extent 'behaviour' is
being discussed any more. As Broadbent(16) points out, it is not always
possible to connect complex behaviour with any particular stimuli which
might have elicited the behaviour - such as complex linguistic utterances
or other novel behaviours. To postulate that controlling stimuli exist
but are not noticeable, means that Skinner's empiricism is lost. To take
the case just quoted, rather more than reinforcing behaviours is
happening, because there is a need to know what is causing the unwanted
behaviour, before reinforcement of the desired ones can begin. There is
an intervening variable - the mind of the individual pupil - which
crucially affects the analysis. To put the matter at its simplest, the
strict behaviourist should be able to work simply by watching a film of
the behaviour exhibited. In the example being discussed, though, if the
child simply gets up and walks around after five minutes, does this give
him enough information to work on? The answer must be no. Whether he
likes it or not, the behaviourist seems to be using other techniques
besides those of observation - he appears to be using knowledge of
motives, inferences, and background factors which are not directly
available from simple behavioural observation.
Now the behaviourist may come back at us by arguing that the level of
reading material is part of the stimulus situation, part of the
environment, and that there is no need to go further than observation,
simply because the reading level of the child can be tested by various
objective measures, and the child's reading age can then be used to select
the correct reading material.
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However, it might again be objected that the child's poor reading level is
due to home background factors - such as lack of parental interest and
encouragement, poor housing - one main room with the television going
full blast all evening etc. Surely the behaviourist needs to know these
causes?
Coulby and Harper(17) are unhappy at teachers phrasing the problems in
this manner. They believe that the ascription of such causes to the
problem produces little but a feeling of helplessness in the teacher, for
if the root causes of the problem are at home, what can the teacher do in
the classroom? It is a 'get-out' which could be used by the teacher as
an excuse for not doing more. They recommend - and have practi5ed - a
direct action in the classroom which relegates home considerations to a
back seat. They recommend that if the behaviour is exhibited in the
classroom, then that is where it must be dealt with.
Now this is not necessarily a behaviourist assumption - more of an
optimistic attempt to solve the problem within the teacher's domain.
What wouldd, be a behaviourist assumption is if one were to treat the
behaviour presented in the classroom and nothing else, on the basis that
this is all one can be interested in, simply because this is all that one
can objectively ascertain and remediate. A common response to this is
that the behaviourist is not treating the cause but only the symptom, and
that even if the behaviourist manages to eliminate unwanted behaviours by
operant conditioning, the underlying tensions which produced them in the
first place will produce others. To which the behaviourist might well
say that firstly, he is curing the child's reading problem - which is no
small 'symptom' to cure - and so doing is rooting out the problem
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behaviour in class; and secondly, he would probably argue that this
hydraulic model of human behaviour and energies is no more than an
unjustified Freudian inference.	 His own model, with its systematic
•
application of proven psychological principles, works - its track record
proves this. Can the critic do as well?
This comparison of track records as being the only thing at issue is
,
tantalising and dangerous.	 Before being drawn into it, however, the
critic can come back at the behaviourist in two major ways, the first
psychological, the second philosophical.
He may begin by accusing the strict behaviourist of making the mistake
of thinking that operant conditioning is the only form of learning
available. The behaviourist describes a world controlled by operant
techniques, and yet this would seem to be very far from the truth. It
would be useful, then, to list some of the other forces at work, in order
to gain a proper perspective of the real role of operant conditioning.
Firstly, in some animals, particularly birds, the phenomena of imprinting
is well documented by ethologists like Lorenz(18). The actual mechanics
of imprinting would appear to be totally non-operant in its functioning -
it would appear to be simply the release within the chick of an
imprinting mechanism upon the sighting of the first thing that it sees
upon breaking out of the egg. This is normally, of course, the mother,
but can be such things as toy trains, wooden figures, and even
ethologists!
Secondly, Bandura and McDonald(19) showed that modelling was a more
effective means of inducing behavioural changes in children than either
reasoning, or the use of reward and punishment. Modelling itself appears
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to involve no occurrence of reinforcement whatsoever. It is perhaps more
interesting than imprinting in this argument, as its effects seem to
relate more directly to human functioning.
Thirdly, operant conditioning normally takes no account of developmental
complexities in its operation; and yet if one accepts anything at all of
developmental psychology, it is that certain behaviours are not available
to an individual until the required brain structure has reached a certain
level of maturation. If the behaviourist accepts anything from
developmental psychology he would have to accept the fact of having to
wait until a child is 'ready'. It is not hard to see why he would be
unhappy with such a concept - it suggests and infers maturation of
undefined brain structures - and this goes counter to a philosophy of
observables only. This issue is, however, not settled - as will be seen at
the beginning of the next chapter.
Fourthly, the evidence from identical twin studies on the heritability of
intelligence by researchers like Mittler(20) strongly suggests that in
this area at least, genetic determinants can radically affect the way
information from the environment is processed. If this is the case,
then again the simpler operant conditioning models are too simple,
because the reinforcements used will not necessarily mean the same thing
to different individuals. The technique has to be adjusted to each
person.
Fifthly, certainly when it comes to avoidance learning, results do not
always go as Behaviourists would predict. The experiment by Garcia and
Koelling(21), for example, does not sit well at all. Using four sets of
rats, Set A was punished for drinking water by an initial noise-light
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stimulus, followed by an electric shock, whilst Set B was punished by a
distinctive flavour in the water followed by artificially induced nausea
(caused by X-rays, and having nothing to do with the flavour of the
water). Very soon, Sets A and B had learnt their intended lesson - at
the sound of the noise-light, or the flavour of the water, they stopped
drinking.
However, a very curious thing happened with Sets C and D. Set C was
given the noise-light stimulus followed by the artificially induced nausea
if they continued drinking, whilst Set D was given the flavoured water
followed by the electric shock. However, neither group learned the
avoidance response. As Garcia and Koelling suggest, the rat seems to
have a "genetically coded hypothesis" when it feels sick to its stomach,
which may be characterised as 'it must have been something that I ate'.
It seems that the hypothesis is encoded so strongly that it ignores
signals of a visual or auditory nature when these precede the nausea.
Similarly, it is not 'designed' to 'think' in terms of flavours as an
explanation of external physical pain.
Such a finding may be surprising to the behaviourist, but is not so to
the biologist, for whom it makes excellent adaptive sense. In other
words, creatures, whether they be rats, dogs, or humans, are genetically
biased to learn some lessons better than others.
	 The behaviourist
ignores this at his peril.
Sixthly, the work by Chomsky(22) in linguistics, and Gregory(23) in
perception, both suggest that the brain is much more active and
interpretative of incoming stimuli than a behaviourist would normally
grant. Modern linguists have come to the conclusion that the ability to
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learn and use a language presupposes the existence of some mental
structures, and that these structures can further be inferred from the
efficiency with which the meanings of sentences not previously heard are
recognised.	 Similarly, psychologists of perception explain the
phenomenon of such illusions as the Muller-Lyer in terms of the brain
being 'set' by previous information and genetic predispositions which
._.
then interprets stimuli according to factors other than just those
received at any one moment. Such interpretations are much more subtle
and sophisticated than a simple stimulus-response model suggests, and
explains why the more complex models of human behaviour seem better able
to cope with the complexities of the human nervous system.
Finally, the straight behaviourist account leaves out the role of reason
and consciousness in the subject being conditioned. The pigeon cannot be
aware (one assumes!) of the shaping of its behaviour. The human being
can. Does this not make a very large difference to the end result? Is
not one major reason for a falling-out between two people when A realises
that B is attempting to shape their behaviour into a manner that B
desires, and when A realises that this shaping has been going on - that
they have been shaped - then they react furiously?
This last example moves into the philosophical level of problems with the
behaviourist approach, but before such an examination is fully entered
into, it is necessary to take stock of the psychological objections. It
would seem from the above account that the practitioners of operant
conditioning might not take into account:
(a) imprinting;
(b) modelling;
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Cc) developmental contingencies;
(d)the influence of personal differences/genetics;
(e)the genetic bias of organisms to learn some lessons better than
others;
(f)the set of the brain through its inherent structuring and its
interpretative capacity;
(g)the role of reason and consciousness.
An adequate account of the total possible psychological functioning of
the human being would have to consider these other factors as well. So
let it be assumed that the operant conditioner grants all these
conditions: that there may be other forms of learning, that there are
mediating factors which will affect the operant technique, and that the
ability to reason and to be conscious of a technique can radically affect
its effect. Nevertheless, the behaviourist says, the technique still
works. It has the best track record for proven effect, it is the most
reliable, it allows for the control of the environment, instead of
leaving things to happy chance, so let it be used. The question is,
should the use of the technique be granted? It can be used, but should
it?	 This is a philosophical and ethical question, as opposed to a
psychological one. and this is the area to be turned to next.
Therefore, following on from point (g) of the psychological factors, the
reason person A was furious with person B was because person A was
capable of being conscious of operant conditioning. Now this is not to
say that operant conditioning is incompatible with consciousness. When I
tell myself that if I continue working for the next hour I can make
myself some lunch, I am using operant conditioning upon myself: the
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peformance of a certain kind of desired behaviour for a specified
duration will be followed by positive reinforcement. But the crucial
point is that 1 am using it. This means at least two things. One is
that I cannot be it - there is an existential 'I' there, separable from
any conditioning. Toynbee(24) hit the nail on the head when he said that
we cannot be totally conditioned - otherwise we could not go on to plan
,
to use conditioning. The force of this line of argument seems to be that
it points to the susceptibility of different parts of the brain (and
whether by part is meant location or function, or both, is still unclear)
to behavioural techniques. Operant conditioning seems to be particularly
effective at the level where reason and consciousness are not at work,
and this lulling to sleep, this by-passing of the critical factors, is one
of its most worrying properties.
The second thing, then, is that the gut reaction against operant
conditioning in human beings seems to come from when it is used on those
who are unaware of its effect.	 Now educationally at least, operant
techniques have been used in deliberate application on special categories
of people;
(a) those who are behaviourally very disturbed;
(b) those who are mentally ill;
(c) those who are severely educationally subnormal;
(d) those who are very young.
In all of these categories, the people who receive treatment are those
who, for one reason or another, are incapable of self control and may
hurt themselves or others. The operant technique then, it may be felt, is
not only effective but necessary.
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But what about when the talk is of . prisoners or growing children?
There would probably be much less confidence in using operant
conditioning then. Most people in this society instinctively feel that
external control is not what human behaviour should be about, nor need be
about. This is then the assertion of a value, the value of autonomy,
about the value of helping others to a realisation of selfhood, and not to
the imposition of an external shaping upon them. Those who feel they
have the right to impose their wants, desires and values on others act
as God if they subscribe to such a philosophy. Skinner describes human
behaviour as "control and countercontrol"(25), a phrase highly reminscent
of Buber's relationships(28), or a Sartrean nightmare. Such a view
of human relationships reduces human beings to objects. Skinner moves
straight from an 'is' to an 'ought', but he doesn't even get past first
base, simply because he doesn't establish his 'is' properly.
Where does the argument stand then? It has been accepted that operant
conditioning is one of a range of possible learning techniques, which is
probably both effective and necessary for those categories of people who
are not capable of looking after themselves. But having advanced
arguments to suggest that reason and consciousness radically affect its
performance, it is still viable to talk of each individual's autonomy and
thereby call into question the ethicality of its use on those capable of
conscious reflection.
However, there is another level of application of the technique, and it
may well be that Skinner has got his sights set on this level even more
than that of the individual: this is the societal level. As indicated
above, Skinner is advocating the adoption of an orientation towards
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positive reinforcement at the institutional and social level to a much
greater extent than exists at present.
The benefits, he believes, are considerable.
Firstly, it has none of the undesirable side effects which punishment
can have - such as tension, anxiety, mental breakdown, reinforcement of
anti-social avoidance behaviour, poor extinction rate through inefficient
applications of negative reinforcements, and the reinforcement of the
punisher's behaviour.
Secondly, human beings will be anticipating problems rather than merely
reacting to them. In a paradoxically very existentialist sense, humanity
will	 have to assume real responsibility for its, and this planet's,
destiny. As Skinner says(27), "to refuse to control is to leave control
not to the person himelf, but to other parts of the social and non-social
environment."
Thirdly, and following directly on from this, it becomes possible to come
to grips with world problems like pollution and overpopulation, and deal
with them before they become too big to handle - always the danger with
reliance on simple reaction.
Now it seems somewhat ironic that a convinced determinist like Skinner
can urge people to try to save the human race. Does this make any sense
within the determinist framework? What value does his exhortation have
for a world of nothing more than physical cause and effect?
However, granting for a moment that this can make some sort of sense, on
an operant analysis, it must be asked what the structure of social
rewards at the present time is; then it must be asked which should be
kept, and which suppressed. These will be determined by, firstly, their
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consequences, and secondly, by the desired conception of humanity. Then it
must be asked what are to be instated as social rewards, as
reinforcements, in their place.
At first glance, Skinner's reasons seem good enough. Who, after all,
would want to punish when they could achieve the same end by reward?
However, there are genuine problems lurking Just below the philosophical
surface.
Firstly, punishment is, by definition, unpleasant. If punished, one tends
to question the Justification for the punishment. In this way legislators
are always kept on their toes. It is a very effective means of making
people think about what the rules are there for. If I am fined £1000 for
breaking a rule, I am going to give very careful thought to the Justice of
that fine. On the other hand, if I am awarded £1000, I am not as likely
to inquire into the Justice of the said award. Reward is a very effective
manner of lulling people's critical faculties to sleep.
Secondly, but deeper than this, is the question of punishment, reward and
reinforcers in general. For many people, punishment and reward are only
seen as intermediate 'helpers' on the road to autonomy. Their ideal state
Is one composed of rational, autonomous individuals who are not motivated
by external sanctions or incentives alone, but by considerations of a
morality ultimately derivable from other principles such as reason,
Justice, and caring. A total focus on punishment and reward would be seen
as a selling oneself short.
Thirdly, a criticism of operant techniques which could be levelled at both
the interpersonal and societal levels is something of a biological
classic: the extrapolation from knowledge of things in vitro to
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conclusions about things in vivo. In the typical instance, the biologist
studies an organ or bit of tissue from a living body, isolated in an
experimental situation dictated by the chosen problem, and observes and
reports on just this occurrence. The unspoken premise is that the organ
functions in this way when existing and functioning in conjunction with
the other bodily organs. Now much of Skinner's work, and behavioural
experimentation in general, resembles the biologist's problem very
closely. To what extent is Skinner justified in making extrapolations to
the societal level when there can be, by definition, little experimental
evidence which could exclude uncontrolled variables, and where it is a
very reasonable assumption that people could behave very differently in
large groups than they do when alone or in simple interpersonal
encounters?
A fourth question is very simple but very much to the point - who will
control the controllers? 	 If reward techniques are implemented, if
behaviour is planned and controlled in the manner Skinner envisages, who
will decide which operant techniques are to be used, and what they are to
achieve? It sounds rather like Plato's philosopher-kings are going to be
in control, but whereas Plato had a transcendent Good for his rulers to
aim at - thereby avoiding the question by asserting that the ultimate
justification for their rule was beyond them - Skinner has no such fall-
back position.	 Indeed, there is little, it seems, but a vicious
relativism. Evans(28) quotes Skinner as saying that:
"...the Nazis made good use of the social sciences, even though
they had driven out most of the good people. It was 'good' from
their point of view, of course; dangerous from ours."
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Again, Skinner says(29):
"—if despotic rule is bad, immoral, or unethical, then it is
the sign of a bad culture, and another kind of culture will
be more likely to survive."
If to this relativism is added Skinner's claim that responsibility for
actions becomes an outmoded term, on what basis do they select?
Skinner's ultimate value - and answer - appears to be the survival of the
culture. But this does not dispose of the relativism problem; it simply
restates it, and it does not give a clear idea of what criteria the
controllers should select.
Look again at Skinner's description(30) of what telling the truth amounts
to:
"—you ought to tell the truth is a value Judgement to the extent
that it refers to reinforcing contingencies—the value is to be
found in the social contingencies maintained for the purposes of
control. It is an ethical or moral Judgment in the sense that
ethos and mores refer to the customary practices of a group."
One might well ask what one is to make of the behaviour of Zarathrustra,
Buddha, Socrates, Jesus, Muhammad, who all in some degree broke with the
society in which they had been born and brought up, and proclaimed that
a society's established beliefs and practices do not have an absolute
claim on the behaviour of the individual, and, in some cases, were
prepared to die for their beliefs. Are they, and the countless millions
who have followed their message, all wrong?
However, there is another level at which Skinner attempts to answer this
question of who controls the controllers. He argues that it is the
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'environment' which will determine the controllers' choice Just like
everyone else's. By this, it seems that Skinner means that in his utopia
the ethos will be such that the mechanisms of reward reinforcement will
be so inbuilt that the controllers will simply 'keep the ball rolling'.
But this is fundamentally unconvincing, and for three reasons.
Firstly, because there are real linguistic difficulties as to Just what
'environment' means in this context - it seems to act like an escape
clause which communicates very little. Secondly, the mechanics of this
control by the environment are never spelt out in any detail, and so one
Is left with the suspicion that Skinner has little idea of how it would
work in practice. And thirdly, it is very unclear Just how one would make
the transition from the present sort of society, the sort of members it
has, to his utopia. Would not the transition from the one to the other
face exactly the same problems as Marxism did in Russia, with the old
guard preventing and perverting the introduction of the new?
Operant techniques have many things in common with the hidden curriculum
of the school.	 Both are seen at their most ethical when they are
consciously adopted at the personal and social levels, because in this
way, in both their cases, human beings can personally control their
effects upon themselves, rather than the techniques controlling them. At
the conscious level, the hidden curriculum ceases to be a hidden
curriculum, and becomes part of the overt planning of the school, whilst
operant conditioning radically changes its form and effect. Platt(31)
could not, then, be more wrong when he argues that Skinner's emphasis on
positive reinforcement could be seen as a modern formulation of the
principle of Jesus:
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"—love your enemies, and do good to those who despitefully
use you. It is the safest and surest way of changing or
converting the behaviour of enemies or masters, far more
effectively than hostility, which only reinforces their old
behaviour."
Platt, like Skinner, is still stuck to the concept of control as the
primary means of interaction between human beings.	 This is the
fundamental weakness and danger of the approach at the moral level, and
why, unless it is used in the restricted manner noted above, for those
people who are incapable of controlling their own behaviour so that they
are not a danger to others or to themselves, or limited in the 'normal'
case to conscious self-application, it would be ethically harmful. It
must be only a small part of the answer to the question of how moral
education should be conducted.
This is the fundamental weakness at the moral level, but there is also a
fundamental weakness at the epistemological level as well, which has been
hinted at throughout this chapter, but which may now be drawn out more
clearly. This criticism of behaviourist theories goes back as far as the
criticisms of the empiricism of Hume, and in effect argues that the
thoroughgoing empiricist can only accept as relevant to his explanation
of human behaviour, observable stimuli and observable behaviour. Yet, as
has been noted above in the work of Chomsky and Gregory, the human being
selects the stimuli he regards as relevant to himself. And further, this
is not necessarily a static, biological phenomenon.
	 It can be	 a
transient personal and cultural phenomenon as well. One of the defining
characteristics of human beings is that they are capable of creating
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their own conceptual schemes, of determining for themselves what count as
important or unimportant aspects of the environment. Thus, if those
self-defining, self-creating, and self-selecting abilities, which come
prior to any observable phenomena, are not included within a
psychological account of the human, then not even a half-adequate account
of the human being is provided.
This links directly in with another ethical criticism which applies not
only to behaviourism, but to other all-inclusive explanatory dogmas like
Freudianism and Marxism as well. This is that whether true or not, ideas
which gain widespread currency tend to create the conditions in which
they become fact. Thus, they filter down through society, their terms
become part of the everyday language, and the everyday consciousness of
the society, and people begin to use the theoretical framework both to
interpret and organise their ideas and experiences(32). They come to
live out the theories. Whether true or not, people become examples of the
theory. Thus the Marxist framework is used to interpret relations within
the society, and people come to believe and act in ways consonant with
the conflict view. Similarly, the psychiatric patient accepts the notion
of analysis, and the location of causality of aberrant behaviour in early
repressed childhood experiences, and genuinely feels better when the
ritual of psychoanalysis is gone through. In much the same way, the
individual comes to believe in the systematised efficacy of operant
conditioning - and the pointlessness of any attempt to break out into a
truly individual pattern of behaviour. Whether these theories are true,
partially true, or simply exotic red herrings is beside the point. Human
beings have an enormous capacity for creating themselves - this is the
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essence of culture. The danger of behaviourism is that man will create
himself in this image through belief in its truth,and will thus terribly
impoverish his possibilities.	 This, it would seem, is another very
Important reason for limiting its widespread application in education.
As Kelly(33) says:
"Behaviour is man's way of changing his circumstances, not
,
proof that he has submitted to them. What on earth, then, can
present day psychology be thinking about when it says that it
intends only to predict and control behaviour scientifically?
Does it intend to halt the human enterprise in its tracks?"
The conclusion must be that human choices depend upon desired ultimate
goals, and that these cannot be derived from within behaviourist
assumptions. This, of course, does not totally invalidate the operant
approach. As with individuals, so with schools and society: one must
start from a description of ultimate aims and then see to what extent the
technology of operant conditioning can be incorporated without abusing or
perverting these aims. Any description, then, of ethical human relations
is going to need more than a simple dependence on factors present in
human functioning. It is going to need choice, and the explanation of that
choice cannot be accomplished at the psychological level, though the
psychological level can help to inform it. It is a philosophical and
moral problem, bounded and informed by other disciplines, but a
philosophical and moral one nevertheless.
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CHAPTER 11 THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
The cognitive-developmental approach is something of an affront to the
behaviourist. After all, if a behaviourist can teach pigeons to play
,
ping-pong, surely he can shape young children to conserve number? Isn't
it merely a matter of devising the correct situations, focussing on the
relevant factors, eliciting and reinforcing the correct responses, and
then the job is done? The behaviourist isn't bothered that most children
entering school can't conserve number: this doesn't need a cognitive-
developmental explanation. For him, it is simply a matter of pre-school
children not being put in situations where the correct notions can
develop. With the right training, all is possible.
It is most instructive to look at the opposed view from these two schools
of thought when precisely this has been attempted. Engelman(l), for
example, attempted to teach the notion of specific gravity for the
floating and sinking of objects to preschoolers, using behaviourist
techniques, and achieved only equivocal results. His conclusion, however,
was that with more time the job could be better done: the rules could be
better designed to cover a wider variety of situations and could be
taught to elicit a higher criterion of performance. Kamii and Derman<2),
two developmental psychologists, on the other hand, argued that the
children had learned nothing more than a verbal overlay, but that deep
seated notions had not evolved. They supported this view with
observations that purported to show that when children were confronted
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with a result they did not expect, rule-bound children hesitated briefly,
searched their memory for a learned rule that might apply, and vocalised
it, whether it really made sense to them or not.
Now the problem seems to lie as much in the approaches as in the results
obtained. Kamii and Derman use concepts like 'hesitate', 'search memory',
and 'making sense' - inferential notions used in conversation all the
time, but ones not admitted, or attended to, by Engleman, who instead
concentrates on isolable factors and their reinforcement. Again,
different paradigms are in use, and the notion of incommensurability
raises its head once more.
Even the results of Greco(3) would not, one assumes, be sufficient. Greco
studied the effects of helping children work out which of three glass
beads in a revolving tube would be at a particular end of the tube after
a specified number of revolutions. He came to the conclusion that in no
case did outside help, characteristic of behaviourist approaches, speed up
the learning process. Greco says(4):
".-the failure of these methods.-shows that the discovery of
the rule could not be the product of perceptual learning.-it is
the discovery of the law which makes possible the correct use of
visual tracking."
The problem is, of course, that the behaviourist can always turn around
and suggest that modifications to Greco's approach could produce the
required improvements, or that more time spent on helping the children
would have done the same. At this interface, then, total disproval of one
theory by another seems most unlikely. Perhaps, as was argued
earlier (5), Lakatos' notion of progressive or degenerative research
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programmes(6) is the most viable approach, and to this extent, in this
context, the behaviourist appears to be the degenerative one.
This is not to say that the cognitive-developmental approach sweeps the
board. It has its fair share of problems, and these are perhaps best
illustrated by an examination of the work of its two major practitioners,
Piaget and Kohlberg.
JEAN PIAGET
It is a curious fact that of all psychologists, Piaget is probably the one
that teachers know best and use most, and yet his theory would seem to
suggest that they, the teachers, play a relatively minor role in the
child's cognitive, and hence moral, development. After all, a teacher's
work is to quite a large extent based upon the assumption that he or she,
having the knowledge and skills that the child lacks, can transmit these
to them. Yet, from a Piagetian point of view, these kinds of activities
have little to do with the child's intellectual development.
Piaget's view was that development took time and could not be hastened.
His ideas on children's moral development centred around two core ideas:
(a) that children are, for a considerable part of their early life,
'egocentric', not only in perceptual outlook, but in moral outlook
as well;
(D) that moral development is predicated upon cognitive development.
There are, of course, many other themes which Piaget discussed - all well
reviewed by Lickona(7), who, in fact, divides research into Piaget's
theory of moral development into nine dimensions - but these two core
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notions will serve the present purpose of assessing the adequacy of the
cognitive-developmental model.
In the purely cognitive domain, Piaget came to his conclusions about
egocentrism after experiments like the 'three mountains experiment' (8),
In this, a model of three mountains was utilised, each mountain being
distinguished by such things as snow on the top of one, a house on
,
another, a flag on the top of the third. The child was then seated in
some position next to the mountains, and a doll at some other, and the
child asked: what does the doll see? Rather than ask the child to
verbally describe what the doll sees, the child was asked to choose from
one of ten pictures which the doll sees, or they were given three smaller
mountains, and asked to arrange them as the doll would see them. Piaget
found that children as old as 8 or 9 could not do this, and that they
tended to pick out or build the view that they themselves saw. Piaget
takes this as evidence for egocentricity - that they are unable to place
themselves in another position because they think that everyone has their
view of things.
However, there are now a number of studies which seriously call these
conclusions into question. For example, Hughes(9) set up a similar
experiment, but with some crucial differences. Hughes used two walls
intersecting to form a cross, and two small dolls, a police doll and a
boy doll. Hughes started his experiment by introducing the child to the
dolls, placing the boy doll in different areas between the intersecting
walls, and asking if the police doll could see the boy doll in each of
these areas, so as to familiarise the child with the set up. After this,
the experiment began, and the task was made more complicated by
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introducing another policeman doll. The child was asked to hide the boy
doll from both policemen, which in effect meant taking into account two
different points of view. The task was repeated three times, and the
results were quite dramatic: when 30 children of between 33 and 5 years
were given the task, 90% of their responses were correct, a finding
totally at variance with Piaget's findings and predictions.
,
Foorman, Leiber and Fernie(10), in a review of perceptual role-taking
studies, suggest that the 'three mountains' task has three major
difficulties within it, which mask younger children's competencies. These
are:
(a)that children may not fully understand what is expected of them
in a rather contrived situation;
(b)that children have difficulty with responses which require the
transposition of a three dimensional model to a two dimensional
picture; and
(c)that the mountains may have been too similar to allow children to
discriminate cues for visualising another perspective.
In a similar vein, Hughes and Donaldson(11) came to the conclusion that
the crucial difference lay in the fact that the child could make sense of
what they were asked to do in the 'hiding from the policeman' task,
whilst they couldn't do this with the 'three mountains' task. This, they
believed, was because the child knew what it was to hide from somebody -
it was part of their experience, and they could become involved in it.
The mountain problem, on the other hand, was artificial, abstract, and
totally outside of the child's experience. It provoked no enthusiasm, and
could not be understood.
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Something further than this should be noted, however, and this is that
the 'policeman' task is a naturally interactive game-like context, in a
way in which the 'three mountain' task is not. This may go some way to
answering Linaza's(12) question regarding Piaget's conception of
children's abilities at games:
"If Piaget's account is correct, how could children play
together a game where each player has a different interpretation
of its rules?"
On the above account, this egocentric play need not occur: non-
egocentrism seems a natural cognitive and social process. It also raises
the very interesting possibility that competition - so long a 'bogey'
word in morally-inclined sport education circles - may, through the need
to outguess an opponent, be part and parcel of coming to understand
another's perspective. It raises the intriguing possibility that
competition, properly handled, may be an extremely important positive
factor in the child's moral growth.
This ability to take on another's perspective is seen in social as well
as play contexts. Thus Hueller(13) found that 3, 4, and 5 year olds were
more verbally explicit when communicating to a person who could not see,
compared to one who could. Similarly, Shatz and Gelman(14) found a
difference in the way in which 4 year olds speak to 2 year olds, and to
adults, that was appropriate to the differential characteristics of the
listeners. Foorman et al.(15) hit the nail on the head when they say:
".-if researchers lighten task demands, children appear less
egocentric."
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Now this is precisely what Borke(16) did when she identified one of the
main problems for children of 3-3% years as verbal responding. She
hypothesised that an experiment where children were asked to do no more
than make a behavioural response would be much easier to them, and would
facilitate responses which might be impeded by, for such children,
complex cognitive processes. Thus Borke asked children from 3-8 years
to select faces of chiLdren exhibiting happy, sad, afraid, or angry
expressions, and to match them with the sorts of feelings which the main
characters in short stories she read might feel, thus requiring an
empathic move on their part, but requiring only a behavioural response.
Her results showed that there was a developmental progression, but not as
normally conceived. Children of 3-3% years easily identified the 'happy'
faces correctly, but needed to be slightly older to correctly identify
'sad' and 'angry', and a little bit older still, for the 'afraid' faces.
Borke argues that the child must initially discriminate between pleasant
and unpleasant experiences, and that this is why 'happy' is the first face
to be empathically understood - it stands for all the 'pleasant'
experiences. However, 'sad', 'afraid' and 'angry' are all sub-categories of
the initial experience of 'unpleasant', she argues, with 'afraid' normally
being the last a child experiences. Her reasoning for the differential
time recognition of the sub-categories by the children could be tested
by, for example, performing the experiment on children from very secure
homes, and those classed as 'at risk'. However, the main result stands,
and Borke's comment(17) is most apposite:
"The task used to measure interpersonal perception, especially
with very young children, significantly influences the child's
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ability to communicate this awareness of other people's feelings."
What Borke's experiment also shows, crucially, is that the young child can
recognise other people's emotional states - that is, he or she can
empathise to them, and therefore is not totally egocentric. This is
shown by the fact that the child has to listen to and understand what
the main character is going through, and then correctly identify this
feeling with a behavioural response (pointing to the happy or sad face).
Of course, it is one thing to empathise: it is another to do something
about it. Johnson(18) has taken this process even further back in the
child's life to 18-24 months, and has shown that reactivity to another
person's distress, and doing something about it, is positively correlated
with the development in the very young child of recognition of the self.
In his experiment, Johnson used the taking away of a doll from either the
mother or the stranger in the laboratory, and consequent feigned distress
by them, and also naturalistic observations in the child's home, to
determine the child's reactivity to distress in others. His results
showed that:
(a)children of this age respond to others in a positive manner,
either by helping directly (giving them their doll), or getting
someone to help (pulling someone's clothes and indicating);
(b)this helping behaviour is positively correlated with development
of the recognition of the self.
Perhaps the most Important point to be noted in the analysis so far is
the manner in which empathic understanding has been contrasted with
egocentrically dominated thought. In the next chapter, it will be
suggested that empathy is perhaps the most fundamental motive force in
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the child's earliest moral ventures, indicating a more affective side to
moral growth, enriching and supplementing the cognitively biased models
of Piaget and Kohlberg.
Eisenberg(19), further, argues that affect, in general, influences the
performance of behaviour in three ways:
(a) it will influence what and how an individual processes incoming
information;
(b) it will influence whether the individual uses role-taking skills
and other types of social cognition with another;
(c) it will influence whether the individual responds to another's
needs in a particular situation.
Affect is a relatively neglected topic when considered in relation to the
development of moral behaviour, specifically altruistic or prosocial. And
yet it will be argued that it is affect which can provide the explanation
for the gap between moral reasoning and moral behaviour.
Part of the neglect is explained by the second of the two core ideas
mentioned above - that moral development is predicated upon cognitive
development. It will be shown shortly that there can be little doubt
that cognitive development is a necessary condition for more complex,
sophisticated moral thought. That it has a vital part to play in the
earliest stages of the child's moral growth will also be shown to be
true. What is, however, extremely problematical is the sometimes implicit
belief in cognitive developmental writings (if only from the fact that
they do not dwell on other factors too often) that cognitive development
is a sufficient condition. The findings by researchers like Mischel and
Mischel(20) give the lie to this.
	 In a review of the literature on
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consistency between moral reasoning and actual behaviour, they come to
the conclusion that the predictive validity from moral reasoning does not
appear to be more than modest at best. Overall, they conclude, knowledge
of an individual's moral reasoning would not allow one to predict more
than about 10% of the variance in their moral behaviour.
If there is a poor relationship between reasoning and behaviour, then
,
that between reasoning and Judgement is not much better. Schlaefli, Rest,
and Thoma(21) analysed 55 studies which used the 'Defining Issues Test'
as a measure of moral Judgement. These studies were of varying quality,
age groups, methods, and time, but Schlaefli et al, concluded:
(a)that moral education using dilemma situations produced increased
moral Judgements at a small though significant order;
(b)that moral education using personality enhancement did the same
to a slightly lesser degree;
(c)that moral education using academic studies had very little
effect.
The problem remained: why was there so little effect? Schlaefli et al.
concluded that reasoning may affect Judgements which may affect
behaviour, but particularly between Judgement and behaviour there are
other processes which cognitive-developmentalists have not taken into
account. These would include factors like personality characteristics and
motivation. The writers therefore suggest that a more complex view of
what is involved in moral behaviour is required, and this is indeed what
this section is arguing for.
But how, one may ask, could cognitive-developmental stage theories fail
to integrate the role of affect in their models? How could they fail to
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recognise its impossibilities and importance at an early age? It has
already been suggested, by looking at the work of people like Donaldson
and Hughes(22), and Borke(23), that part of the problem may have lain in
the sheer quality of the experimental situation - that the task demand in
Piaget's case was simply too heavy for the child, and that lightening
task loads unmasks children's early competencies.
Another factor may be the very methodology used. Look, for example, at
the approach that Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow(24) used. They trained
mothers to observe the reactions of their children (aged 10-29 months)
to others' emotions of distress, people such as the mother or an
investigator, in naturalistic settings, rather than their devising
situations in a laboratory which would be strange and possibly confusing
to the child. Bias from mothers' observations was not present - on the
occasions when the mother, along with two independent investigators, made
observations of children's responses to the same simulated events,
reliability figures were just as high between mothers and investigators
as they were between the two investigators.
Now the really interesting thing from the present point of view is that
the relationship between mother and child did make a difference to the
child's behaviour. As they said(25):
"...prosocial interventions toward mother were significantly
more frequent than those directed towards the investigator."
And they continue:
"If the study had used a relative stranger as the victim, the
conclusion would have been that children between the ages of 1
and 2 are not capable of prosocial behaviour."
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In other words, the methodology used significantly affected the results
obtained. There are obvious parallels here with the point made by
Mischel and Mischel(26), with regard to Kohlberg's theory, that his
results do not allow one to separate the type of reasoning the individual
prefers from the one he is capable of. In this case, the behaviour
preferred by the child is determined by the situation and the
participants - part of the experimental design. It is more than likely
that the previous lack of naturalistic observations has given a false
impression of very young children's non-egocentric motivations.
PIAGET AND KOHLBERG
The theories of Piaget and Kohlberg are usually linked quite closely in
peoples' minds, especially as Kohlberg admits his inspiration and
gratitude to Piaget<27). For example, both believe in the cognitive
Involvement in moral development through structural underpinning, and
both believe in the notions of internal cognitive conflict and active
participation as providing the motivation for change. There are,
similarly, philosophical as well as psychological links - both belong to
the Kantian formalist tradition, both acknowledge the need to be able to
take the role of the other, which implies the notion of
universalisability. They do, indeed, have a lot in common.
But there are differences as well, and they are significant differences.
For example, according to Piaget, almost all people reach moral maturity
by about 12 years of age. According to Kohlberg, however, only a very
few ever reach it, and then certainly not until their very late teens at
the earliest. A second difference is that Kohlberg's stages 3 and 4 could
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be said to reverse the sequence of development outlined by Piaget, that
is, from an authority to a peer orientation. A third difference is that
an essential part of Piaget's account of heteronomy is the notion of
sacred, unanalysable and unquestionable rightness; and yet this hardly
seems to figure at all in Kohlberg's account.
The simple point is that while there are similarities, there are quite
,
profound differences, and it would be very wide of the mark to say that
Kohlberg's theory was a mere continuation of Piaget's.
KOHLBERG
Kohlberg's name has appeared at fairly regular intervals throughout this
thesis, and for good reason. His has been, for the last twenty years, the
most comprehensive attempt to marry philosophical and psychological
thought in a manner which stresses the reasonableness and individuality
of morality. His theory of invariant, progressively more integrative
stages of moral development, which are culturally universalisable in form
if not in content, along with his belief in the possible connections
between moral psychological findings and normative philosophical beliefs,
is now so famous that any account which excludes it from consideration
must be deficient. It has, indeed, come under increasingly heavy critical
fire over the last few years, and these criticisms will be reviewed
shortly. However, it may be as well at this moment to stress some of the
probable sufficiencies of the theory, as there can be a tendency to throw
the baby out with bathwater.
Thus there seems little doubt that, in the broadest sense, cognitive
abilities do have a vital role to play in moral development. One of
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these cognitive abilities which Kohlberg cites is that of role-taking, and
Perry and Krebs(28) have found that mentally retarded adolescents scored
lower on role-taking ability and moral development than adolescents
matched for chronological age, clearly indicating that intelligence is
Implicated in moral development. However, they also found that such
mentally retarded adolescents did not differ from younger children of
-
their same mental age on role-taking abilities, but tended to score lower
in moral development, suggesting that role-taking ability is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for moral development. This finding clearly
agrees with that of Selman(29) who found that for 8-10 year olds,
Improvements in a child's moral judgements do not occur until there is an
Improvement in role taking. This improvement in role taking, however,
can occur without a corresponding improvement in moral judgement, thus
indicating again that role-taking is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for an improvement in moral reasoning.
A recent review by Israely(30) reports a finding much like that of Perry
and Krebs(31), that normal and retarded children of the same
chronological age, but with different mental ages, have significantly
different moral judgement scores, clearly indicating again that IQ has a
vital part to play in the process of moral development.
Significantly, Israely also goes on to report that moral judgement scores
In retarded children increase with chronological age, even when mental
age is held constant - clearly implying that intelligence and rationality
cannot be the whole story.
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In this respect, the findings of Severy and Davis(32) are also highly
apposite. They investigated the helping behaviour of normal and retarded
children from 3 to 10 years, testing along two dimensions;
(a) attempted help v. successful help;
(0) physical 'task' help v, psychological help.
They found that, with retarded children, both dimensions increased with
age, but that successful and psychological helping remained relatively
low, indicating to them that there are again, cognitive factors in the
process. However, and perhaps surprisingly, normals did not improve on
either dimension, indicating to Severy and Davis that these 'normal'
children had entered a different social milieu from the older retarded
children - one where competition, independence and achievement was the
norm, whilst the retarded children had tended to remain within a more
co-operative, dependent situation.
What these findings suggest is that, negatively from a Kohlbergian point
of view, there are other factors besides intelligence amd cognitive
maturation implicated in moral development, but, positively, that there is
a need at higher, more sophisticated levels of moral judgement and action,
for a certain base-level mental age, which retarded children do not
normally acquire. What Kohlberg and other cognitive-developmentalists
seem to miss or exclude is the interactional effect of higher and lower
processes, concentrating their efforts on the higher, and thereby
distorting the true picture. Of course, the effect works the other way
round as well - higher cognitive processes can affect the non-cognitive
ones, and this has been a deficiency in other schools of thought.
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On this interactional effect, take, for example, the process of modelling.
The effects of modelling are well documented and fairly startling for the
unacquainted. In the classic experiment, mentioned in the last chapter,
by Bandura and Macdonald (33), they found that adult modelling was as
influential in inducing change in children's behaviour as was modelling
and reward together, with reward conditioning on its own trailing well
,
behind. Further, modelling on its own could reverse children's moral
orientations to earlier, supposedly cognitively less satisfactory levels.
In a later experiment, Bandura and Jeffery(34) investigated the effect of
symbolic coding and rehearsal on the retention of complex modelling, and
found that coding through language is a critical determinant of the
retention of these more complex modelling cues. Before language
acquisition, it seems, modelling cannot be encoded, and its more complex
Instances will be rapidly forgotten. Thus, in this instance, complex
cognitive functioning seems a prerequisite.
This dependence on verbal complexity is further seen in the work of
Breznitz and Kugelmass(35) who found that the child's increasing capacity
for verbal complexity is a crucial determinant of age-related changes in
the ability to utilise the principle of intentionality in the appraisal of
other people's conduct.
As a final example of the implication of the higher cognitive processes
in the development of morality within the individual, the work of
Salzstein(36) is highly interesting. In a review of the literature on
nurturance techniques, he comes to the conclusion that different types of
disciplinary techniques used by parents produce different types of moral
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behaviour by their children.
	 He believes that three forms can be
perceived:
Firstly, the use of power-assertive techniques is normally associated
with a morality typified by attention to the fear of punishment.
Secondly, the use of love-withdrawal techniques is associated with
'conformist morality' - a morality which is internalised, but is rigid and
unthinking.
Lastly, the use of inductive techniques, like reasoning and explaining the
consequences of actions upon other people, leads to a 'humanist morality',
which is characterised again by an internalisation of norms, but this
time with flexibility and the application of reason to specific
situations.
What Salzstein is in effect saying, then, is that nurturance techniques
which rely upon the use of higher cognitive functions are likely to
produce a morality characterised by factors normally seen as 'better' -
flexibility, rationality, and autonomy. What also seems to be implied is
that perhaps the focus of attention in the moral education of very young
children should be changed from the children themselves, to their
mothers. If the mothers were educated to understand the consequences of
the different types of nurturance techniques available to them, the
process could be begun long before the children reached school.
It would seem, then, that cognition, in one form or another, does
undoubtedly play an important, and sometimes vital, role in moral
development. However, it has already been suggested that this importance
may be limited in the case of the early development of altruism, and that
the role of non-cognitive factors in this process may be much more
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important than normally realised. It is instructive, in this context, to
look at the differing results of Bar-Tal, Raviv, and Leiser(37), and
Eisenberg(38), to see how, once again, methodological procedures may have
an important role to play in this investigation. Thus, Bar-Tal et al,
argued that whilst children of all ages will indulge in helping
behaviours, the reasons behind this will differ with age - that the
'quality' of their reasoning increases with age. They theorised that there
are six developmental stages through which the child passes towards true
altruism;
(1)altruism through promise of reward and punishment;
(2)altruism through obedience to authority;
(3)altruism through recognising the needs of others;
(4)altruism through wanting to gain social approval;
(5)altruism through belief that one day they will be helped;
(6) 'true' altruism - help given voluntarily with no expectation of
personal reward.
Bar-Tal et al. set up a situation where a child was provided with the
opportunity to give to other children at level (6), then, if no giving
resulted, given the opportunity at level (5), then at level (4), and so on,
until the child eventually gave. The results showed that quality increased
with age, but that the greatest number of children in all ages gave at
levels (1) and (2). On the face of it, then, they seem to contradict the
picture of early occurring empathy and altruism so far described, and to
support the notion that altruism is essentially the possession of the
cognitive domain.
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However, Eisenberg pointed out that the experiments of Bar-Tal et al.
consist primarily of situations where children did not share until
explicitly requested to do so, and argued that it was the nature of the
experimental situation which inhibited the younger children, rather than
through any altruistic deficiency on their part. 	 In support of her
hypothesis, Eisenberg quotes the experiment by Eisenberg-Berg and
Neal (39), which explored children's reasoning about their naturally
occurring positive behaviours, rather than behaviours in contrived
situations.	 According to this data, the children most frequently
explained their •own prosocial behaviour with reference to the needs of
others and pragmatic concerns. Authority and punishment reasons
analagous to Kohlberg's and Bar-Tal's procedures were not used by any of
the children, and stereotyped justifications (it's nice to help) and
hedonistic and approval-oriented reasonings were also verbalised
infrequently.
These findings point, once more, to the importance of methodological
procedures, and the probability of altruistic and empathic abilities at
much earlier ages than the strict cognitive-developmental would suggest.
They suggest that cognition does have a vital part to play, but not on
the more simplistic developmental model. The connections between
cognition and other, notably affective, processes are more interactive and
complex than have normally been allowed for, and must, when taken into
account, radically affect the Kohlbergian hypothesis.
However, the criticism of Kohlberg cannot rest there. Indeed, there
already has been reason to criticise the theory in previous chapters of
this thesis. Thus, in Chapter I, it was seen that he has retreated from
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what he calls an 'isomorphism' thesis to a 'complementarity' thesis(40),
and in so doing, has made his theory less challenging and less
interesting. Further, he was criticised for basing his treatment of
morality as being the product of, at best, three areas of morality. These
criticisms were followed up in Chapter 5 with the criticism(41) that any
moral theory based upon Rawls' conception of justice must be flawed, for
much the same reasons.
In Chapter 7(42), it was asked whether a stage 3 person who focussed on
content was any 'worse' than, or 'inferior' to, a stage 4, 5, or 6 person
who tended to abstraction and lost sight of the individual. And in
Chapter 9(43), it was asked whether Kohlberg's theory was really as
culturally universalisable as he claims, or more the reflection of an
individualistic, competitive, western social ethic. These criticisms must
now be expanded and some more included.
To begin with, then, the findings of Bergling(44) may be noted. He
extracted two fundamental postulates from Kohlberg's theory and submitted
them to empirical testing. These two postulates he described as:
(a)The 'Sequentiality Postulate' - that Kohlberg's six stages of
moral development form an invariant sequence, or succession, in
individual development.
(b)The 'Universality Postulate' - that the invariant sequence of six
stages of moral development is universal i.e. true in all
countries and for both sexes.
Bergling found that the 'Sequentiality Postulate' was only partially
supported, with generally more progressive than regressive changes in
childhood and adolescence, but with differences due to gender, and a
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tendency to jump stages, and with more regression than progression in
adulthood and old age. However, for Bergling:
"The most fundamental implication of the present study was
the refutation of the Universality Postulate..."
due to the emphasis on societal values and cultural influences
"—stemming from religiously or philosophically grounded values
of the society..."
which were taken as evidence
".-opposing a purely cognitive-developmental interpretation
of the development of moral reasoning."(45)
This notion of the importance of the influence of societal values is only
to be expected. Any theory such as Kohlberg's which fails to take non-
cognitive interactive influences into account can hardly be adequate,
granted the importance of influences described in Chapter 9 impinging on
the individual.
Furthermore, whilst the first section of this thesis stressed the
constructionist, active and teleological nature of the individual, it also
described his or her necessarily subjective grasp of reality. Now if it
is granted that concepts are impermanent, finitist, and changeable, what
does this make of Kohlberg's 6th and highest stage, his principle of
Justice? Munsey(46> sets Kohlberg a neat little problem which highlights
his difficulties. She says:
"If moral rules are taken as constitutive rules, they would
be a set of a priori rules which could not admit of exception.
If, on the other hand, moral rules were summary rules, empirical
generalizations, they could admit of exception."
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Now Kohlberg must be unhappy with both formulations. He cannot wish to
accept the notion of constitutive rules, as this a priori philosophic
conception runs counter to the Piagetian psychological assumptions that
moral mental structures are not a priori biological innates, and would
leave him with the philosophical problem of explaining, if they were a
priori, of where they came from. (It is of interest to note here that a
psychological assumption is directly affecting the perceived tenability of
a philosophical standpoint. One might well wonder if Kohlberg has given
up his isomorphism claim after all).
However, Kohlberg cannot wish to accept the notion of summary rules
either, as they take us down the road to ethical relativity, as well as
suggesting, again counter to Piagetian assumptions, that moral mental
structures are based on inductive habits passively learned from sense
experience.
Kohlberg wishes instead to suggest that our moral values and principles
are 'constructions':
"...a process of bootstrapping or spiralling to attaining
reflective equiltbrium.."(47)
Thus moral principles are developmental, active constructions which, using
Piagetian terminology, assimilate experiences whilst accommodating them.
Kohlberg goes on to say that even stage 6 principles are of a "socially
constructive nature", rather than an individual's discovery of them
through some "infallible faculty of conscience" (48). They are necessarily
social constructions, Kohlberg goes on, because stage 6 consists of his
'moral musical chairs' and 'ideal role-taking' which involves a moral
dialogue from which such construction arises.
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Now this is a new interpretation of stage 6 by Kohlberg; most
commentators would say that Kohlberg was committed to a stage 6
discovery of moral principles through his 'moral musical chairs', that one
arrived at an objective principle of justice. To talk of 'constructions'
is surely to walk down the road to subjectivism; but if Kohlberg does
this, then, what happens to the validity of his six stages? It is
difficult to see how he can hold the two together at the same time.
This objectivism/subjectivism difference is clearly of vital importance
for the discussion of aims in moral education, for if there are moral
laws which exist, and can be discovered, and obeyed by man, but not
created and changed by him, as in some Platonic idyll, then the essential
aim is laid down and moral education becomes merely the designing of
means to a given end. It is most interesting, in this respect, to read
Trainer, for he likens such moral laws to ones "like the facts of
science" (49). The argument throughout this thesis has been that even the
facts of science do not give us this assurance. Subjectivism is part of
the definition of being human, and Trainer cannot look for objectivism in
science, any more than Kohlberg can in ethics.
A final criticism of Kohlbergian theory comes in a variety of forms, but
amounts to much the same thing - the inadequacy of justice as a
description of morality, and the inadequacy of Kohlberg's description of
justice.
Taking the latter first, Sullivan (50) traces Kohlberg's conception of
justice back to that of Rawls'(51), and asks whether such a conception
can really do the job for Kohlberg: after all, the individual in Rawls'
'original position' is autonomous, but he is also isolated, impersonal and
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egocentric. He has no conception of community, apart from that which
resolves conflicts of interests, and he has no commitment and care
because his is an impersonal, universal ethic. Sullivan argues that a
truly human ethic needs the recognition of community as something more
than:
"—made up of independent autonomous units who co-operate only
when the terms of co-operation are such as to make it further
the ends of each of the parties,.." (2)
Yet by subscribing to the Rawlsian conception of justice, Kohlberg finds
himself committed to it as well. The question, asks Sullivan, is what
happens to autonomy when it becomes separated from commitment and care:
"It is a universal ethic without a soul because it is based
on a premise of impersonality—universal moral principles
do not buy friendship and care."(53)
It is quite possible that this impersonality in the Rawlsian and
Kohlbergian conceptions of justice reasoning explains why very young
children do not appear to display Kohlberg's advanced stages. Eisenberg-
Berg(54) points out that Kohlberg's dilemmas only deal with the
prohibition-oriented domain. In his dilemmas, laws, authorities, rules,
and punishment at the impersonal institutional level are the salient
concerns. Eisenberg-Berg argues that Kohlberg's dilemmas do not tap
prosocial motives of a personal nature, and so she has constructed
dilemmas to deal with this domain, where rules and authorities are
irrelevant or minimal. Thus, instead of the classic 'Heinz' dilemma, she
has produced a dilemma like the following:
"One day a girl named Mary was going to a friend's birthday party.
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On her way she saw a girl who had fallen down and hurt her leg.
The girl asked Mary to go to her house and tell her parents so
the parents could come and take her to the doctor. But if Mary
did run and get the child's parents, she would be late for the
birthday party and miss the ice cream, cake, and all the games.
What should Mary do? Why?"
Eisenberg-Berg did find age-related developmental trends in reasoning,
but also found no invariant sequence, and the expression of empathic
prosocial reasoning occurred much earlier than on a Kohlbergian model.
It may well be that in prosocial moral reasoning, the child is able at a
very early age to help as well as to be helped, and thus gets the
necessary practice to understand and perform such behaviours. This does
not normally happen in prohibition oriented situations, where the young
child is almost invariably on the 'receiving end'.	 The findings by
Grusec(55) support this notion - she found that 4 year olds who make
frequent offers of help are those whose help is proportionately more
often accepted, and who are allowed to gain practice in helping others,
whilst children whose help is refused make few offers.
The situation bears some comparison with that of Piaget and Donaldson's
'mountain' and 'policemen' situations (56). The Kohlbergian situation may
be less approachable than the Eisenberg-Berg one for the young child,
simply because notions of laws, rules, and authority do involve a degree
of cognitive complexity which is not required for simple prosocial
behaviour. In this respect, then, Kohlberg's strength - his implication
of higher cognitive processes - is his weakness when it comes to the
understanding of simple prosocial behaviour.
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However, the problem goes further than this. If one were to ask the
average student in this area what Kohlberg's theory was concerned with,
he or she would probably reply 'stages of moral development' or some
such phrase, in effect asserting that it is to do with stage theory,
morality, and people's development in this area. It seems highly
significant in this respect that Kohlberg now describes his theory as one
concerned with stages of "moral development as justice reasoning" (57),
rather than as one concerned with stages of moral development per se.
(It is also very interesting that in 1971 Edel proposed precisely this
re-definition to Kohlberg(58)). Such a change in terminology appears to
be no accident, and could be explained in the following way. Kohlberg
began his research along strong Piagetian lines with the conviction that
thinking about moral matters was virtually identical with reasoning about
justice as fairness. As time has gone on, and as more critics have
pointed out that this is a very limited conception of morality, Kohlberg
has come to recognise the inadequacy of his earlier formulation, and has
attempted to shift his ground from purporting to talk about morality per
se, to talking about his area, justice reasoning. In so doing, he has
attempted to keep justice at the centre of the stage, but finds difficulty
In formulating an exact conception. Look, for example, at the variety of
formulations in one of his most recent works:
(i)"—special obligations of care presuppose but go beyond the
general duties of justice..." (59)
(ii)"—to imply that justice is the first virtue of a person
or of a society—is not required for establishing the
validity of our measure and theory of justice development..." (60)
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(iii)"—the acknowledgement of an orientation of care and
response usefully enlarges the moral domain,.." (61)
(iv)"...at the hypothetical sixth stage there occurs an
integration of Justice and care which forms a single moral
principle..." (62)
(v)"...we believe moral stage development is the development of
,
one morality, not of two, because moral situations and
choice always involve both issues of justice and
compassion..."(63)
It might well be argued that the reason given in the last quotation for a
single principle of morality might well be a reason for precisely the
opposite conclusion. Kohlberg rejects Gilligan's suggestion(64) that
morality really includes two moral orientations: the first, the morality
of justice as stressed by Piaget and Kohlberg; and, the second, an ethic
of care and response which is more central to understanding female moral
Judgements and actions than it is to an understanding of Judgement and
actions in males. He further rejects Frankena's claims(65) that two
distinct principles, one of care, and the other of Justice, must both be
accounted for by a moral theory. His attempt at a fusion of these two at
the highest level does not appear to be a final analysis, and it would
seem that further thought and change on this subject can be expected from
Kohlberg in the future.
The fusion looks to be unsatisfactory as Kohlberg begins from within a
school of thought and appears to be attempting to assimilate other
findings to this school, without radically affecting its own internal
structure.
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From the account given so far, a comprehensive theory of moral
development would, instead, have to include the following.
Firstly, a theory of cognitive development which showed that increased
cognitive capacity facilitated the resolution of complex moral dilemmas.
Secondly, an account of non-cognitive factors which interacted in an
impeding or facilitating way with the cognitive factors. Finally, a
theory of affective development which integrated with the first two
approaches, and which accounted for the motivation to perform altruistic
acts, thus providing the vital links between reasoning, judgement, and
action.
This will be the purpose of the last chapter of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 12 AFFECT, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
1. Problems and Definitions.
It seems that there has been a subtle change in emphasis in the research
on the psychology of moral development over the last ten years or so. A
,
cluster of concepts which previously received little attention have gained
greater and greater prominence. These concepts include role-taking,
prosocial behaviour, altruism and empathy. Of course, most or all of
these appeared on their own before this time; but the fact that they have
come together more and more as seemingly interdependent (and,
regrettably, sometimes seemingly interchangeable) concepts, has been a
change of focus.
This upsurge of interest in this area has brought with it its own
problems. The matter of seeming interchangeability between some concepts
is symptomatic of researchers in a relatively new area, who have not yet
got down to defining concepts, or have defined only after the experiments
have been performed. Take, for example, the concept of role-taking. In
the manner in which it has been utilised so far in this thesis, it is
envisaged as an essentially cognitive construct. And yet it could also
be taken in a perceptual as well as an affective sense. Indeed, in the
affective sense, it probably would be better called empathy - as has been
done so far - particularly as Krebs and Russell(1) report that where the
relationship between types of role-taking has been investigated, the
results from tests of 'affective' role-taking do not appear to relate to
tests of 'perceptual' and 'cognitive' role-taking, suggesting that empathy
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may indeed ./3
 an independent factor. Krebs and Russell's complaint is
that in most studies, this relationship between different types of role-
taking has not been investigated, and that this may have no little
connection with the fact that the findings from the 16 existing studies
on the relationship between role-taking and altruism were "woefully
inconclusive" (2) - approximately half found a positive relationship, the
other half found nothing significant, and three actually found evidence
for a negative correlation between the two measures. If distinctions and
definitions in the area are as slipshod in many cases as they argue it
is, then the inconclusiveness of results should cause little surprise.
However, the problem goes deeper than this. If the distinction between
role-taking as a cognitive phenomenon, and role-taking as an affective
quality is accepted, the implications are quite profound, for in the
former case, there is no necessary connection between it and altruism,
whilst the connection in the latter case is quite intimate.
Thus, the motivation intrinsic to role-taking as a cognitive phenomenon
is that of aiming to obtain knowledge, to gather understanding to enable
action, but the uses to which this knowledge may be put are not
necessarily altruistic. For example, the con-artist may take the role of
one of his potential victims in order to anticipate the victim's reaction
to one of his ploys: there is no altruistic content here.
Of course, role-taking may produce a cognitive state that is conducive to
altruism.	 Knowledge obtained through role-taking may provide the
individual with an entirely new perspective from which to view a
situation. Or it can produce a state of cognitive disequilibrium, which
can only be resolved by an altruistic act. It is possible that
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concentration upon this aspect of cognitive role-taking has led to the
confusion between it and the affective kind, but it is a dangerously
misleading confusion. As will be shown shortly, the empathic quality of
affective role-taking is much more closely bound up with the birth of the
altruistic motive than is its cognitive role-taking counterpart.
Of course, the concept of altruism itself is one which needs a fair
amount of scrutiny. It is no accident that much work in this area adopts
another term, "prosocial behaviour'. In so doing, it attempts to avoid
the thorny problem of whether there is such a thing as true altruistic
behaviour in the first place - by which is meant the kind of behaviour
which helps another, without in any way helping or rewarding oneself. The
trouble is, of course, that this reward does not need to be of a physical
kind - it can simply be an emotional relief at having rid oneself of an
unpleasant state of arousal at the recognition of someone else's
unpleasant situation. There appear to be at least three possible stands
to take on this issue:
(a) assert that there is a genuine difference between altruistic and
egoistic behaviour;
(b) assert that all altruistic behaviour is really egoistic behaviour
in disguise;
(c) call the whole area "prosocial behaviour" and ignore the problem.
The last option seems the least satisfying and the most dangerous. If
there is a genuine difference, then any research produced under the
blanket term "prosocial behaviour" will have failed to distinguish between
two radically different areas, and must lead to incorrect conclusions.
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The second option seems the most unpleasant, but one which many have
accepted in the past, partly because of the difficulties inherent in the
first option, and partly because of the sophisticated egoistic
explanations possible by psychoanalysis and behaviourism.
The first option is, perhaps, the most intuitively satisfying, but the
most difficult to prove. The problem lies in finding a procedure which
predicts a certain kind of behaviour for altruism which is not predicted
for egoism. A compounding problem is that the motivation for helping
someone might be a mixture of altruism and egoism, that is, an act need
not be solely or even primarily altruistic to have an altruistic
component.
How then can such a procedure be found? Batson and Coke(3) believe that
they have found one. The rationale for it stems from the fact that the
egoistically motivated person helps because of the wish to reduce
personal distress at seeing another in trouble, and would escape from the
situation if given the opportunity. Batson and Coke argue that the
altruistically motivated person, on the other hand, is not trying to
reduce personal distress, but is trying to help the other, and so the
possibility of escape from the situation should make no difference to his
or her actions. They reason that if people are put in situations where
the opportunity to escape is made progressively more easy for an
individual, then this factor will only affect the egoistically motivated
person, and have no effect on the altruistically motivated person. They
quote four experiments in support of the hypothesis that there is a
difference, but for a variety of reasons the evidence is not totally
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satisfactory or conclusive. Indeed, they themselves will go no further
than saying that:
"...the research to date convinces us of the legitimacy of
suggesting that the motivation to help evoked by empathic
emotion may be truly altruistic." (4)
It would seem, then, that further evidence must be awaited in order to
decide one way or the other.
However, even if the last option does turn out to be correct - that the
blanket term 'prosocial behaviour' will do - it would still appear that
measures used by researchers at the moment on a seemingly
interchangeable basis, purporting to assess the same kind of material,
may instead contain subtle but significant differences. Consider, for
example, a frequent measure of altruism or prosocial behaviour used in
the field at the present time - that of donating to.charity. Does it not
seem probable that the following factors may well affect the results:
(a)what kind of thing the child is asked to donate;
(b)who the donor is, and what relationship he or she is to the
recipient;
(c)who the recipient is, and what relationship he or she is to the
donor;
(d)the time period between the donor being given donations by the
experimenter, and he or she having to donate it;
(e)the degree to which the experimental situation matches the child's
own experience.
To the extent that these, and other, intervening variables are not taken
into account, so much the worse for the results and conclusions. And to
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the extent that there is a degree of idiosyncratic definition, indicative
of excursions into a new branch of the field, so the results must be
viewed with considerable caution. It hardly needs saying, then, that the
awareness of the kinds of problems which have bedevilled cognitive
developmentalists - those of assessing the correct degree of task
difficulty, of assessing the developmental level of the subject, and of
producing results in as naturalistic a setting as possible, must also be
considered as well.
The situation is a simple reflection of the fact that the area is a most
extraordinarily complex one, where issues and concepts are still much in
the formative stage. Not only must the whole person be described along a
variety of psychological dimensions, when the theories that exist at
present are simply too narrow to adequately perform the task of
description on their own. But even within one area the factors involved
are not isolable in some simple sense; they cannot be documented in any
way suggestive of their being uncontaminated by other factors.
But just as these factors should not be seen in isolation from one
another, so also should they not be seen in isolation from the person on
whom they act, and within whom they interact. These factors come to
bear upon an individual who already has certain predispositions, certain
personality traits, and a conception of him or herself which will affect
and be affected by these factors. Consider, for example, how the child's
self-concept can be affected by other peoples' attribution of
characteristics. Toner, Moore, and Emmons (5) reported that girls who
had been told that they were patient were able to delay gratification
longer than those who had not been given the label. Interestingly, the
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mechanism by which children adopt such behaviours appears to be of a
radically different nature from that of reward/punishment mechanisms.
Grusec(6), for example, reports that children who had had their sharing
attributed to their own personality characteristics, shared significantly
more than children who had had sharing attributed to external pressure
from an adult.
This finding has been supported by Smith, Gelfand, Hartmann and
Partlow(7), who followed the sharing of 7 and 8 years olds with either
praise or material reward. The children were then asked to give a reason
for why they had shared. Those children socially reinforced tended to
attribute their sharing to prosocial motives, whilst those who had been
materially rewarded said they shared in order to get a reward. These
findings seem especially significant since they appear to imply that
external reinforcements may actually hinder the internalization of moral
behaviour, and restrict such behaviour to those occasions when the child
believes reward or punishment will follow.
The effect upon the individual is seen in much broader contexts as well.
Rosenhan, Moore and Underwood(8) found that in children there is a
developmental progression in helping others, which at first sight seems
counter-intuitive: they found that as children get older, so they are less 
likely to intervene in a situation. This, however, suggested to them that
children's fears of disapproval increase as they get older, and that they
become more sensitive to the opinions of others around them - in other
words, that there is a greater awareness of their social milieu.
These findings accord well with those of Severy and Davis(9), who found
that normal children's helping behaviour did not increase with age, in
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contrast to that of retarded children's, indicating to the researchers
that the normal children had entered a more competitive, achievement-
oriented social milieu, in contrast to the retarded children, who remained
in a more nurturant, less demanding atmosphere.
The influence of the social milieu is strikingly brought out in the
experiment of Haney, Zimbardo and Banks(10) who simulated a prison
situation, and placed within it, as guards, college student volunteers
specifically selected to have exemplary backgrounds and no anti-social
tendencies. Within one week, all volunteer guards were exhibiting
extreme antisocial behaviour, indicating to the experimenters that the
'situation' produces unreasoned behaviour changes in people. Indeed, on
this basis, the findings of Kohlberg and Kramer(11), that college
students give moral reasons scorable at a lower stage than those they
gave in high school, can be seen, not as Kohlberg and Kramer believe, as
reflecting a regression from an invariant sequence, but as a response to
a changing social milieu.
As a final, and powerful, indication of the pervasiveness of the social
milieu, the findings of Heinila(12) will be quoted. He investigated the
different attitudes of sports participants of differing ages to moral
situations in	 sport.	 The samples were drawn from three different
countries - Finland, Sweden and England. There were differences between
the national samples, the English being the least 'moral'. In all samples,
however, professional sportsmen were less moral than their amateur
counterparts, clearly indicating that where sport is seen as being of
crucial financial importance, it tends to be taken less morally than when
seen as a mere pastime. From the present point of view, however,
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perhaps the most interesting finding was the developmental one - that
children tended to support the belief in the priority of team interest as
they got older, in contrast to their younger belief that general fair play
was the most important priority. Heinila drew the important conclusions
that
(a)social pressures may actually work against the development of
-
moral behaviour in children; and
(b)that how P.E. is organised in school will crucially affect the
moral development of the child in this area.
These findings, then, again point to the complex manner in which the
child's moral character is facilitated or hindered, and of the involvement
of social and institutional factors in this development.
These social and institutional factors provide the background against
which the child's development is set, and are the larger canvas on which
nurturant techniques are drawn. For just as the parents of the child
have the primary nurturant task, so, as the child's world expands, do
these larger factors come into play. These larger factors, as was
argued earlier, have a crucial role in the child's general development, but
particularly with regard to the development of general helping behaviour.
Take, in illustration of this, the experiment by Staub(13), who
investigated the effects of nurturance upon the child's response to a
person in distress. The basic situation was one in which the
experimenter played with the child in the room. The experimenter adopted
one of two guises:
(a)nurturant - warm and responding;
(b)neutral - distant but not overtly threatening.
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When the experimenter left the room on a pretext, the sounds of distress
came from an adjoining room. The results showed that guise (a) was
followed by many more helpful acts by the children than was guise (b).
Now Staub hypothesized that probably the major reason that the child
was more willing to help in situation (a), was because it 'felt good', its
affective state was such that it felt more capable of helping another.
Nurturance, then, would seem to be closely linked to the child's concept
of itself, of its feeling of well-being, and of its self-confidence. If
this is the case, it has significant implications for the kind of
environment which the child will need if moral growth- is to be sustained.
This environment must then, necessarily, be one which allows the child to
develop self-esteem and confidence through its trust in the care and love
of those around it.
There is further evidence to support this claim. Both Mischel and
Mischel(14) and Rosenham, Moore and Underwood(15), in reviews of the
literature on short-term affective states, relate that after positive
experiences, such as individuals' perceptions of their being liked, or of
their achieving something which they felt to be important, these same
individuals became much more benign towards themselves and others.
There was greater selective attention to positive information about the
self, greater noncontingent self-gratification, and greater generosity to
others.
In short-term situations, therefore, the literature suggests that people's
present affective states can greatly influence their behaviour towards
themselves and others. Is there such evidence for the long term?
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Hoffman(16) quotes the findings of Murphy(17) that the children most
concerned about other children in their group were those most popular,
emotionally secure and self-confident.
	 On an egoistic assumption of
young children's behaviour, one might well assume that it would be those
children who most need the rewards of social approval who would indulge
in such behaviour; in fact, it is just the opposite. Those less secure
and less popular, Hoffman argues, are so pre-occupied with their own self
that they have difficulty extending their empathy and interest to others.
As Hoffman says(18)'
"—that people will help others when their own needs are not
salient, indeed when they are in a state of well-being rather
than want, lends credence to the view thatan altruistic motive
system separate from the egoistic may exist within the individual."
Further support for such a belief comes from a variety of sources. Staub
and Sherk(19), for example, found that sharing behaviour in children was
negatively correlated with their need for approval i.e. children who
ranked high on need for approval were the least likely to share their
sweets with peers in a situation where no instructions had been given as
to what to do. They interpreted the findings as suggesting that children
were inhibited in any situation where 'what to do' was not immediately
obvious. This could be through their fear of disapproval, rejection or
even punishment. Whilst they do not show causal connections, but only
correlations, their findings do tend to support the hypothesis that
personal security and well-being are necessary prerequisites before
sharing or altruistic behaviour is possible.
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Again, Rosenhan, Moore and Underwood(20), in reviewing the literature on
the variables affecting people's actions in situations, came to the
conclusion that one of the major factors determining whether people would
act, was their fear of looking foolish - of acting inappropriately and
Incurring other people's disparaging looks or remarks. This is probably
linked to another factor they cite, that of ambiguity. The more puzzling
a situation, the less direction given, the less the likelihood is of there
being any action. And thia is probably linked with factors of self-
confidence and well-being - suggesting, once more, that this is an area
of linked concepts, which all affect one another.
Central to this area of concepts, it seems, is that of empathy. So far in
this chapter,	 contributory factors like role-taking, nurturance, and
social and attributional influences have been examined, and throughout,
the implication of empathic involvement has been fairly strong. But as
yet little explanation has been provided as to exactly why people should
act altruistically in the first place. Further, it has been pointed out
that cognitive-developmental theories have difficulty in explaining a
number of behaviours in this area: what prompts people to subordinate
their interests in the service of helping others; what makes them feel
bad when they harm someone; and how the principles of Justice and
fairness become activated in situations where eogoistic interests are
also present, when acting in accord with such principles would seemingly
be against their own interests.
It follows, therefore, that a comprehensive theory of moral development
requires both a principle and a motive component, a cognitive and an
affective force. Having already described in some detail the kind of
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cognitive-developmental theory required, and having outlined some of the
contributory factors impinging upon the individual's moral growth, an
affective developmental theory will now be presented to complement the
foregoing, and complete the picture.
Whilst there is still much research and confirmatory evidence to be
acquired, it seems that the theory of empathy development described by
Hoffman(21) may well provide the necessary extra perspective, for he
argues that altruistic motives develop out of a synthesis of empathic
distress and the child's increasingly sophisticated sense of the other.
He believes there are six distinct modes of empathic arousal which he
describes as:
(a)Reactive New Born Cry;
(b)Classical Conditioning;
(c)Direct Association;
(d)Mimicry;
(e)Symbolic Association;
(f)Role-Taking.
It is important to note that he does not claim that they form a stage
sequence in the sense of each one encompassing and replacing the
preceding mode, and he thereby avoids the kinds of problem which
Kohlberg's stage development sequence tends to get itself into. Instead,
he argues that which arousal mode operates in a given situation will
depend upon which cues are salient, and that empathy as a universal
response from a very early age should not be surprising, given the
diversity of arousal modes.
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The earliest - developmentally - of the arousal modes, the Reactive New
Born Cry, was found by Simner(22) in 2 to 3 day olds, and has been
replicated by Sagi and Hogffman(23), who reported that infants responded
to a distress cry in others by experiencing distress themselves. This is
obviously not a full empathic response, as it lacks any awareness of what
is happening, and, further, the concept of _person permanence does not
occur until 1-1% years(24). However, this lack of differentiation between
self and other may actually facilitate the empathic process, because as
this differentiation occurs in a gradual way, the child will be unclear as
to just who is experiencing the distress. Thus, via the second mode of
arousal, classical conditioning, the child will connect his experience of
the distress with the other child's experience, and the gradual nature of
the differentiation will allow the vital link to be forged.
Once this initial stage of differentiation of self from another is
achieved, there is still a long way to go. The child will not know what
caused the other child's distress, nor that different people need
different things to alleviate distress - hence the oft-repeated example
of the child at this stage either putting his thumb in his mouth and
sucking it, as this has comforted him in the past, or of him offering his
teddy bear to another because this, too, has made him feel better in the
past (25).
The process of self-other differentiation appears to be an invariant one,
but the degree to which the child understands what causes another's
distress, or the need for different remedies for different people's
distress, is not so invariant. Hoffman(26) argues that there are five
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ways in which socialization may affect empathy - most of them already
mentioned in this thesis.
(a)Empathic experience may be fostered by an environment which permits
children to experience many emotions, though Hoffman does point out
that there may be an 'optimal level' of experience, and above this,
emotions may be so upsetting as to be avoided or repressed.
(b)Directing attention to the internal states of others will aid
children's understanding. This has been supported by the
Salzstein(27) work on inductive methods in discipline and nurturance.
Both call attention to the pain or injury caused by a child's action,
and encourage the child to imagine how it would feel to be in the
victim's place.
(c)Role-taking will sharpen the child's cognitive sense of others'
internal states.
(1) Providing children with an environment which is warm, trusting and
affectionate, which heightens the child's self confidence and self-
esteem, should help them to be more open to the needs of others, and
less preoccupied with themelves.
(e)The use of models, acting in a prosocial way, and their verbalization
of empathic feelings, should also facilitate the process.
To this list of Hoffman's, using the findings discussed earlier, may be
added another four methods.
(f)One can ensure that the child is given the opportunity to help when
he or she asks to. Whilst the empathic response is already there,
Grusec's research quoted above(28) shows that children given the
opportunity to help, continue to do so, whilst those not given the
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opportunity, reduce the number of their offers. On the assumption
that practice makes perfect, increasing the times that the child acts
will increase his or her empathic capacity.
(10 The provision of external help to the child, to show what needs to be
done in a situation, will ensure that he or she does not refrain
from helping through feeling confused or embarrassed.
<h) Feedback on the correctness or incorrectness of these attempts to
solve the problem situation will boost their feelings of success, and
hence their confidence to help again.
(i) Finally, the facilitation as early as possible of the acquisition of
coding devices like language to extend memory capacity, and to
facilitate complex thought, and the facilitation of general increased
cognitive complexity should all be utilised.
Indeed, by late childhood or early adolescence, through this last factor,
children become aware of others as having personal identities and life
experiences beyond the immediate situation. This will lead them into the
complex areas of Judgement over helping people in a specific situation
versus long-term effects, and the possibilities of imaginative
understanding of the distress of not only individuals but groups and
races as well. It is at this level, Hoffman concludes (29), that empathy's
limitations are most apparent, and when developed cognitive capacities
come most into play. After all, whilst empathy may sensitise and make
one aware of another's plight, it cannot, on its own, decide between
competing moral claims; and even the most mature empathisers will be
biased in favour of those people with whom they share interests and
experiences. This, it seems, is a strength rather than a weakness of
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empathy theory, because it recognises its limitations, and draws on the
strengths of other areas in order to complement and strengthen its
contribution.
However, Hoffman believes that its contribution does not finish quite
there.	 So far empathy has been examined from the position of the
innocent bystander. When it is examined, Hoffman argues(30), from the
point of view of one who may have caused the other's distress, a
convincing theory of the genesis and development of guilt is discovered.
As Hoffman says(31):
"...it seems reasonable to assume, when one feels empathic
distress, that if the cues indicate that one has caused the
victim's distress, one's empathic feelings will be transformed
by the self-blame attribution into a feeling of guilt."
Now just as with the earlier empathic theory, where the child's cognitive
development blended with the modes of empathy arousal to produce the
more sophisticated empathic forms, so the same thing can be found with
guilt. Thus, for a person to feel guilty, it requires an awareness of the
harmful effects which one's behaviour might have on others. A child who
does not yet know that others have independent inner states may not feel
guilty over hurting their feelings. Very young children who have not yet
reached the stage of self-other differentiation, may even be uncertain as
to who committed the harmful act, or on whom it was committed.
Hoffman is therefore suggesting - though this awaits confirmatory
research - that there are temporal differences between types of guilt.
Thus, the simplest case would be one where the child commits a physically
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harmful act.	 This is the least demanding cognitively, because the
consequences of the act are immediately observable.
Next would come guilt over inaction or omission, and this is cognitively
more demanding because it requires the ability to imagine something which
might have happened but did not, and be aware of the consequences of that
omission.
Contemplation over a harmful act may be yet more cognitively demanding
because it requires, on top of the preceding requirements, an ability to
fuse thoughts, intentions, non-occurring actions, and consequences
together.
The list could go on - cognitive understanding of others' internal
feelings, comprehension of ongoing personality and long-term needs,
relationships of one's own position in life to that of other people's. , and
comprehension of societies' moral norms.	 All of these will go to
complicate the guilt process, again implicating the increasing need for
higher cognitive functions for the proper resolution of these problems.
But the point has been made. Hoffman's theory seems to be the needed
addition to a comprehensive theory of moral development because it
recognises its limitations and others' strengths. It also recognises the
interactive, complex nature of the entire process - of the way in which
cognitive development drastically affects the way in which affective and
non-cognitive factors work within the individual, determining the manner
in which they can be utilised. At the same time it recognises that
affective and non-cognitive factors influence the child's overall
development from the very earliest age. Together, the various processes
explain not only how an individual can form a Judgement about a
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situation, but also how it can be that he or she may come to act out that
judgement, even where it apparently would entail some kind of loss.
Conclusions.
In Section 1, a process of moral enquiry was described which was
essentially rational and cognitive in nature, and which suggested a
tolerance on our part towards the actions of others through the
perception of our own ignorance. It was suggested, however, that such an
approach could not expect to do the job on its own, for, firstly, it had
difficulty explaining how action could be taken; and, secondly, it could
not provide an adequate account of why altruistic action would be taken.
Moral education, then, was seen as much more than the perfection of a
cognitive faculty; it involves a complex interrelationship of the
affective with the cognitive capacities of the individual, in which care
and respect have as large a place to play in the curriculum as purely
cognitive facilitation.
In Section 2, five different areas of morality were described which
suggested that the genesis for moral thought and experience was extremely
diverse, and that any curriculum content, as well as any psychological
theory, which attempted to reflect the nature of morality, would have to
be as diverse as well. It suggested that whilst the genesis of moral
thought, for most people, begins with a reflection upon their own
situation and experiences, this thought spreads outward to others in this
world, as well as implicating the profound and pervasive importance of
social and institutional factors upon each individual. It suggested that
the responsibility for moral education of young people should not be laid
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Just at the door of parents and teachers, but was as deeply the
responsibility of those people who create and affect the policies, ethos,
and climate of this society at its institutional levels.
In Section 3, a review of major psychological theories in this field was
attempted, and it was suggested, following on from the earlier sections,
that any account which did not reflect the diversity of moral experience,
,
which did not implicate both cognitive and affective dimensions, would be
inadequate: for the affective without the cognitive cannot explain how
understanding and Judgement can be arrived at, whilst the cognitive
without the affective cannot explain why these Judgements should be acted
upon.
The foregoing analysis has, then, suggested that a curriculum in moral
education has a wide variety of approaches and techniques to draw from.
It can, firstly, facilitate cognitive development and provide for
conditions of optimum cognitive conflict.
Secondly, it can create and enhance children's opportunities for role-
taking.
Thirdly, it can utilise techniques of nurturance of the inductive variety.
Fourthly, it can provide an environment where children's self-confidence
and well-being is promoted and enhanced.
Fifthly, it can aid in the development of the children's empathic
capacities by all the means described above.
And lastly, it can carefully and selectively use techniques like
modelling, attribution, and conditioning.
It will be very apparent by now that these techniques are not all of
equal worth, and the interpretation in this thesis has been one which
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stresses the factors of rationality and care. Rationality avoids the
criticism of indoctrination, and fights the problem of prejudice; care
avoids the criticism of impersonality and 	 fights the problem of
alienation.	 It is only by the intelligent application of these twin
ideals that a moral education curriculum can be properly developed.
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